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This research analyzes the United States Naval Academy's (USNA)
admissions and professional development processes and their impact on the career
development of its graduates in the Unrestricted Line (URL) communities. Three
hypotheses are advanced to explain the high level of fleet performance and retention
of USNA graduates: selectivity of applicants; Navy-specific human capital
investment; and institutional favoritism. Non-linear LOGIT regression models for
the USNA Classes of 1980 through 1985 are developed to analyze the influence of
the hypothesed factors on the probability of a midshipman: (a) graduating from the
USNA, and (b) developing into a career officer.
Both the USNA's composite "whole-person" and individual selection criteria
play a significant role in the probability of graduation. Non-scholastic affective
selection criteria, and both affective military performance and Navy-specific
cognitive skill development at the USNA, are positively associated with the
development of career officers. Additionally, several key predictors of career
potential are identified. A paradigm shift in perspective from the current short-term
context to a life-cycle career context is recommended in the "whole-person"
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Education at a service academy is the first and most crucial experience
ofa professional soldier; and although attendance at a service academy
is not universalfor generals and admirals, the academies set the
standards ofbehaviorfor the whole militaryprofession. 1
A. BACKGROUND
The above observation by noted sociologist Morris Janowitz exemplifies the
traditional school of western military thought. Military and naval academies in the United
States, Europe, and Russia have throughout modern history produced the world's most
outstanding and most successful military leaders.
This thesis explores the development of service academy graduates into professional
military officers by focusing on the 152 year-old United States Naval Academy (USNA).
While the USNA differs in many respects from its sister academies at West Point, Colorado
Springs, and New London, all U.S. service academies are undergraduate four-year colleges
which, despite offering a variety of majors, prescribe a technically-oriented general course of
education in engineering, math and sciences, the humanities, as well as applicable professional
military subjects. Indeed all the academies "bear a distinct family relationship to each other
for they have a common mission, namely, to develop the qualities of character and intellect
essential to their graduates' progressive and continued development as career officers of the
1
Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier . New York: The Free Press, 1960. p. 127.
regular forces."2
While the world has changed greatly since the founding ofWest Point in 1802 And
Annapolis in 1845, the roles of the U.S. service academies have not changed greatly. Though
they now only produce a small percentage of newly commissioned officers, the ideal of the
academy as the key, if not essential, first rung in the ladder towards a successful military
career still exists.
3
While several studies have questioned the academies' relevance and affordability in
recent years of military downsizing, a recent study by Professor William R. Bowman at the
USNA looks at the cost effectiveness of the service academies with more broadly defined
career training costs and long-run economic returns, focusing on the Navy's officer corps.
Within the context of the life-cycle analysis of long-term career performance, Bowman
concludes that the USNA is the most cost-effective commissioning source of career officers.
USNA graduates consistently display higher career retention and promotion rates than their
peers from other commissioning services, making the marginal cost of producing a Navy
Captain (0-6) from the USNA significantly lower than from any other commissioning source.
(Bowman, 1995)
Further evidence as to the success ofUSNA graduates in the fleet is provided by a
Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) study of active-duty Navy
2
Little, Roger. Handbook of Military Institutions . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications,
1971. p.217
3 USNA currently commissions approximately 30 percent of the Navy's URL officers, up
from 15-18 percent during the Cold War build-up.
officers commissioned from 1972-1985. It found that the USNA graduates outperformed
officers from other accession sources in retention and fitness report scores at every career
point in almost every officer community. (Neumann and Abrahams, 1992)
This study extends these earlier studies by investigating the potential causes underlying
the observed differential in officer performance. What is it about the service academies, then-
graduates, and the training they offer that explains this difference? How can an institution
which produces only a minority ofthe military's new officers develop over half of its admirals
and generals? Building on ideas developed by Bowman and focusing specifically on the
USNA, this thesis proposes and investigates three alternative hypotheses for why the service
academies are so successful in producing the military's top leaders.
First, the U.S. service academies are among the most selective undergraduate
institutions in the country and in recent years have selected from roughly ten candidates for
one appointment to an entering class. Thus, their inputs are of a higher quality than most
American colleges and universities. This high degree of selectivity ofthe nation's "best and
brightest" 17 to 21 year old men and women ensures that academy graduates will be among
the "best and brightest" college graduates and junior military officers.
Secondly, the United States makes a substantial human capital investment in the
training, development, and education of each academy graduate. The four-year service
academy experience, which has been described as a "seminary-like" breeding ground for
officers, not only offers a high quality undergraduate education, but also four years of
military-specific professional training and military socialization. Thus, the academies' outputs
are better prepared for the challenges of a military career. This intensive military-specific
human capital investment, which is estimated to cost $150,000 per midshipman at the USNA, 4
may well explain the superior officer performance of service academy graduates.
The third hypothesis is that an institutional favoritism exists in the services which
significantly enhances the likelihood of career success for academy graduates relative to
officers commissioned from other sources. Favoritism occurs if high-ranking officers who
are service academy graduates select future generations of service academy graduates for
prestigious assignments or promotion due to their allegiances to their alma mater regardless
of their relative performance to their peers. In the case of the Navy, an elite naval aristocracy
may consciously or unconsciously be driving this bias. Over the last thirty years the USNA
has produced between 15 and 18 percent of the Navy's unrestricted line (URL) officers, yet
"USNA graduates comprise 27 percent ofthe Navy captains and 54 percent of the admirals."5
While Academy leadership point to this fact as a justification for its existence, such statistics
warrant investigation into possible institutional bias. Such favoritism could be said to exist
ifAcademy graduates were systematically promoted over equally (or more) qualified officers
from other accession sources (OCS, NROTC).
To better illustrate these three hypotheses ofnaval officer development, the following
conceptual model is proposed (Figure 1). This thesis will attempt to explain empirically the
separate effects or impact of selectivity in admissions, human capital investment in
4 Smith, Marvin. Officer Commissioning Proerams: Costs and Officer Performance .
Congressional Budget Office, 1990.
5 Larson, Charles R. Admiral, USN. "Service Academies: Critical to our Future."
Proceedings, October 1995, p. 34. Statistics represent only URL captains and admirals.
Figure 1. Introductory Model of Career
Naval Officer Development
midshipmen, and institutional favoritism on the development of career naval officers from the
USNA. Although the issues discussed in this thesis are relevant to all of the military branches,
the research focuses on the Navy.
B. OBJECTIVES
In an era of decreasing defense budgets and limited resources for officer
commissioning programs, it is essential that all services efficiently utilize existing resources
to produce the most effective officer corps at minimum cost. In order to do so, the Navy
must identify the relative contribution (or institutional impact) of alternative commissioning
sources in terms ofproducing quality officers. Additionally, in an effort to select those with
the highest potential for success, the Navy should identify predictors of individual success at
the earliest possible stage ofthe development process. Herein lie the objectives of this thesis,
which was undertaken to support the effort of Navy policy makers in making informed
decisions concerning its future officer corps. The major objective of this thesis is to examine
the fleet officer performance of the USNA's graduates. Specifically, this research attempts
to answer two questions regarding their performance:
• What is the relative strength of the aforementioned three hypotheses (Selectivity,
human capital, and institutionalfavoritism) in explaining the fleetperformance
and retention of USNA graduates?
• Do significantpredictors of officerfleetperformance exist which could enhance
the selection andperformance criteria of USNA midshipmen, and thus improve
the USNA 's ability to attract and develop individuals who are more likely to
achieve career success as a naval officer?
The thesis investigates several databases in an effort to paint a complete statistical
picture ofnaval officer development for a sub-set ofUSNA graduates serving in the Navy's
URL communities. Utilization of alternative USNA selection, performance, and Navy officer
fleet performance criteria are developed in Chapter V. Final composite measures of both
USNA success and fleet performance and retention are adopted. Once these outcome
measures are identified, the effects of the following categories of explanatory variables are
analyzed and discussed:
• personal demographics;
• pre-USNA adolescent and secondary school indicators (selectivity);
• USNA development/performance indicators (human capital);
• post-commissioning Navy experience and post-commissioning demographics.
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis is not intended to provide a comparison of all officer commissioning
sources. The thesis also does not attempt to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of each
commissioning program. Rather, this study begins to investigate the development of naval
officers using the USNA and its graduates as a case study. As such, the study offers insight
and recommendations which are specific to the United States Naval Academy. However,
some of the conclusions may also be generalized to other commissioning and training
programs.
The USNA was selected for this study because of the availability of the data and the
institution's interest in personnel research. The Dean of Admissions and Director of
Institutional Research have sponsored extensive personnel selection and performance research
by NPRDC. Additionally, the author's experience and familiarity with the institution offered
an excellent opportunity for detailed analysis.
The study focuses on the USNA Classes of 1980 through 1985. From this population,
two samples are utilized. Those candidates who were selected for appointment as USNA
midshipmen and accepted that appointment are included in the sample used to analyze
midshipman performance. Data on candidates who were selected for appointment but did not
accept the appointment were not available.
The second sample includes officers who graduated from the USNA and chose careers
in the major Navy URL communities. This sample is used to analyze fleet performance, and
includes surface warfare officers (SWO), submarine officers, navy pilots, and naval flight
officers (NFO).6 Officers commissioned from the USNA in the United States Marine Corps
and either the Navy Restricted Line, Staff Corps, or smaller URL communities are omitted
from the fleet performance data set. The major URL communities offer significant sample
sizes, as well as standardized promotion rates. Additionally, the structured career paths of
the major URL communities offer a consistent baseline for analyzing officer performance at
various career points.
In analyzing fleet performance, there is a significant potential for selection bias. This
arises because the data sets are restricted to individuals who first were admitted to the USNA
6
Officers from the smaller Navy URL communities (Special Warfare, Special Operations)
represent such a small percentage ofUSNA graduates and URL officers that they were excluded
from this data set.
through its highly competitive selection process, and secondly who completed the rigorous
four-year USNA program and were commissioned as officers. This selection bias will be
explained in greater detail in the statistical analysis.
While several alternative measures of officer performance are discussed, this study
focuses on the "career potential" of an officer as a measure ofboth individual effectiveness
(the selectivity hypothesis) and USNA effectiveness (the human capital hypothesis). Career
potential (developed further in Chapter IV) incorporates both the individual's propensity to
stay in the Navy as well as the Navy's organizational evaluation of his/her
performance/potential as measured at officer promotion boards. A potential limitation ofthe
study exists in analyzing a joint retention/promotion measure of career potential. It is possible
that individual factors may have disparate effects on retention and promotion. The models
utilized for this study will not be able to distinguish between such disparate effects.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study is organized into eight chapters and six appendices. Chapter II contains
historical and background information on the USNA, as well as qualitative analyses of the
USNA's selection and professional development processes. Chapter III reviews the pertinent
literature that relate to the area of military officer selection and development. Chapter IV
develops the theory utilized as a foundation in this study's empirical models, and explains the
research methodologies employed. Chapter V describes the contents of the several data files
that were merged for this study and used in the statistical analysis. Discussion ofthe pre-
USNA and USNA background variables employed in the analysis is also presented in this
chapter. Chapter VI presents the empirical results of analysis ofUSNA performance, while
Chapter VTI presents the analysis of fleet performance. Chapter VTII summarizes conclusions
from the research and offers both policy recommendations, and recommendations for further
research.
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H. UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
While service academies throughout modern history have provided their countries
with the bulk of the career officer corps, many different educational philosophies exist.
Western service academies evolved primarily from the classical Spartan and Athenian models.
In his authoritative tome on the evolution of the American service academies, John Lovell
contends that the concept ofwhat a service academy should be incorporates both the Spartan
ideals of the noble warrior and the Athenian ideals of culture and learning. (Lovell, 1979)
While the USNA manages this delicate balance between Athens and Sparta, traditional
American naval education also attempts to embody the words of the founder of the American
Navy, John Paul Jones:
It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable
mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a great deal more. He should
be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious
courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor. 7
Beyond a well-rounded education and technical skills, Janowitz hypothesized that the
academies must prepare cadets and midshipmen for the particular style of life of military
existence and indoctrinate them in the importance of heroic leadership. (Janowitz, 1960)
None of these are easy tasks, but Lovell' s, John Paul Jones' and Janowitz' theories for
7
Jones, John Paul, "Qualifications of the Naval Officer" from a composite letter of
Jones as compiled by Augustus C. Buell, Reef Points. The Annual Handbook ofthe Brigade of
Midshipmen (Annapolis: United States Naval Academy, 1987).
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developing officers are still rather simple in the face of today's growing military complexity:
The day is long past when every line officer could be expected to embody all
the qualifications and specialties desired in a career... Rather, (service
academies) undertake to produce line officers who collectively possess the
wide range ofknowledge and capabilities demanded of our modern military. 8
This chapter examines closely the 152 year-old United States Naval Academy at
Annapolis, focusing especially on the midshipman selection and professional development
processes. Qualitative analysis ofthese processes will provide background for help the reader
to understand this study's selectivity and human capital hypotheses of naval officer
development. Due to their proven success in the past, little attention is paid to the quality or
content of their selection processes or professional development programs:
Here we have the managers, technical experts, and leaders of the world's
conventional forces, professionals in violence, who hold the ultimate key to
the success or failure of a nation's defense, and ... no one seems to be much
concerned with how they're picked or how they're trained. 9
A. HISTORY
The history ofthe United States Naval Academy extends almost as far as back as the
8 1972-1973 U.S. Naval Academy Catalog, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Academy, 1972);
quoted in Lovell, 7.
9
Eitelberg, Mark J., Laurence, Janice H., and Brown Diane C, "Becoming Brass: Issues
in the Testing, Recruiting, and Selection of American Military Officers." in Test Policy for
Defense
.
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), p. 85. This reference offers an extensive
review of the demographic background, testing and selection, training and education, and career
patterns of American military officers.
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U.S. itself, when President John Adams made his first recommendation to Congress for the
founding of a naval school to serve as the foundation of a scientific and accomplished officers
corps. However, opposition to the founding of an institution similar to the Military Academy
at West Point was strong at this time. So, until the establishment of the USNA, midshipmen
were educated by a school master, one of whom was embarked on every 75-gun frigate.
Progress was made when, in 1839, a Naval School was established at the Philadelphia Naval
Asylum along with other small naval schools in Boston, New York City, and Norfolk, VA.
The course of instruction was to last one year and be mainly a means for the midshipmen to
pass their Commissioning exam. (USNA Office of Public Affairs, 1996)
This concept came under scrutiny in 1842 after a midshipman-lead mutiny onboard
the American Brig Somers. Following this incident, Secretary ofthe Navy George Bancroft
decided to stop recruiting officers from miscellaneous ranks and teenage naval apprentice
volunteers and instead to train an elite officer corps at a supervised academy. Through his
efforts and without Congressional funding, the Naval School was established on October 10,
1845, with a class of fifty midshipmen and seven professors at a 10-acre Army post named
Fort Severn in Annapolis, Maryland. The curriculum included mathematics and navigation,
gunnery and steam, chemistry, English, natural philosophy, and French. Essentially, this
Naval School was to serve as a trade school for future officers of the navy and maritime
services. (USNA Office of Public Affairs, 1996)
In 1850 the school officially became the United States Naval Academy and adopted
a new curriculum requiring midshipmen to study at Annapolis for four years and to train
13
aboard ships each summer. That format is the basis of a far more advanced and sophisticated
curriculum at the USNA today. As the U.S. Navy grew over the years, the USNA expanded
in campus size to 338 acres and brigade size to over 4000. Congress authorized the USNA
to begin awarding bachelor of science degrees in 1933. (USNA Office of Public Affairs,
1996)
In the post-World War II period, the Holloway Board ofNaval Education, as well as
the DoD Service Academy Board, clarified the USNA's purpose—to serve as the bedrock of
naval education and to produce the bulk of career naval line officers. Other commissioning
sources, most notably the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), were permanently
instituted to augment this cadre of officers, man the reserve naval force, and commission the
speciality officers required of a larger career standing force. The ROTC was introduced due
to capacity limitations at the service academies to complement the career officer corps with
highly trained and educated young officers from the nation's leading colleges and universities.
OCS would also eventually become institutionalized to serve to as an additional supply of
college graduates on an as-needed basis. Meanwhile, the USNA would continue to
"represent the ultimate in professional and personal standards, and that it and its graduates
would be a tremendous binding force in the creation or a solidarity of loyalty and ideals of
service in the Navy as a whole." 10
The 1950 Service Academy Board built on the Holloway Plan to standardize the
officer education system within the Department of Defense in the post Word War II
10 Board ofNaval Education, (Washington, DC: Department of Navy, 1945), 7.
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environment, reaffirming that the mission ofthe service academies is dictated by the qualities,
abilities and attributes essential in a career officer. (Service Academy Board, 1950) In short,
the so-called Steams-Eisenhower board reported that the service academies should provide
the following:
• Moral qualities required for leadership
• High degree of mental alertness
• Physical attributes of health, stamina and endurance
• Background of knowledge comparable to that possessed by graduates of leading
universities
• Theoretical instruction supplemented with practical experience
• Motivation for a lifetime career as an officer of the armed forces
Though no longer able to serve as the sole breeding ground for career officers, the
USNA and the other service academies were seen by the Service Academy Board as still
unique among colleges in securing an early devotion to a military career. The report further
stated that it would be "unlikely that the excellence achieved in the ROTC program could be
maintained without (the service academies as) this bench mark of comparison." 11
The 1960's was a period of academic revolution at the USNA during which time the
needs ofthe new nuclear navy led to an increased emphasis on technical related subjects, as
well a concurrent emphasis on the intellectual growth of military leaders. Admiral Hyman
11 Service Academy Board, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1950), 21.
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Rickover, the father of the nuclear navy, first brought this issue to a head with his cries for
educational reform at the U.S. Naval Academy. Due greatly to his political influence and the
need to man the Navy's new nuclear-powered ships and submarines, the Naval Academy
adopted in the late 1960's a solid core curriculum of engineering, science, and professional
courses, along with a broad majors program, a wide variety of elective courses, plus advanced
study and research opportunities. The new curricula was to serve as a replacement for the
fixed naval science curriculum taken by all midshipmen. The Air Force and Army similarly
followed suit to varying degrees, but all greatly emphasizing engineering and sciences in their
core curricula. (Lovell, 1979)
"The development of the Naval Academy has reflected the history of this country.
As America has changed culturally and technologically so has the Naval Academy." 12 First,
from a cultural perspective, the USNA's first black midshipman graduated in 1949, and in
1976, the USNA became a coeducational institution as Congress first authorized the
admission ofwomen to all service academies. Today minorities comprise almost 20 percent
of entering plebes or freshmen, while women comprise about 16 percent, and all midshipmen
pursue the same academic and professional training. And in just a few decades, the Navy
moved from a fleet of sail and steam-powered ships to a high-tech fleet with nuclear-powered
submarines and surface ships and supersonic aircraft. Technologically, the USNA has
changed with the Navy, giving midshipmen the state-of-the-art academic and professional
12
U.S. Naval Academy 1995-96 Catalog, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Academy. 1995),
25.
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training they need to be effective naval officers.
B. ORGANIZATION
The USNA's 600-member faculty is composed ofan equal number of civilian scholars
and experienced military officers. The civilian professors give the academic program
continuity and a foundation of scholarship and teaching experience, and the officers bring
fresh experiences and ideas from operational and staff assignments in the Navy and Marine
Corps. 13 The joint military and civilian faculty and staff serve under the leadership of the
Superintendent, an active-duty Navy flag officer.
1. Military Organization
The military staffofthe Naval Academy serve in various academic and non-academic
positions, but their primary role is in the Office of the Commandant and the Division of
Professional Development. Additional military staff serve in support roles ranging from the
Office of Admissions and Candidate Guidance to the Supply Department.
The Office of the Commandant is responsible for the activities of the 4000-plus
member Brigade ofMidshipmen. The Brigade is divided into two regiments, 6 battalions, and
13 USNA is unique among U.S. service academies in its 50-50 split between civilian and
military faculty. USMA and USAFA faculty are estimated at 1/3 civilian and 2/3 military. This
differential is due to the Navy's extensive operational sea duty requirements for its officer corps,
thereby not allowing for top quality officers to dedicate substantial portions of their careers to
teaching. The Army and Air Force place greater emphasis on the role of teaching in the careers of
their officers, and their faculties include "permanent" military faculty members. (Lovell, 1979) A
new program under review at the USNA would bring in military faculty with Ph.D.'s as
permanent faculty.
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thirty companies, all living, eating, and breathing within the massive midshipman dormitory,
Bancroft Hall. Each Battalion and Company is supervised by an active duty military officer
(0-5 Battalion Officer and 0-3 or 0-4 Company Officer), and each company is served by a
senior enlisted non-commissioned officer (NCO) from the Navy or Marine Corps.
Additionally, each company ofapproximately 120 midshipmen, comprised of male and female
midshipmen from all four classes, is broken down into three platoons with three squads each.
The daily activities ofthe Brigade are lead by midshipmen from the first class (seniors), who
serve in roles ranging from Brigade Commander to Squad Leader.
The Division ofProfessional Development (PRODEV) is made up of the departments
of Leadership, Law, and Ethics, Professional Programs, and Seamanship and Navigation.
PRODEV is responsible for administering all formal professional military course and summer
training programs. It is under the joint auspices of the Commandant ofMidshipmen and the
Academic Dean. Additionally, a new and independent Character Development Division,
established by the Superintendent and Secretary of the Navy, is charged with providing
oversight and coordination in the leadership and character development of midshipmen in an
integrated four-year program.
2. Academic Organization
The Academic Dean oversees the 4 academic divisions and 20 departments, as well
as an administrative academic structure. All academic matters are administered by the
Academic Board comprising the Academy's military and academic leadership.
All midshipmen are required to take a certain core curriculum of engineering (25
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semester hours), math and sciences (33 semester hours), social sciences and humanities (24
semester hours), professional military subjects (21 semester hours) and physical education.
(USNA Office of the Academic Dean, 1985) While the USNA is fundamentally an
engineering school, a broad majors program is offered to all midshipmen who study towards
a Bachelor of Science Degree in one of three academic groups:
• Group I: Aerospace Engineering, Electrical Engineering, General Engineering,
Marine Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Naval Architecture, Ocean
Engineering, and Systems Engineering
• Group II: Chemistry, Computer Science, General Science, Mathematics,
Oceanography, and Physics
• Group III: Economics, English, History, and Political Science
Special academic opportunities, including honors programs and societies, independent
research through the Trident Scholarship program, and graduate education at civilian schools
in the Annapolis area prior to commissioning through the Voluntary Graduate Education
Program (VGEP), are offered to a small number of outstanding students. Additionally, post-
commissioning graduate education programs are offered to the top graduating midshipmen
through the Burke and Olmstead Scholarship foundations.
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C. VISION AND MISSION
To develop midshipmen morally, mentally andphysically, and to imbue them
with the highest ideals of duty, honor and loyalty in order to provide
graduates who are dedicated to a career ofNaval service and have potential
for future development in mind and character to assume the highest
responsibilities ofcommand, citizenship, and government.
This mission gives the USNA its unique clarity of purpose among undergraduate
institutions. Yet despite its ties to tradition, the formal mission statement has changed slightly
in the last thirty years. Prior to 1967, the mission focused on graduating junior officers
ready to assume duties at sea. As academics became a higher priority for the service
academies and as the services themselves grew more complex, the USNA gradually
transformed itself from a naval or maritime trade school to a foundation for future naval
leadership. This change is manifest in the 1967 mission revision calling for graduates
"dedicated to a career in the Naval service" in contrast to the traditional call for "capable
junior officers" ready to report to ships immediately upon graduation. (Lovell, 1979)
This transformation may be seen as a direct product of the increasing technological
complexities found in initial fleet assignments. Specialized training after graduation became
essential in the certain warfare communities, and gradually the Navy and Marine Corps
introduced post-commissioning pipeline training of varying lengths for all warfare areas.
Navy leaders began to view the USNA more as a foundation for career leadership rather than
capable "officership."
In recent years, a new vision has surfaced among the USNA's officers and faculty
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under the leadership of the present Superintendent, Admiral Charles R. Larson. The vision
is for the USNA to continue to produce graduates to meet the new challenges of technology
and changing world political conditions with courage, honor and integrity while upholding
cherished traditions, leading to a new and better future. In accomplishing this and noting
recent deficiencies in its "moral" development, the USNA has since 1994 placed an increased
emphasis on character development with a particular focus on the associated attributes of
honor, integrity, and mutual respect.
Despite the recent rash of service academy-bashing articles found in the popular
media, the USNA is truly in a period of "character renaissance" under the leadership of
Admiral Larson. External pressures stemming from various scandals in its recent history are
primarily responsible for this. Larson, USNA Superintendent from 1983-1986, was selected
to return in 1994 to steer the Academy back on a course of moral, mental, and physical
development for midshipmen. Some of the more significant changes under Larson's
leadership include the following:
a. Establishment of the Character Development Division to oversee the honor, ethics,
and integrity development of midshipmen. It has helped to integrate the leadership
training into a four-year continuum involving leaders from the military, academic, and
athletic organizations. Training now focuses both on classical leadership and ethics
philosophies, as a foundation for practical leadership as an upperclass midshipman and
as an officer in the Navy or Marine Corps.
b. Revision of the "Service Selection" process. The old process driven strictly by the
midshipmen Order ofMerit has been redesignated "Service Assignment." The Order
ofMerit itselfhas been changed to increase emphasis on non-academic factors. And
prior to service assignment, first class midshipmen are now interviewed by officers
from each warfare community. These boards are used to identify non-quantitative and
other motivational factors influencing a midshipman's desires. The new process which
is still influenced greatly by the Order of Merit now allows for human intuition, and
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is designed to best fit the needs of the Navy with the needs of the individual.
(Interview, CAPT William Mason, USN, 1996)
Establishment of a fully-funded graduate education program with the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) for prospective Company Officers (and potentially for
Professional Development instructors.) This program, scheduled to begin in Spring
1997, will serve as a motivational tool to attract top quality officers and will enhance
the leadership role and skills of the company officer in midshipman development.
(Interview, CDR Patrick M. Walsh, USN, 1996)
Development of an effective "four year leadership laboratory" for midshipmen. This
challenge involves a transition from the traditional harsh and intense leadership
practices ofBancroft Hall into realistic fleet leadership practices. Company officers
face a challenge, too, ofinvolving themselves in every aspect of a midshipmen's life-
establishing continuity between his or her life in Bancroft Hall, in the classrooms, and
on the athletic fields—and not allowing a midshipmen to neglect his/her whole-person
development either morally, mentally, or physically.
D. ADMISSIONS PROCESS AND STANDARDS
The USNA's Dean of Admissions has a task quite different from that of other
undergraduate institution admissions directors in that the service academies are selecting for
a profession in partnership with the Congress. The USNA, like the other service academies,
employs a "Whole-Person" philosophy in its selection ofand in the development of America's
future officers. In 1958, Superintendent Melson first introduced the "Whole Man Concept"
in the selection of midshipmen. (Sweetman, 1979)
This concept evolved under the direction of retired Rear Admiral and Dean of
Admissions, Robert McNitt into an quantitative evaluative approach of all prospective
midshipmen which takes into account all available candidate data, including extracurricular
activities and evidence of leadership potential as well as academic achievement. (Interview,
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Idell Neumann, 1996)
And in the last fifteen years, the role ofthe Candidate Guidance Office has broadened
to go beyond guidance to a major recruiting and information effort, designed to help the Navy
meet its diversity goals as well as increase the quality of incoming classes. A strong visitation
program, field recruiting and information officers, and special outreach programs for
exceptional high school youth are designed to simultaneously attract potential outstanding
midshipmen to the Academy while "telling it like it is" about the rigors of life at USNA. This
helps to ensure a quality class while rninimizing early voluntary resignations. (Interview, Dean
J.W. Renard, CAPT USN (Ret), 1996)
1. Candidate Multiple
Since 1975, for each candidate, the admissions office has calculated a composite
"Candidate Multiple" from the following criteria:
• SAT (or ACT) Math score;
• SAT (or ACT) Verbal score;
• high school class rank;
• high school teacher recommendations;
• composite participation score of high school athletic and non-athletic extra-
curricular activities;
• technical-interest scale derived from the Strong-Campbell Interest Inventory
(sen);
• military career-interest scale derived from the SCII.
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The Candidate Multiple was developed and has been refined through a joint effort by the
USNA Dean of Admissions and the NPRDC, with revisions resulting from both policy
decisions and more recently from empirical optimization of the predictors. (Interview,
Neumann, 1996)
Annually, NPRDC validates and recalculates the weights of the multiple against
specific USNA criteria—academic quality point rating, military quality point rating, choice of
technical major, and total disenrollment. 14 The multiple is most heavily weighted on the
academic criteria (approximately 2/3 of the total), though weights vary from year to year.
The effective weight of the individual predictors (converted to scales of approximately 200-
800 based on norming procedures) which make up the Candidate Multiple for the Class of
2001 are seen below in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 USNA Candidate Multiple Effective Weights for Class of 2001.
Predictor Effective Weight
SAT -V orACT English 12
SAT- M or ACT Math 24
Rank in Secondary School Class 26
Recommendations of Secondary School Officials 14
Extracurricular Activities 8
Technical Interest 12
Military Career Interest 4
Source: USNA Admissions Office.
14 For a more complete discussion of the Candidate Multiple see E.F Alf, I. Neumann, and





As is plainly evident, the Candidate Multiple for the Class of 2001 includes 62 percent
directly from academic and scholastic aptitude scores, and places three times as much weight
on potential interest in a technical major as in potential interest in a military career.
The USNA leadership has been aware of this inherent limitation in its selection
process since its inception. Validation efforts have attempted to identify relationships
between the whole-person Candidate Multiple and the actual fleet performance ofUSNA
graduates but its recommendations have not been implemented. 15 The Candidate Multiple and
therefore the role ofthe admissions process remains designed only to predict first year success
as a midshipman and therefore to protect the Navy's investment against separation. Attempts
to look beyond this scope, and eventually to shift the selection paradigm, have been deemed
as infeasible in a selection process aimed at 17-18 year olds. (Interview, Dean Renard, 1996)
While the Candidate Multiple serves as the primary yardstick by which candidates are
measured, the process does allow for human intuition. One most interesting dynamic in this
whole-person selection process occurs at the USNA admissions board. Board members,
according to recently retired Dean ofAdmissions Jack Renard, represent "a highly trained and
most diverse group of Navy and Marine Corps officers, in addition to civilian faculty
members." The Board reviews each candidate's record and may adjust a Candidate Multiple
15 A study by Neumann and Mattson, which will be further discussed in Chapter HI,
resulted in NPRDC's development of a proposed Officer Potential Composite (OPC), based on
high school teacher's recommendations, extra-curricular activities, and the military career interest
scale. (Neumann and Matson, 1989)
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by as much as 20 percent. Adjustments, or so-called RAB's (Recommendations of the
Admissions Board) are based on a candidate's personal statement, additional
recommendations, unquantifiable aspects of a candidate's record, military background
(personal or family), or special interest by the USNA in the candidates—minorities, women,
and blue-chip athletes. (Interview, Dean Renard, 1996)
Theoretically, "reviewers may be able to see something important in a candidate's
background, a positive or negative characteristic, otherwise omitted from the whole person
score."
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It should be noted though that Admissions Board members are cautioned against
"over-intuition." CAPT Howard J. Halliday, USN, Chair of the 1996-97 Admissions Board
reminds board members before each meeting to "stick to the facts, not what's not there."
(USNA Admissions Board, 1996)
2. Nominations
Any discussion ofthe USNA selection process is incomplete without mentioning the
primary driver ofthe process towards eventual appointment to the DoD service academies—
the nomination. With rare exceptions (enlisted service members, sons/daughters ofMedal of
Honor winners) all candidates must first independently obtain a nomination from a member
ofCongress before he or she is considered for appointment by the admissions board. By law,
Members of Congress have three options by which they can nominate candidates:
1. Competitive Nomination Method - nominate a slate of up to ten candidates for each
vacancy for the USNA to evaluate and select qualified appointees based on the Candidate
Multiple.
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Eitelberg et al, 117.
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2. Principal Nomination Method - designate one principal nominee with up to nine other
alternates ranked in order of preference.
3. Principal Nomination with Competitive Alternates Method - designate one principal
nominee with a competitive slate ofup to nine alternates, and allow the USNA to select from
among the alternates on a competitive basis for remaining appointments.
A principal nominee is assured appointment to the USNA provided that he/she meets the
minimum Candidate Multiple criteria and passes physical and medical screening requirements.
While the USNA is obligated to select one qualified (scholastically, medically, and physically)
nominee for appointment from each congressional district vacancy, there is flexibility built
into the system. The USNA is authorized to fill the entering class from a list of qualified
competitive nominees and alternates, thereby maintaining quality and diversity in the selection
process.
A review by the author ofthe applicable information provided to congressional staffs
by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and by the service academies themselves
revealed no standard selection guidelines or direction for Members of Congress. The
information includes backgrounds of the academies, similar to what might be found in
academy catalogs, a time line ofthe academy application processes, an outline of the general
criteria for which a candidate will be rated prior to an appointment being offered, and points
of contact at the academies' admissions office. (Congressional Research Service, 1996)
The only specific guidance is offered in the area ofNomination Methods. The CRS
guide clearly states that "it is strongly encouraged that Members nominate as many young




It further states that "the more competitive the method of selecting and
evaluating nominees, the more likely the individual selected for appointment will be the best
qualified."
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It is evident from such boldfaced recommendations that the academies want the
final say in whom they select for appointment to occur at the admissions board and not within
the halls of Capitol Hill.
While the congressional nomination process does ensure a broad geographical
representation ofmidshipmen from across the fifty states, the process may bias the selection
process. Though it is unclear what percentage of appointments are offered via principal
nominations, at a minimum, the nomination process does play a significant role in the initial
screening of all applicants. Additionally, it is unknown how congressional staffs employ, if
at all, the academies' recommended selection criteria.
Regardless, the make-up of today's congress poses an interesting question of the
service academy whole-person selection process. "The 104th Congress includes 53 veterans
among its 100 senators. Of the 435 members of the new House, 154 are veterans. By
contrast, the 94th Congress of 1975-1976 had 73 veterans in the Senate and 306 in the
House." 19 If such a widening rift between political leaders and military leaders does in fact
exist in the wake of the All-Volunteer Force, then do congressional staffs, which are
17 Congressional Research Service, Congressional Guide for Admissions to the United
States Service Academies . (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1996), 6.
18
Ibid, p. 7.
19 Lewthwaite, Gilbert A., "Military Growing Isolated from Society, Analysts Say,'
Baltimore Sun, 28 December 1994, 1.
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presumably even more under-represented by veterans, have the requisite tools to select
America's future military leaders? This preference dates back to the aforementioned 1950
Stearns-Eisenhower Report which concluded that "it seems preferable to leave the final
selection to the service academies, which will select, on the basis of merit, the most
outstanding individual among the nominees of each congressman."20
3. Degree of Selectivity
Defining what constitutes the "most outstanding" candidate may be at best elusive to
both congressional staffs and the Admissions Board. While the efforts of the USNA Office
ofAdmissions and NPRDC have made great strides in identifying the best candidates, there
remains persistent questions of the criteria being used. Based on the above Candidate
Multiple weights, the so-called "whole-person" concept appears to be skewed towards
academic performance and scholastic/intellectual aptitude, perhaps as a direct result of the
increasing role of academics at the USNA.
While attempts should continue towards identifying those candidates who are least
likely to survive the moral, mental, and physical rigors of the USNA, a longer-term goal than
merely success during the plebe year appears to be warranted. Actual fleet retention and
officer promotion also should be used, in combination with USNA performance and
graduation, as selection criteria if the Navy is to maximize the return on its training
investment.
Indeed, the USNA is unique among undergraduate institutions in that it is not
20
Service Academy Board, 1950, 47.
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selecting college students, but rather it is selecting future Navy and Marine Corps officers.
(Interview, Dean Renard, 1996) As its mission has changed to effect a long-term career
whole-person philosophy, so should its selection process. Evidence exists that there is
nothing new about the idea of "selection for a profession, not an education" idea:
In the final selection of men (and women) for the service academies,
appropriate weight should be attached to the personal qualities that indicate
potentiality for leadership. Otherwise, some men (and women) will be
selected who, while intellectually adequate, will lack aptitude for leadership. 21
Despite apparent shortcomings in the process, the USNA has remained "one ofthe
few truly selective institutions in the country"22 largely due to the proactive efforts of the
Admissions Office, Candidate Guidance Office, and NPRDC. The Barron's Profile of
American Colleges consistently ranks the USNA in its highest category of selective colleges—
"Most Competitive"~along with the likes ofHarvard and Stanford. This rating is based on
the median SAT scores and grade point averages of incoming freshman classes, minimum
SAT and class rank requirements, as well as percentage of applicants accepted. (Barron's,
1991)
Of the 9,962 applicants who initiated the application process for the Class of 2000,
only 4,824 (or 48.4 percent) received nominations (congressional or other). Eventually,
1,527 offers of appointment were made, giving the class an extremely competitive selection
21 Service Academy Board, 1950, 26 (appendix).
22 U.S. Naval Academy Admissions Office. Indoctrination brief given to the 1996-97
Admissions Board.
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ratio of 13.3 percent or a nominee-to-appointment ratio of well over 3:1. 23
Statistics from a profile of the Class of 2000 offer further evidence as to how the
USNA has continued to attract the "best and brightest" in spite of military downsizing. For
example, 25 percent of the class had Math SAT scores greater than 700, 77 percent of the
class ranked in the top fifth oftheir high school class, 13 percent of the class were high school
class presidents or vice presidents, and 85 percent earned a varsity letter in high school
athletics. (USNA Admissions Office, 1996) Similar data showing the exceptional pre-USNA
characteristics/experiences ofthe incoming classes of 1980 through 1985 will be found in this
study.
Certainly, comparative statistics can be found at other colleges and universities in the
"Most Competitive" category which offer NROTC programs, such as Notre Dame and
Princeton. Where the overall selectivity differs ofUSNA graduates differs from ROTC and
OCS officers is better seen at "Highly Competitive" ROTC schools such as Villanova and
Boston University, "Very Competitive" ROTC schools such as Perm State and Missouri,
"Competitive" ROTC schools including Norwich and Oklahoma, "Less Competitive" ROTC
schools including Savannah State (GA) and Maine Maritime Academy, and even
"Noncompetitive" schools like the University ofKansas and the University of Akron.
The statistics are truly impressive, but the question remains as to whether the
Candidate Multiple, or the individual predictors of the Candidate Multiple, ensure the




women. This thesis will explore this area by focusing on the long-term career potential of the
USNA's graduates.
E. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The USNA further reinforces the "Whole-Person" philosophy in the moral, mental,
and physical development ofmidshipmen during their four year program. A core curriculum
ofprofessional military courses and training is required for all midshipmen. Required courses
in such areas as naval science, engineering, navigation, and weapons systems are designed to
give midshipmen a working knowledge ofmodem naval operations and technology. Courses
in leadership and military law attempt to prepare midshipmen for leadership responsibilities
as an upperclass midshipman and as a naval officer. Ceremonial infantry drill engenders a
knowledge ofthe customs and traditions of military ceremonies, as well as self-discipline and
teamwork. Physical education and athletics teach midshipmen the value of physical fitness,
the values ofteamwork and competition, and how to stay fit for life. Eight weeks of annual
summer training introduces midshipmen to the operational units of the Navy and Marine
Corps, and exposes them to the numerous career opportunities available upon graduation. In
addition, all midshipmen participate in monthly Integrity Development Seminars facilitated
by teams of officers, faculty, and coaches for small groups. These seminars are designed to
reinforce and augment the moral-ethical development of midshipmen over their four years at
the USNA. (USNA Catalog, 1996) A more complete breakdown of the USNA's four-year
professional development program is presented in Appendix A.
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As stated earlier, the Class of 1985 core of professional development courses made
up just 21 hours of the overall USNA core curriculum of 103 semester hours. The typical
USNA graduate completes at least 140 semester hours, with the remaining hours, which vary
by major, dedicated to majors courses. This in mind, we see that professional development
courses are only a very small part of a midshipman's life at the USNA, 21.4 percent of the
core and just 15.7 percent ofthe total. Here too, we see evidence of a skewed relative degree
of emphasis between academics and military development, leading to a culture among
midshipmen which subjugates their professional development in favor of academics. Beyond
the plebe (freshman) year, almost all involuntary attrition from the Academy is academic
related and a general feeling exists that "they can't kick me out as long as I've got that 2.0
(in academics)."
1. Measurement of Performance/Development
As in the selection process, the USNA attempts to quantify most areas of performance
and midshipman development. The "Aggregate Multiple" serves as the nearest thing to a
whole-person measurement instrument for midshipmen, and is composed of the following
areas:
• Academic courses
• Professional Development courses
• Physical Education courses
• Military Performance grades
• Military Conduct grades
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• Professional Competency Review (PCR) grades
• Summer Cruise performance grades
This Aggregate Multiple is compiled over a midshipman's four years at Annapolis in order
to determine the graduation "Order ofMerit." The Order of Merit is the class standing used
in the former "Service Selection" process, by which first-class midshipmen select from among
the available junior officer billets in the Navy and Marine Corps warfare communities.
Until recently, the Aggregate Multiple, and therefore the Order of Merit, has been a
weighted average of the above areas, with approximately 70 percent assigned to academic
performance and 30 percent to professional performance. (U.S. Naval Academy, USNAINST
153 1, 1977-1996) Recent changes have seen an increase in the weighting assigned to non-
academic measures such as military performance and physical education, and the elimination
ofthe PCR and summer-cruise grades, as part of an effort to better measure a midshipman's
leadership potential and his/her "Whole-Person" qualities. (Interview, Dr. Richard L. Davis,
1996) While the 70-30 academic-professional split is applicable for the classes of 1980-1985
used in this study, the Aggregate Multiple and thus Order ofMerit has been revised as shown
below in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2 USNA Aggregate Multiple Weights.
Performance Category Percentage of Total
Academic & Professional Courses 64.48%
Physical Education 6.66%
Athletic Performance 3.38%
Military Performance * 16.68%
Military Conduct * 7.80%
Note: * Performance and Conduct include graduated coefficients that increase
with seniority.
Source: USNAINST 1531.51A.
These changes reflect a sincere attempt on the part of the USNA leadership to shift
the emphasis away from academic development towards whole-person development.
As Order of Merit and Service Assignment remains a primary motivation for most
midshipmen, these changes are expected to result in a shift in their individual emphasis and
priorities as well. Despite these changes though, the question persists as to whether a 65-
35 split goes far enough towards righting the potential conflict.
2. Training Development and Validation
From time to time in its history, internal committees such as this the Holloway Board
ofNaval Education and special panels sponsored by the Board of Visitors have attempted to
examine the effectiveness of professional military training. However, the closest to an
Instructional Systems Design Model or a formal training needs assessment the author could
find were John Paul Jones' famous words ("He must be that of course, but also a great deal
more...") which are passed on from generation to generation. The USNA also lacks the tools
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to validate the effectiveness of its military training. While progress is being made, the lack
offormal internal structures such as a professional military training development staff show
signs that such reforms may not endure.
Over the last ten years, two potentially effective validation tools were discontinued.
The PCR was last given in 1993. Until then, the four level multiple-choice exam, given to
midshipmen at the end of each academic year, measured their cumulative retention and
knowledge ofthe wide range of professional military subjects. The PCR was disestablished
for a number ofreasons, most especially due to disagreement over its content, objectives, and
testing methodology. And while the PCR could have served as a powerful internal validation
measure against learning criteria (professional competency objectives), it was used more often
to identify those midshipmen who required remedial training. (Interview, Dr. Paul Roush,
1996)
Another tool, the "GRAPES" (Graduate Performance & Evaluation Surveys) was
comprised oftwo separate surveys sent to the commanding officers of graduates two years
after graduation and to the graduates themselves three years after graduation. Their purpose
was to solicit an evaluation of the Academy's role in developing the officer in a number of
areas, whether or not he or she was adequately prepared, and what areas required increased
emphasis. The GRAPES survey, a potentially invaluable external validation tool, could
provide actual measures of Academy training performance/effectiveness against true
behavioral and results criteria such as fleet performance, retention, and career development.
Yet, the survey was discontinued due to budgetary constraints and a general consensus
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among Academy leadership that the survey was not being used for this original purpose due
to a lack of a training development staff and resources. (Interview, Dr. Roush, 1996)
As the USNA has restated its mission to reflect an emphasis on the "long haul" or
military careers of their graduates vice the short-term junior officer performance, so should
its measures oftraining effectiveness. As a result, ifGRAPES or another post-commissioning
validation tool is reinstituted, it too should focus on long-haul issues such as career propensity
and leadership/command potential rather than on short-term effectiveness measures such as
junior officer skills and performance. As the USNA and the other service academies are
training the nation's future military leaders and serve as the foundation for America's military
elite, both the academies and the services should be more concerned about the who, how,
why, and what of professional development.
This thesis does not attempt to measure the overall effectiveness of USNA
professional development. The research only attempts to measure the impact of professional
development on the career potential of its graduates. This notwithstanding, it does appear
from the above qualitative analysis that there remains considerable room for improvement
in the relative emphasis on academics vice professional development, and in the area of
training development. The nation's taxpayers are making a significant human capital
investment in every USNA midshipman. It is thus incumbent upon the USNA to ensure the
public earns the greatest return on its investment. This thesis will explore the effects ofthe





The officer corps has rarely been examined in great detail, and as a result few studies
have been concerned with how officers are selected and trained. (Eitelberg et al, 1992) Such
limitations notwithstanding, this chapter explores the significant prior research from a range
of disciplines on the development of military officers. Studies will be grouped by their
applicability to the issues associated with selectivity, human capital investment, and
institutional favoritism.
Although the objectives and methodology ofsome ofthe previous research differ from
this thesis, the associated ideas provide a logical starting point for a study which attempts to
explore the development of military officers. While this study is based primarily on labor
economics and utilizes an econometrics methodology, a great deal can be learned from the
other social sciences about the effect of selectivity and human capital investment, as well as
institutional bias, on naval officer development.
A. SELECTIVITY
1. Prediction of Officer Potential
In a 1989 NPRDC study, Idell Neumann, Joyce Mattson, and Norman Abrahams,
predicted the potential success of military officers using pre-commissioning selection
variables. This study, Development and Evaluation of an Officer Potential Composite, was
conducted in response to a request by the USNA to develop a measure of officer potential
to be used in the selection ofUSNA candidates, thereby expanding the existing scope of the
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system explored in Chapter II
. While the Candidate Multiple had been proven to be an
effective screening tool for evaluating candidates in terms of potential for early USNA
success, its predictors had not been shown to be significantly related to officer fleet success.
(Neumann et al., 1989)
The first step of their study was to develop a criterion for assessing officer
performance. Navy Officer Fitness Reports (fitreps) were explored to determine the best
criterion of officer potential for a sample of officers commissioned from the USNA between
1979 and 1982. While most Fitness Report performance areas were skewed greatly towards
the top ratings due to grade inflation, the "Recommendation for Promotion" element showed
sufficient variability to provide meaningful differentiation among officers. This element
consisted of the reporting senior's recommendation of the individual officer for (1) early
promotion, (2) regular promotion, or (3) no promotion. It is considered a critical factor in
identifying superior officers, with the recommendation for early promotion appropriate only
for those '"head and shoulders above' type performers who merit promotion ahead of their
contemporaries
"24 Only 26 percent of the officers in their sample received recommendation
for early promotion in every valid fitrep. Neumann et al utilized this "Recommendation for
Promotion" element to develop an individual performance indicator, which was the
percentage of an individual officer's fitness reports with a recommendation for early
promotion divided by the total number of his/her valid fitness reports (REP). Valid fitness
24 Navy Military Personnel Command Instruction 161 1.1, 12 May 1981, in Neumann,
Mattson, and Abrahams, Development of an Officer Potential Composite , (San Diego: Navy
Personnel Research and Development Center, 1989), 6.
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reports include all "observed" fitness reports from the grade of Ensign (0-1) through
Lieutenant (0-3).
Next, the study evaluated existing USNA operational and experimental selection
scores for predicting the REP criterion. Utilizing first-order validity correlation as its
methodology, the study found that although the composite Candidate Multiple measure was
not related to officer performance, two of its individual predictor components, the
Extracurricular Activities (ECA's) and Secondary School Teacher Recommendation scores,
exhibited significant positive correlation relationships with the REP criterion. Additionally,
two experimental predictors, empirically derived from individual extracurricular activities and
individual SCII items related to officer performance, were significantly positively related to
the REP score. An Officer Potential Composite (OPC) was then developed from three of
these significant individual predictors (ECA's, school recommendations, and the officer
performance SCII scale). The OPC was shown to significantly increase fleet performance
while not adversely affecting performance as a midshipman. 25 Finally, the study showed that
performance as a midshipman, as measured both by Military Quality Point Rating (MQPR)
and Academic Quality Point Rating (AQPR), is significantly related to officer performance
as measured by the REP score.
This study made significant advances in the area of officer development, not only by
25 The OPC was validated against USNA plebe year performance for a second sample, the
USNA Classes of 1987 through 1990. A significant positive relationship was found between the
OPC and both MQPR and attrition, though less positive than the operational USNA selectors.
The data, though biased by the positive selection ofUSNA appointees only, suggest that there is
"little risk that the OPC's use will adversely affect midshipman performance."
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proposing a valid officer performance measure but also by revealing significant relationships
with this measure ofofficer performance. 26 This is especially noteworthy and promising when
one considers the significant time lapse between application to the USNA and the cumulative
officer performance measure through the rank of Lieutenant (approximately 8 years). The
researchers proposed further evaluation of the OPC with actual fleet officer promotion and
retention, though no evidence of such research or of further consideration of integration of
the OPC measure into the USNA selection system can be found.
Despite the significance of the NPRDC study to the field of military officer
development, its relatively simple statistical methodology is a concern. By testing only first-
order correlations of predictors with criteria such as REP, the study ignores the potential
interaction of other related variables. For example, while REP may be positively related to
a teacher recommendations, teacher recommendations itselfmay have a positive relationship
with ECA's. The question of which predictor best statistically explains the success of a
reference officer can only be determined through multivariate regression, which tests the
significance of each explanatory variable in a model while holding all other variables in the
model constant. This thesis will attempt to investigate the statistical relationships between
the selection criteria and officer performance using such multivariate regression models.
A further limitation of the NPRDC study is the potential for selection bias assumed
by examining only midshipmen who have been selected for appointment through the highly
26 The correlation coefficient (r) for the OPC with the REP criterion for the total officer
sample is .21 (p < .01), varying slightly between warfare communities.
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selective admissions process, and then by only examining officers who have completed the
rigorous USNA program. 27 Finally, as the NPRDC researchers conclude, a more valuable
analysis might examine the same selectors against actual life-cycle measures of the Navy's
return on its education/training investment—retention and promotion.
2. Related Studies
a. Scholastic Aptitude
The Department of Defense (DOD) has long been interested in the aptitude
of military personnel, but has only recently become interested in the aptitude of its officer
corps. Lacking a valid DOD wide aptitude test for officers similar to the Armed Forces
Qualifying Test (AFQT), they have turned to college admissions test scores as the best
proxies available for officer aptitude. A database has been compiled at the Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) merging the DMDC Officer Cohort File of officers
commissioned from 1975 through 1985 and the Educational Testing Service's (ETS) SAT
data file, matching scores for approximately 56 percent ofthese newly commissioned officers.
(Eitelberg et al., 1992)
Their study examined both promotion and retention for groups of officers in
this sample, attempting to investigate the relationship between SAT and officer performance.
The SAT means (combined Math and Verbal) were compared on the basis of promotion to
0-2 and 0-3. Across all the services, the SAT mean scores of all promoted officers are found
27 The potential for similar selection bias will also be found in this research, and it will be
discussed in further detail in the following chapters.
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to be higher than those of officers not promoted. 28 The retention analysis looked at the
average number ofmonths served through the grade of 0-3 by officers above and below the
50th percentile for SAT scores. No significant differences were found within the services,
though retention across all services for the "Above 50th Percentile" group significantly
exceeded the retention for the "Below 50th Percentile" groups.
No conclusive evidence is offered by this study due to limitations in the data
base, including the potential for geographic bias assumed by excluding officers who had not
taken the SAT and had taken the American College Testing examination (ACT) most
common to the Midwest. Despite this, it does point out some initial trends. The scoring
differences seen in the analysis ofpromotion to the "quasi-automatic" grades of 0-2 and 0-3
may indicate a natural "weeding out" of lower aptitude officers, though further research is
warranted. (Eitelberg et al, 1992)
b. Forecasting Transformational Leadership
Drs. Francis J. Yammarino and Bernard M. Bass of the Center for Leadership
Studies (CLS) at the State University of New York (SUNY) Binghamton conducted
extensive research on a limited sample of USNA graduates in the fleet in order to test a
general model of transformational leadership and its relationship to both predictors and
outcomes. Yammarino and Bass examined a representative sample of 186 USNA graduates
serving in operational assignments in the surface warfare fleet. Data was collected from
officer and midshipmen records, as well as from the sample officers themselves, 793
28 Significant at the .01 level for all services except the Marine Corps at the 0-3 rank.
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subordinates of the sample officers, and superior evaluations from fitness reports.
(Yammarino and Bass, 1989)
The new model of leadership developed in previous research by Bass portrays
a "transformational" leader as one who is able to articulate a realistic vision of the future that
can be shared by and can stimulate subordinates, as opposed to the "transactional" leader who
participates in an exchange ofrewards for services with subordinates. His model empirically
derived three essential factors of transformational leadership—charisma and inspirational
ability, individualized consideration, and intellectual stimulation. Though transformational
leadership is not a mandatory ingredient in effective career military officers, the literature
suggests that it is likely to improve both individual and unit effectiveness. (Yammarino and
Bass, 1988)
This model is applied to long-term forecasting of transformational leadership
ofUSNA graduates in the fleet in Yammarino and Bass' second report. The study finds as
predicted, that USNA academic selection criteria are valid predictors of academic and military
success at the USNA. Yet, the USNA selectors are not found to be predictive of either this
leadership measure or of future performance. Further, military performance is found to be
an accurate and positive predictor of transformation leadership, as seen by subordinate-rated
charismatic and inspirational leadership, and of future officer performance. And as
hypothesized, the study further finds that transformational as compared to transactional
leadership (rated by subordinates), was strongly related to the both the subordinate evaluation
of effectiveness and to superior ratings in fitness reports (consequences or outcomes).
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(Yammarino and Bass, 1988) While the study is limited to an extremely small sample of
officers in only one warfare specialty, it offers credibility to the utilization of biodata and data
on leadership traits to the selection of future military leaders.
c. "Human Research"
Dr. Karel Montor ofthe USNA Leadership, Ethics, and Law Department has
conducted numerous "human research" analyses of the USNA class of 1980. Montor has
examined whether predictive elements taken from a variety of data—including factors in
blood, psychological and neurological profiles, as well as scholastic aptitude, and
demographics— impacted relative success as a USNA midshipmen and later as an officer in
the Navy. (Montor, 1996)
Among the notable findings, Montor found that those who graduated from the
USNA (compared to those who left either voluntarily or involuntarily) had as expected higher
Candidate Multiple scores, and were more emotionally stable, conscientious, trusting, more
in control ofthemselves, relaxed and less anxious, and less independent, with higher superego
scores, and stronger boyfriend and girlfriend relationships. 29 Overall, Montor found no
statistical difference between the Math and Verbal SAT scores ofUSNA graduates and non-
graduates.
Additionally, Montor found that those non-female, black, and hispanic officers
still on active duty after fifteen years of service had significantly higher Physical Education
29
All findings presented are significant at the 95% confidence level. Psychological
characteristics are from the 16PF psychological factors test (16PF) and the Motivational Analysis
Test (MAT).
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and Military Performance grades while at the USNA than graduates no longer in the service.
This group of "careerists" were also found to be more assertive (16PF) and had higher mating
scores on the MAT. Again, no overall statistical differences in SAT scores are found between
those who remain on active duty and those who leave the Navy. Despite this, black officers
with lower Math and Verbal SAT scores are more likely to stay on active duty than fellow
blacks. Motivation is postulated as the key to this interesting finding.
The above represent just a sample ofMontor's on-going analysis of the USNA
Class of 1980. His project is useful in that it demonstrates the wealth of factors, neurological,
psychological, academic, and non-academic, that can be used to explain the differences in
performance and career motivation between groups.
d. Personality Traits
Dr. Lawrence J. Strieker at the Educational Testing Service (ETS) constructed
a biographical inventory ofthe USNA Class of 1991 during their plebe summer in an effort
to identify the personality traits ofmidshipmen with significant potential for leadership. From
the biographical inventory, Strieker develops five scales—Dominance, Emotional Stability,
Need for Achievement, Self-Confidence, and Sociability. (Strieker, 1989)
These scales are analyzed against plebe year Military Performance grades and
MQPR (hypothesized to reflect leadership potential), as well as peer ratings of leadership to
test for correlation. Of the five scales, Sociability, Dominance, and Need for Achievement
showed some signs of correlation validity with the USNA criteria, while Sociability was found
to be correlated significantly with the peer leadership rating.
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While this study indicates promise for utilization of personality traits as
predictors of leadership potential, the methodology makes the practical value of the study
questionable. As plebes spend their entire first year at the USNA being indoctrinated to the
Navy and the Academy, an examination of plebe leadership lacks true value. The emphasis
of"followership" during the Plebe year makes the Military Performance grades as well as the
peer ratings of leadership poor proxies for leadership potential. While "followership" is
certainly an essential ingredient of leadership, and is essential to early junior officer
performance. A follow-up study of the personality scales as predictors of first-class
midshipman leadership ratings and officer success is recommended.
B. HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT
1. Undergraduate Education
Professor William Bowman tested the so-called "Rickover hypothesis" that "the best
naval officers are those with a solid technical college background" in his 1990 study, "Do
Engineers Make Better Naval Officers?'1 '' The objective of his study was to model the
statistical relationship between an individual's undergraduate academic background as a
measure ofhis/her investment (quality and quantity) in human capital, and later performance
as a fleet officer. Academic background was measured by grade point average (quality) and
major (quantity, assuming that engineers receive more Navy-applicable human capital than
their peers). Fleet performance was defined in the Bowman study as retention six months
beyond minimum service requirement and "superior" ratings in "command desirability" and
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"overall summary" by commanding officers in junior officer fitness reports at the end of their
fourth year of service. Bowman was unable to establish a relationship between the academic
world of the USNA and junior officer performance in the surface and submarine warfare
communities, with controls for personal characteristics and Navy-specific factors related to
ship type and job description. 30 (Bowman, 1990)
Bowman studied USNA graduates from the classes of 1976 through 1980, merging
personal demographic and Navy experience data from the DMDC 1986 Navy Officer
Master/Loss Files with the associated NPRDC longitudinal profile of the individual officer
fitness report entries. Empirical models ofjunior officer experience and human capital were
developed, utilizing nonlinear maximum likelihood estimation techniques. Overall, Bowman
found that performance and retention of officers is related more to personal characteristics
than to academic background. Academic measures, such as academic major and grade point
average (GPA) within grouped courses (engineering, math/sciences, humanities) are found
to be less significantly and less positively related to officer performance and retention than
achieving warfare specialty qualification as a junior officer, race, or marital status. He
concludes that junior officer performance is more a measure of managerial skills than
leadership or technical skills, as management/economics majors are more likely to receive high
ratings, and that retention is more related to personal characteristics than to acquired human
capital.
30 Academic factors are found to be significantly related to the service selection, as
measured by the probability of a midshipman selecting the Nuclear Navy (surface ships or
submarines.)
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Despite its acclaim as a landmark study in this area, a weakness ofBowman's study
in testing the Rickover hypothesis is the homogeneity of the sample. The 1560 USNA
graduates from the years 1976-1980, serving in surface warfare and submarine communities
ofthe Navy, do not display great variance in their level of technical education. As discussed
above, all USNA graduates undergo a solid core curriculum of engineering, science, and
mathematics courses. In fact, due to the heavy emphasis of this technical core, all graduates,
even those who major in the humanities and social sciences, receive a Bachelor of Science
degree. This fact demonstrates that all USNA graduates are to a degree "engineers"—
prepared to adequately understand (ifnot to design) the technical systems for which they will
be responsible as junior officers. Thus, the differences between technical and non-technical
majors are minor, and not as great as they would be for ROTC or OCS officers who were
graduates of civilian universities.
Several studies of the relationship between job performance and undergraduate
education have been performed in the civilian sector as well. A significant study conducted
by AT&T is highlighted in LCOL Mitchell M. Zais', USA, 1990 article "West Point: Sword
Making or Swordsmanship." (Zais, 1990) The study examined the leadership, management
performance, and career advancement of first-level general managers over a 30-year period.
College major was found to be the most important factor in accounting for differences in
performance—more important than academic performance, college prestige, or extra-
curricular activities. AT&T's study concluded that humanities and social science majors were
"clearly superior in all measures of overall performance and progress." The study also found
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that engineering majors lacked important leadership and managerial skills. Logically opposite
to the flaw in Bowman's study, the application of the AT&T study to the military
environment is limited to the extent that all officers are selected primarily utilizing "whole-
person" criteria (Eitelberg et al
., 1992) and theoretically would not be lacking in such people
or managerial skills.
Another study of note, including both public and private sector career success was
conducted by the Standard & Poor's Corporation with a related analysis by Professor Michael
Useem of Boston University. The study, highlighted by Dr. William P. Snyder in an Air
University Review article, included a survey of some 50,000 top executives in 38,000 public
offices and private American companies, and found that the highest-ranking executives
typically came from general education, usually liberal arts, backgrounds. Executives who had
specialty majors in business administration were less successful. (Snyder, 1985) In contrast
to the Bowman study, the Standard & Poor study reflected too heterogeneous a sample to
be applied to the current context of the military in that it explored a very diverse array of
firms.
Works such as these and by retired Navy Admiral William Stockdale (Stockdale,
1984) continue to argue against the increased technical emphasis seen both in service
academy curricula and ROTC programs and for a return to increased emphasis on the liberal
arts. A clear need to strike a balance between technical specialization and general education
has been demonstrated by such studies. Few dispute that the Navy does need some highly-
trained technically-oriented officers. The question ofwhether or not the Navy needs a "Navy
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ofmodem engineers" will again be addressed in this study, though it is not the major focus.
2. Graduate Education
Donald J. Cymrot at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) assessed the benefit to the
Navy offully-funded graduate education for its officers. In doing so, Cymrot developed both
theoretical and empirical models of graduate education, its marginal costs, and its marginal
benefits using officer promotion as a measure of officer productivity. (Cymrot, 1986)
It can be hypothesized that officers with graduate education are relatively more
productive than their peers. Cymrot utilized non-linear LOGIT models of the probability of
promotion to the next higher rank within a given period to empirically measure this increased
productivity for a sample of officers. Cross-sectional data was obtained in March 1985 from
the Navy's Officer Master File, after eliminating officers who had left the service. Cymrot
concluded that the graduate education has a significantly positive effect on the probability of
officer promotion up to and through the rank of Captain.
A notable weakness to this study is Cymrot 's use of cross-sectional data, as opposed
to a data set that tracked officer cohorts. This would have accounted for those officers either
voluntarily or involuntarily separated from the Navy, and would have accounted for
differences in promotion rates by fiscal year. Additionally, selection bias, which Cymrot
attempts to compensate for by including previous experience and job performance in his
models, undoubtedly still affects the empirical results. The Navy selects officers for graduate
education by some of the very same criteria it promotes its officer corps, including
promotablity, thereby ensuring a select group of officers with graduate education. Such
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selection bias has been found in numerous follow-on graduate education studies, despite
various techniques attempting to compensate for it.
Bowman further advanced the study ofhuman capital and military job performance
with Dr. Stephen L. Mehay in a 1996 study, Human Capital and Job Performance in a
Hierarchical Organization: Evidence from Military Personnel. Mehay and Bowman
examine the relationship between graduate education and on the job performance, as
measured by actual promotion to Lieutenant Commander (LCDR), for Navy officers reviewed
by promotion boards between 1985 and 1990. (Mehay and Bowman, 1996)
Following the earlier work of David A. Wise (Wise, 1975), Mehay and Bowman
specify their promotion model by assuming that relative performance depends on accumulated
human capital. Wise had studied the promotion of managerial and professional workers,
partitioning their accumulated human capital into two stocks—cognitive and affective skills.
Cognitive skills are those learned skills and accumulated knowledge attributed to intellectual
aptitude and academic performance, while affective skills include those non-academic
personal factors such as perseverance, cooperation, self-discipline, leadership, and initiative.
Mehay and Bowman include in their model such cognitive skills as college grade point
average, type ofundergraduate degree, and graduate degree, and attribute affective skills to
accession source to the Navy's officer corps. Commissioning programs such as the USNA
are assumed to imbue an individual with a greater level of affective skills than ROTC or OCS




Wise had previously found in two studies of individual firms that both the salary and
probability ofpromotion were increased by a graduate degree. Wise also found that affective
skills contributed to a worker's productivity. Controlling for undergraduate education,
personal demographics, warfare specialty, and fitness report scores, Bowman and Mehay
build on the work of Wise to specify non-linear PROBIT models of promotion within the
Navy to LCDR.
Their results, consistent with the findings of Wise, show that graduate education
significantly increases the probability of promotion, indicating a positive effect of additional
human capital in the military's internal labor market. They also show that the promotion
probability for USNA graduates is significantly higher than for those who entered via other
routes, supporting the impact of affective skills on performance and the notion that USNA
graduates possess a greater stock of such firm-specific affective skills.
Positive selection bias is seen again in this study as the more "promotable" officers
(based on fleet performance) are also more likely to be selected for graduate education.
Further, such officers selected for advanced education tend to have stronger academic
backgrounds. Bowman and Mehay address the selection issue in two ways. First, they simply
include undergraduate education background variables as controls in a single-stage model.
Second, they add an endogenous selection process to the model and estimate the promotion
equation using an instrument for attendance at a fully-funded graduate school, which is
uncorrected with the error term in the promotion model. Treating graduate education as
endogenous reduces the overall direct effect of graduate education. However, a graduate
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degree nonetheless remains a positive and significant factor in the promotion ofNavy officers.
C. INSTITUTIONAL FAVORITISM
1. Historical Context
Janowitz offers an outstanding historical portrait of the dominance played by the
service academies in producing the elite members of America's military hierarchy. The
statistics offered are revealing. Military leadership, defined by Janowitz as general or flag
officers, consisted almost exclusively ofWest Point or Annapolis products through 1935 (81
percent in the Army and 98 percent in the Navy). World War II brought about a sharp
change in these numbers for the expansive Army and new Air Force, while the Navy was able
to continue its practice of reliance on USNA training for its future leaders. While the
percentage of Army leadership from West Point had dropped to 58.4 percent, Annapolis
graduates still constituted 96.6 percent ofthe Navy's leadership. (Janowitz, 1960)
Despite these statistics, Janowitz offers no specific evidence of bias within the services
which might account for the high percentage of service academy graduates in the top officer
ranks. Instead, Janowitz explained his findings on the basis of multiple factors—social origins,
career motivation, aptitude, education, self-image, and career development among them—none
of which alone explain this phenomenon. Janowitz suggests that all of these factors are
increased for service academy graduates. Janowitz' s greatest insight is found in several
sociological arguments and predictions for the development of a new professional soldier
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model. 31
Over time, even the Navy's leadership ranks have changed. As of September 1987,
academy graduates represented 29.9 percent of the Army's general officer ranks and 47.3
percent of the Navy's flag ranks. Yet as one examines the trend up through the military
leadership hierarchy, the percentage of academy graduates rises at each successive rank.
(Eitelberg et al., 1992) This trend continues despite the lower percentage of service academy
graduates among newly commissioned officers.
Though the perception of an academy ring as being a prerequisite for military
leadership has waned, a 1984 Gallup Poll of U.S. military general and flag officers revealed
that 88 percent of the officers felt that "being a service academy graduate" helped one
succeed in the military. (Eitelberg et al., 1992) Unfortunately the poll goes no further
towards asking the officers why being a service academy graduate helped one succeed in the
military or whether an institutional bias existed.
While no overt signs of institutional favoritism are found in these works, the historical
context of service academy dominance in the officer corps lends some sociological credibility
to the idea that such a bias favoring service academy graduates may exist. This is seen in the
31 For greater insight on the impact of societal changes and changing recruitment trends
for military officers, see Fitzgerald, John A., "Changing Patterns of Officer Recruitment at the
U.S. Naval Academy," Armed Forces and Society, 8 No. 1, Fall 1981; Cochran, Charles L.,
"Midshipman and Cadet Profiles and National Norms: A Profile," Naval War College Review,
XXIV No. 9, May 1972, and "A Comparison ofNaval Academy Plebes and College Freshmen
Over Twenty Years" (USNA Internal Report, 1996); or Snyder, William P., "Officer Recruitment
for the All-Volunteer Force: Trends and Prospects," Armed Forces and Society, 10 No. 3, Spring
1984.
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persistent over-representation of service academy graduates at the highest military ranks.
2. DOD Studies
While DoD and the services have commissioned numerous studies to assess potential
institutional discrimination by race, ethnicity, and gender, no prior research could be found
in the area of favoritism or bias by officer commissioning source. The studies reviewed
focused on equal opportunity (EO) climate, training, sexual discrimination and harassment,
promotions, discipline, and recruitment. 32
A recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) study advocates a standard criteria
and methodology for Military Equal Opportunity Assessments (MEOAs) across the services.
The criteria or expected outcomes include accessions, assignments, and promotions. While
discrimination/bias can exist in all these processes, this study will focus on identifying
potential favoritism in promotions. The advocated "odds-ratio" methodology involves
calculating the odds of a particular group member being selected for an outcome. An odds
ratio is obtained by dividing the odds for one group member by the odds of another group
member for the same given outcome. Equal odds therefore will result in an odds ratio of 1
.
This methodology enables researchers to determine if the difference in odds is statistically
significant, or if it is due to random chance. (GAO, 1996) While this methodology is
recommended for use across DoD, it does not allow researchers to include possible related
factors such as aptitude or performance ratings, and therefore assess whether subgroups such
32 See General Accounting Office, Equal Opportunity: DOD Studies on Discrimination in
the Military, (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1995) for an outstanding survey of
the relevant military EO studies and advances in the last twenty years.
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as minorities and non-minorities were essentially equal.
Finally, a thorough review by the author ofthe Navy's Promotion Board Precepts (or
guidelines) for fiscal years 1985-1996 0-4 through 0-6 showed no trace of overt bias which
might give preferential treatment to USNA graduates. As USNA graduates have historically
been over represented in the Navy's higher ranks, this study will look for a more subtle bias
by examining the relationship between the outcomes of promotion boards and representation,
by commissioning source, ofthe senior officers charged with making the promotion decisions.
D. COMPOSITE STUDIES OF OFFICER DEVELOPMENT
While Janowitz's Professional Soldier, and more recently, the chapter "Becoming
Brass" by Eitelberg, Laurence and Brown in Test Policy for Defense , offer comprehensive
surveys ofthe complex issues involved with military officer development, they do not focus
on specific officer cohorts and few practical lessons can be applied. Successful Officer
Careers: Analysis ofAugmentation, Promotion, and Voluntary Continuation by James North,
Dan Goldhaber, Kletus Lawler, and Jeremy Suess at CNA, offers a comprehensive review of
Marine Corps officer development. In an effort to analyze the extent and causes of racial-
ethnic differences in career success, the researchers propose five possible factors that may
explain the differences—occupational preferences or assignment, ability, motivation,
discrimination, and performance at The Basic School (TBS). (North et al., 1995)
The researchers created a Headquarters Master File (HMF) of longitudinal data from
personnel records beginning with FY 1987, combined with files from TBS, augmentation
58
selection and promotion boards, and loss records. Numerous non-linear multivariate LOGIT
models were run to determine the significant factors for predicting success. The following
summarize the results of the models:
• Race/Ethnicity: "Other minorities" have significantly lower augmentation selection
probabilities than white officers. Both blacks and "other minorities" exhibit lower
probabilities of promotion to captain (0-3), and blacks have a lower probability of
promotion to major. No statistical differences are found in promotion to lieutenant
colonel (0-5) or retention.
• TBS Performance: TBS leadership class rank is positively and significantly related
to all future officer "success"measures~promotion, augmentation, and retention.
• Mental/Academic Aptitude: As measured by General Classifications Test (GCT)
scores, mental aptitude does not appear to be significantly related to any of the
"success" measures. Only at promotion to major is the GCT important, where it
is negatively associated with probability of promotion. Undergraduate academic
major is not significantly related to any ofthe success measures.
• Occupation: Officers in certain occupations have higher probabilities ofpromotion
than others. Support officers are associated with a significantly lower probability
ofpromotion than combat officers. And as compared to ground combat officers,
pilots and judge advocates tend to be more successful (as one would expect based
on their high level ofhuman capital.)
The most important findings in this study are the significance ofTBS leadership rank
and the insignificance of mental aptitude as predictors of officer success. The authors
recommend an increased emphasis on assessing leadership potential and decreased emphasis
on mental aptitude in both screening and selecting future Marine Corps officers. The study
suggests that capable minority officer candidates with excellent leadership potential are being
screened from service because of the Marine Corps' stringent mental aptitude requirements.
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E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
The issue ofmilitary officer effectiveness has been approached from many angles. It
is likely that no single measure of effectiveness will ever be universally agreed upon as most
valid. In this chapter alone, we see a number of substitute (or proxy) measures of
effectiveness, including fitness report scores, recommendation for promotion, promotion to
various ranks, retention, time to promotion, professional qualifications, augmentation, and
subordinate ratings.
LT Joseph F. Nolan, USN, addresses this concern in a master's thesis, which analyzes
various measures of effectiveness (MOE)--retention between the LT and LCDR selection
boards, promotion to LCDR, and early professional qualifications—and the relationship of
background factors to them for a sample of surface warfare officers. Nolan utilized data from
the Navy Officer Master File, Officer Loss File, and the NPRDC Traintrack System File from
1981 through 1990 to develop LOGIT models of the MOE. The thesis reveals that a
significant amount ofthe variability in the MOE reflect differences in human capital acquired
in pre-commissioning education or Navy training/experience. (Nolan, 1993)
Nolan's analysis of the surface warfare community was effective at identifying some
relationships between background factors and various measures of performance.
Additionally, the thesis provides further evidence that there is little agreement on the best
measure of officer performance. For example, the measure of early professional qualification
is often criticized as being biased by individual opportunities and command philosophies
(varying underway days between ships, command philosophy of qualification, and division
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officer responsibilities.) Indeed, similar criticisms can be applied to every other MOE.
F. SUMMARY
This study incorporates several ideas from the literature in an effort to portray a
comprehensive picture of naval officer development. While methodology, data sets, and
objectives obviously differ between studies, each of the reviewed research studies make
significant contributions to the interdisciplinary area of military officer development. As
Nolan and others make clear, a true statistical measure officer effectiveness may never be
found. The applicability of such measures depend on either the objectives of the organization,
or the analysis itself. For example, while this study will focus on the effects of various
background factors on the probability of a U.S. Navy officer becoming a "careerist", we
might never be able to determine if those career officers are in fact the most effective leaders




A. THEORETICAL MODEL DEVELOPMENT
1. Career Development
As the purpose of this study is to empirically examine the potential impact of three
unique processes—selection, professional development, and favoritism—on the career
development of naval officers, a final composite metric of career potential must first be
developed. The literature review reveals that no single measure of officer productivity,
performance, or effectiveness has been identified. Prior studies have focused on one, two,
or three of the most readily available proxies such as evaluations by superiors (fitness
reports), retention (beyond minimum service requirement (MSR)), professional qualifications,
and promotion. Earnings, commonly used in civilian economic studies, have generally been
ignored due to the hierarchical pay structure of the military and the strong linear correlation
between years of service and earnings.
Simply stated, if national security is the output of a military officer's service,
measuring individual effectiveness at meeting this goal is a difficult task. Whereas the
productivity or performance ofmost civilian professionals can be measured in financial terms,
how does one place a value of the service of a military officer in defense of a nation? Based
on these given limitations and using the very words of the USNA's mission~"a career of
Naval service"—the assumption is made here that an Academy graduate's true measure of
personal effectiveness is a career of service to the U.S. Navy. And as the focus of the
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USNA's output has traditionally been and continues to be line officers, the study incorporates
the "supremacy ofthe line" concept explored by Peter Karsten by restricting the effectiveness
measure to the unrestricted line. In the U.S. Navy, line officers have historically been
perceived as superior to and more valuable than staff or restricted line officers. (Karsten,
1972) This "supremacy of the line" concept continues today from a cost perspective when
one considers the enormous training investment made by the Navy in its nuclear officers and
jet pilots. (Bowman, 1995) Thus, the USNA's true contribution to the Navy is the
development of career naval officers in the unrestricted line.
As seen in Figure 1 above, graduation from the USNA and a career-orientation are
the two essential ingredients in the development of a career naval officer. This study will
utilize these two essential "career" ingredients-GRADUATION and CAREER
POTENTIAL~as the key criteria and thus as the dependent variables in the regression
models.
a. USNA Graduation
While some argument can be made as to the potential for midshipmen making
an individual contribution to the Navy through USNA performance, it is assumed in this study
that a midshipman's only value to the Navy is realized upon graduation and commissioning
as a junior officer. And while career-orientation is a complex dynamic involving many
external factors, graduation from the USNA is quite simple. A midshipman must have the
moral, mental, and physical discipline, talent, and motivation in order to complete the rigorous
four-year USNA program. A historical graduation rate of 75 percent of the incoming plebe
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class indicates that this essential first ingredient is neither easily attained nor impossible. The
selectivity model of USNA success, developed below, will estimate the impact of the
Academy's selection criteria on the probability ofa midshipman graduating from the USNA. 33
b. Career Potential
The study of career potential evaluates naval officers who graduated from the
USNA in terms of both retention and promotion. Retention is evaluated between the
Lieutenant (0-3) and Lieutenant Commander (0-4) promotion boards for all USNA officers
who successfully make it through the 0-3 screen (approximately 98 percent of all
commissioned officers). Promotion is measured by the 0-4 URL promotion board, at roughly
1 years of service, among those officers who have remained in the Navy to this point.
Mehay and Bowman pointed out that 0-4 promotion is "the first significant chokepoint of an
officer's career," and thus the decisions of this board significantly shape the face ofthe Navy's
career officer corps.
The models include both the officer's first significant career decision of
whether he or she wants to remain a part of the organization beyond his/her MSR, and the
Navy's first significant decision regarding the officer's relative value and whether it wants the
officer to remain a part ofthe Navy. These decisions are utilized to estimate the probability
of an officer becoming a "careerist." It is assumed that to be a career naval officer, the two
33 Midshipmen who will be commissioned as non-URL officers, as Marine Corps officers,
or into another service are virtually indistinguishable from Navy URL officers during their USNA
development. For this reason, the graduation model will examine all midshipmen. The
characteristics of these groups are presented in Appendix B.
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decisions must be answered affirmatively.
First, the USNA graduate must make the decision to stay after his/her MSR
(5 years for non-aviators, up to 7 years for aviators) expires and extend his/her career in a
URL community to the 0-4 promotion board (approximately ten years.) It is assumed that
this individual decision will be based on the strength of the officer's commitment to the
organization. Second, the Navy must make an assessment of the officer's value to the
organization at the promotion board and decide whether or not to promote the individual.
If both decisions are made affirmatively, the officer is assumed to be a "careerist."
An estimation ofthe probability ofbecoming a career officer will be made by
treating the two post-commissioning decisions jointly. The probability of becoming a
"careerist" (of these two events to occur sequentially) is simply the probability of retention
multiplied by the probability of promotion. (Newbold, 1995) For example, if an officer's
probability of retention is 0.4, but his probability of promotion is 0.8, then the probability of
that officer becoming a "careerist" is 0.32. Alternatively, the "yield rate" for 100 newly
commissioned URL officers with these retention and promotion probabilities is 32
"careerists."
The conditional relationship of retention and promotion is a limitation of this
study in that behavioral characteristics such as propensity to stay in the Navy or likelihood
of promotion are indistinguishable from one another. Two notional officers, one with a
probability of retention of 0.9 but with a promotion probability of only 0.4, and the other with
a 0.6 probability of both retention and promotion, each have the same probability of
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developing into careerists (0.36).
2. Selectivity
Selection is defined as the process of choosing for employment a subset of applicants
available for hire, and is predicated on the premise that some applicants are better suited for
a job than others. Its purpose therefore is to identify the superior candidates. (Muchinsky,
1993)
The economic foundation of this study's selectivity hypothesis for military officer
development from the service academies includes two aspects of selection behavior. First,
the USNA, and Navy as a future employer, apply a screening process through the nomination
and admissions processes. In these processes, the nomination itself as well as the Candidate
Multiple are essentially "screens" or "filters," easily measured characteristics which take the
place of more Navy-relevant measures (e.g. technical/managerial skills, commitment, and
self-discipline) in order to identify "better" candidates. The Navy relies greatly upon these
screens in making its USNA appointment decisions. 34
A self-selection process occurs when a USNA candidate first makes the decision to
compete for an appointment, and then after having received an appointment, chooses to
accept the appointment and the rigors and discipline involved with four years of full-time
military education and the post-commissioning obligation to the Navy. It is hypothesized that
USNA midshipmen, who have chosen to enter the officer corps via a service academy rather
34
This theory is based upon the work of Kenneth Arrow and John Riley, among others.
(Cited in Bowman, 1990).
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than through a NROTC scholarship or OCS program, have at a very early age a higher level
of motivation and taste for military service and thus are more likely to be career-minded.
Valuable insight into the strength of this selectivity theory can also be seen from an
Industrial and Organizational (I/O) Psychology approach. As seen above, multiple factors,
or predictors, are utilized to identify such "better" candidates. One critical factor in assessing
the utility of a predictor is the "selection ratio."35 Simply, the selection ratio (SR) is the
number ofjob openings («) divided by the number ofjob applicants (N):
SR = nM
Regardless of the other factors, the smaller the selection ratio for a firm, the greater
the predictor's utility or value. Obviously, with an SR equal to 1, even the best designed
predictor has little value. The firm will have to accept every applicant walking through its
doors. In this case, the USNA maintains an extremely low selection ratio. As an example,
for the class of 2000, whether one uses total number of applicants (9,962) or number of
applicants with a qualified nomination (4,824) as its N, the SR varies from a low of 15.3
percent to no greater than 31.6 percent. Indeed, the self-selection can also be seen in the case
ofthe Class of2000 as only 1,212 of those 1,527 accepted for appointment actually entered
the USNA. It is assumed that a majority of those with the requisite aptitude de-selected
themselves on the basis oftheir taste for the military, lowering the Class of 2000's SR to 12.2
percent. While the reliability and validity of the USNA's predictors and criteria can be
35 Muchinsky, Paul M, Psychology Applied to Work. 4th Edition, (Pacific Grove, CA:
Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1993), 154. Other factors contributing to predictor utility are criterion
reliability, criterion relevance, predictor reliability, and predictor validity.
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debated at length, it is clear that such a low selection ratio goes far towards ensuring a quality
input of students to the USNA by increasing the relative value of the predictors.
Based on the screens utilized and the quality ensured by such a low selection ratio, it
is hypothesized that the USNA's selection process and degree of selectivity play an important
and positive role in naval officer development. This study will incorporate both the overall
USNA Candidate Multiple and then the individual predictors in models in order to empirically
measure the impact of selectivity first on the probability of graduation from the USNA
(Chapter VI) and secondly on the probability of an officer developing into a careerist
(Chapter VII).
3. Human Capital
Human capital is a labor economics term intended to conceptualize workers as
embodying a set of knowledge and skills that can be rented out to employers. This set of
knowledge and skills, which comes from education and training, including the training that
experience yields, generates a certain stock of productive capital. (Ehrenberg and Smith,
1994) Human capital theory focuses on the expected returns ofhuman capital investments
both by individuals and by society. 36 These returns include a higher level of earnings, greater
job satisfaction over one's lifetime, and a greater appreciation of nonmarket activities and
interests.
The basic assumption of this theory applied to the firm or to society at-large is that
36 See for example Becker, Gary, Human Capital
,
(New York: National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1975).
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increased human capital will increase worker productivity. In this case, the Navy as an
employer (and society) is assumed to make investments in the general formal education, and
also the Navy-specific and general training of midshipmen. Investments will be made as long
as the present value of expected returns exceeds the present value of total costs. 37
Measurement of these productivity returns is especially difficult in the context of
military personnel, because no tangible final product—evaluated at market prices—is produced.
As explained earlier, the unquantifiable national defense output remains the objective ofthe
Navy and of each individual officer. As a proxy for USNA effectiveness and officer
productivity, this study assumes that the return to the Navy is in the form of a career-oriented
officer. This measure incorporates both individual retention behavior and the firm's
promotion behavior in this case of the military's "up or out" personnel system.
Human capital will be explored on three levels. First, overall USNA performance, the
Aggregate Multiple, is assumed to be the accumulated quantity of an individual's human
capital. Secondly, as in Bowman's 1990 study, the human capital model in this study
accounts for both the quality and quantity ofhuman capital investments at the USNA through
the use ofproxies. Quality of human capital is accounted for in the model through academic
grades in both academic and professional/military areas. Midshipmen with higher levels of
academic performance in these areas are assumed to have acquired a greater quality of
37
Alternative labor economics theories view higher education as providing society with a
screening device which sorts individuals by ability, or a signaling device which determines for
society those individuals who are innately productive. In both cases, it is assumed that higher
education does not augment the work place productivity of individuals. See Ehrenberg and
Smith, 1994, for a complete explanation of education as such a screening or signaling device.
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specialized or general human capital. Quantity is accounted for by academic major, as well
as leadership or athletic experience. Relative to the average midshipman, it is assumed that
an engineering major or a midshipman leader in the Brigade ofMidshipmen will have acquired
a greater quantity ofhuman capital. Based on human capital theory, it is hypothesized that
the quantity and quality ofhuman capital invested by the Navy in the individual, and by the
individual himself/herself, positively impacts the probability of an officer becoming a
"careerist."
Finally, following Wise (and Mehay and Bowman) this study will partition
accumulated human capital into stocks of cognitive and affective skills. Cognitive skills will
include the performance of midshipmen in both academic and USNA professional courses,
while affective skills will be measured utilizing both overall military performance as well as
more qualitative measurements such as leadership or athletic achievement. Based on the
previous works of Wise, and Mehay and Bowman, it is expected that increases in both
cognitive and affective skills will positively impact the career potential ofUSNA graduates.
4. Institutional Favoritism
Labor market discrimination or bias is said to exist when a subgroup ofworkers with
identical productive characteristics are subject to a pattern of unequal treatment. Such
unequal treatment could include both wage discrimination and occupational segregation. The
former refers to unequal wages for equal services, while the latter involves restricting
subgroups of a population from certain occupations or levels of responsibility. (Ehrenberg
and Smith, 1994)
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The focus here is the Navy's internal labor market. Classic discrimination studies
focus on unequal treatment based on gender, race, ethnicity, lifestyle, and even age, but not
undergraduate institution. However, a similar bias might be found in large civilian firms. A
favorable bias my be seen, for example, applied to Ivy league graduates, while a negative bias
may be applied to graduates of historically-black colleges and universities (HBCU's). Due
to the unique nature of the subject matter and limitations in the officer sample (USNA
graduates only), this study incorporates an ad-hoc model of officer representation at the
LCDR promotion board in order to investigate possible favoritism through occupation
segregation.
USNA graduates are traditionally over-represented at the higher ranks, which are
charged with the selection ofjunior officers for promotion, leading to the possibility that there
is some bias favoring USNA graduates at lower promotion boards. Therefore it will be
necessary to determine just how over-represented this subgroup has been on promotion
boards. A test of the institutional favoritism hypothesis would be to investigate the
relationship between the percentage of seniorUSNA graduates serving on a given promotion
board and the differential in the promotion outcomes for USNA graduates versus the overall
promotion rate for all Navy officers in the same years groups.
It is acknowledged that this study's definition of institutional favoritism is limited to
only the most obvious and blatant form of potential bias. Research and data restrictions make
the inclusion of more subtle areas of potential favoritism, such as the initial assignment
process or fitness report grades, beyond the scope of this study. However, these are
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interesting areas for further research.
B. EMPIRICAL MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Two groups of explanatory variables are utilized for the graduation models:
demographic variables and USNA admissions variables, which represent the selectivity of the
school. The latter group ofexplanatory variables are observed upon entering the USNA and
are expected to positively impact the individual's probability of graduation. Thus, the model
to examine the impact ofUSNA selectivity on graduation is specified as:
Selectivity: GRADUATION =/(Demographic Variables + USNA Admissions Variables)
This model will be further specified and evaluated in Chapter VI.
In the career potential models, two groups of explanatory variables—USNA
admissions (selectivity) and USNA performance (human capital)~are utilized to estimate their
impact on career development. Additionally, demographic and post-commissioning warfare
community and marital status dummy variables are included. The selectivity and human
capital explanatory variables are all observable at the Lieutenant (0-3) selection board and
are expected to positively influence an officer's decision whether or not to "stay Navy" as
well as the Navy's promotion decision.
Additional post-commissioning variables such as graduate education, fitness reports,
and qualifications which are observable at the 0-4 promotion board are not included because
they may not be observable at the time ofthe retention decision. Furthermore, as the Navy's
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promotion decision is theoretically based almost exclusively on performance and
qualifications, their inclusion would introduce a simultaneity bias into the careerist models.
Including a variable such as an individual's REP score as an independent variable would result
in essentially modeling the same promotability characteristics simultaneously on opposite sides
ofthe regression equation. Thus, two different groups of models are estimated to investigate
the two causal factors of selectivity and human capital.
Selectivity: CAREER POTENTIAL =/(Demographic Variables + USNA Admissions
Variables + Post-Commissioning Control Variables)
Human Capital: CAREER POTENTIAL =/(Demographic Variables + USNA
Performance Variables + Post-Commissioning Control Variables)
These models will be further described and analyzed in Chapter VTI.
As USNA graduate representation on a promotion board by fiscal year will be directly
related to the relative promotion opportunities by fiscal year, institutional favoritism can not
be accurately estimated in a multivariate regression model. It will be evaluated along with
the above models in Chapter VTI by cross-tabulation methodology, in order to determine any
relationship between senior USNA officer over-representation and higher promotion
opportunities for USNA junior officers.
1. Regression Methodology
This study utilizes both linear and non-linear regression techniques to estimate the
"Graduation" and "Career Potential") multivariate models. USNA graduation and career
development are utilized as dependent variables. Each model is estimated for a pooled sample
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ofUSNA midshipmen and graduates from the classes of 1980 through 1985.
Binary logistic models (LOGIT), using maximum likelihood techniques, offered the
best estimation of the graduation and "careerist" decisions, because both decisions are both
coded as binary (l=Yes, 0= No) variables. This offers a reasonable estimation, with large
sample sizes, ofthe probability ofeach outcome. Actually, the non-linear LOGIT probability
characteristic can be thought of as the "log-odds" that the decision in question will be made.
Quality of LOGIT model fit is assessed using the -2 LOG L criterion, while predictive
accuracy is estimated from the concordance ratio of paired responses. Based on the
-2 LOG L criterion, the model's overall null hypothesis of zero explanatory power will be
either rejected or not rejected. (Studenmund, 1992)
While no inference regarding model fit or quality of fit can be gained from the linear
probability models (using ordinary least squares techniques) due to the unboundedness of the
probability characteristic and inherent heteroskedasticity of the error term, these models were
utilized to assess multicollinearity, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and to obtain
comparative estimates ofthe significance and weighting of the independent variable's effects.
(Studenmund, 1992)
Next, the more efficient LOGIT estimates are evaluated at the mean level of all
independent variables, and recalculated given marginal changes in these explanatory variables.
Essentially, this transformation generates the marginal probability effect for the reference (or
notional) midshipman/officer of a change in an independent variable. (Gujarati, 1995)
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2. Hypothesis Testing
Based on the theories ofUSNA graduate selectivity and human capital investment
explored above, null hypotheses for the explanatory variables are developed and will be tested
through the regression analyses. First, in terms of graduation, we expect the degree of
selectivity, based on the USNA's selection criteria, of an individual to have a positive impact
on his/her likelihood ofgraduation. Therefore, the null (Ho) and alternative (Ha) hypotheses
are as follows:
"0 : pselectivity ^ "
**a : Pselectivity >
"
The null hypothesis states the range of values (less than or equal to 0) of the selectivity
variables' regression coefficients that are expected to occur if the selectivity theory is not
correct. The selectivity hypothesis is thus stated by the alternative hypothesis. Through
evaluation of the regression models in Chapter VI, the null hypothesis will be rejected if the
selectivity variables' P coefficients are positive. Otherwise, the null hypothesis will not be
able to be rejected, and we will not be able to prove or disprove the validity of the selectivity
theory. Since the alternative hypothesis has values on only one side of the null (or "zero")
hypothesis, "one-tailed" tests are used to determine the significance of the coefficients.
(Studenmund, 1992)
Similar hypothesis testing is used for the career potential models in Chapter VII.
Based on the underlying theories developed above, we expect both the selectivity and the
accumulated human capital of an individual to have positive impacts on career development.
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Therefore, the null and alternative hypotheses are stated as follows:
"o : PSELECTIVITY ^ "
**a : Pselectivity > "
"o" PhUMAN CAPITAL ^ "
"a" Phuman capital >
"
The null hypotheses again state the range of values of the selectivity and human capital
variables' regression coefficients that are expected to occur ifthe theories are not correct.
Regression models of career potential are estimated in order to test the hypotheses. The null
hypotheses of selectivity and human capital will be rejected if the explanatory variables' P
coefficients are positive. "One-tailed" tests are used to determine the significance of the
coefficients due to the positive specification of the alternative hypothesis.
3. Data Restrictions
The graduation models explored in Chapter VI are not intended to be representative
of all interested USNA applicants, or even all those offered letters of appointment. They
examine only the probability ofgraduation for those who are actually inducted as midshipmen.
It is further noted that by modeling graduation as a binary (l=yes or 0=no) dependent
variable, the study does not distinguish between involuntary and voluntary resignations. This
restriction will be explored in greater detail in Chapter VI.
Similarly restrictive, the models of career potential in Chapter VII are only ofthose
officers who graduated from the USNA, and were commissioned as officers in the
unrestricted line. Though the sample may or not be representative of the entire Navy officer
corps, the results are applicable to only this sub-set of officers as will be demonstrated in
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Chapter VII.
The Navy's URL officer community, as previously discussed, can be grouped into
four core designators-Surface Warfare, Submarine Warfare, Pilot, and Naval Flight Officer.
URL officers are reviewed at the same career point by common promotion boards which
ideally hold no distinction between warfare communities. Due to this and other similarities
between the career paths of officers within these communities, this study analyzes the decision
processes of the individual and the Navy pooled together in one sample. Despite the
similarities, common control variables in the career potential models are used in order to
account for the warfare community self-selection process and a possible resulting bias which
will be explored later. Previous research by Heckman and Maddala indicated that such a
bias may exist ifbetter or more qualified and/or motivated individuals are more likely to select
one community over another. For example, aggregating officers in the Navy's more selective
aviation and nuclear-power programs with officers in the less selective surface warfare
community may in fact introduce this bias. (Bowman, 1990) Additionally, separate models
are estimated by warfare community in order to identify significant discrepancies from the
common URL models. These results are presented in Appendices D through G.
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V. THE DATA
The data used in this research to estimate the various models were derived from a
number of sources. Several data sets were merged to create a very robust database for the
USNA Classes of 1980 through 1985. The merged database tracks individuals from the tenth
grade (approximately age 15-16) through their tenth year of commissioned service (ages 31-
36). In addition to its applicability to this study, the newly created database will be available
in the future for related research in the development of naval officers.
USNA applicant data come from the USNA Applicant files maintained by the Navy
Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC). USNA midshipman performance
information is derived from a number of sources, including the USNA Midshipman
Performance files also maintained by NPRDC, a matrix database of the USNA Registrar
Office, as well as historical paper records from the Office ofthe Commandant ofMidshipmen,
the Naval Academy Athletic Association (NAAA), and the USNA Trident Scholarship Office.
Post-commissioning data were derived from the Officer Promotion History Data Files
created by Bowman and Mehay and maintained at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).
This database provides demographic and background information on all officers in the major
URL communities reviewed by the 0-3 and 0-4 promotion boards from 1976 through 1995,
as well as actual promotion board results. The Bowman-Mehay file itself incorporates a file
with individual officer Fitness Report data, the Navy's Officer Master File, and the Officer
Loss File for all U.S. Navy officers in year groups 1976 through 1986 from commissioning
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as Ensigns (0-1) through their 0-4 promotion boards. Finally, the author obtained historical
Navy promotion board records in order to compile board membership lists. Table 5. 1 below
summarizes the complete sources of data.
Table 5.1 Components of the USNA Database.
Source Data Type




USNA Registrar USNA Academic
Performance
Computer-Based
USNA Institutional Research Brigade Leadership Records Hard-Copy
USNA Institutional Research Varsity Letter winner
Records
Hard-Copy
USNA Trident Scholar Office Trident Scholar Records Hard-Copy
NPS Officer Promotion & History
Files
Computer-Based
NPS Officer Master File Computer-Based
NPS Fitness Report Files Computer-Based
Navy Office of the Judge
Advocate General (OJAG)
Promotion Board Precepts Hard-Copy
After matching by Social Security Numbers (SSN) and Midshipman ID's, the above files were
merged to create one quasi-longitudinal database. The following sections highlight the




This first group of variables included in the models reflect personal demographics.
The MINI racial/ethnic group variable is binary signifying an individual's status as either a
minority or not, as identified on the USNA's applicant file. Earlier studies have attempted
to further divide this minority classification into black, Hispanic, and others. While this would
be advantageous, this sample population's relatively insignificant number of Hispanics and
others precludes this. The three groups are therefore combined into a single minority status.
FEMALE! is a binary variable38 derived from the applicant file identifying female
midshipmen/officers. Females were first admitted to the USNA with the class of 1980, the
first class of our sample. It should be noted that no females are included in the submarine
officer category due to warfare community restrictions on females entering this community.
IDAYAGE is a continuous variable of an officer's age upon entrance to the USNA,
Indoctrination Day (first week in July of plebe year.) This variable is utilized in the
"GRADUATION" models. In the "CAREER POTENTIAL" models, GRADAGE, a
continuous variable derived from the applicant file's date of birth data to determine age at
commissioning (approximately 30May of his/her year of graduation), is used. It should be
noted that the USNA does not allow anyone over the age of22 to enter the USNA, so the
age variables show little variance. Prior studies have shown that officers commissioned at an
older age are more likely to exhibit the stable behavior characteristics of career military
38 Generally binary variables are equal to 1 when something is true (e.g. minority) and
otherwise equal to (e.g. non-minority.)
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officers both at the retention decision and promotion decision points. (Mehay and Bowman,
1996)
Two additional binary demographic variable, MILFAM and PRJORNOM, are derived
from the applicant file nomination source data. MILFAM = 1 if an individual was raised in
a military family (officer or enlisted). All midshipmen who had obtained a nomination to the
USNA from one of the following non-congressional sources were assumed to be from a
military family: Medal ofHonor (sons/daughters ofMedal ofHonor recipients), Presidential
(sons/daughters of career military or retired military parents), or Deceased Veterans/
(sons/daughters of deceased veterans). While this variable may not capture all those
midshipmen who were raised in a military family, it is the most reasonable proxy given the
data available. PRIORNOM = 1 if a midshipman served on active duty as an enlisted
man/woman in the Navy or Marine Corps prior to entering the USNA. Midshipmen with a
Regular Navy and Marine nomination code are included in this category. 39 It is hypothesized
that individuals from military families and/or with prior military service will have accumulated
a lifetime ofmilitary socialization and are more likely to be oriented towards military careers
of their own.
The binary coded CIVPREP = 1 for those midshipmen who attended a civilian
preparatory school or had a minimum of one full semester at a four-year college prior to
entering the USNA. MILPREP = 1 for those individuals who attended a military prep school
39
It should be noted that prior-enlisted reservists are not included in this category due to
possible confusion with Naval Academy Prep School (NAPS) students (see below), all ofwhom
must enlist as reservists in order to attend NAPS.
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(sponsored by the USNA), prior to entering the Academy. This category includes graduates
of the following institutions: Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS), Naval Academy
Foundation-funded preparatory schools40
,
or the Navy's Broadened Opportunity for Officer
Selection and Training (BOOST) program. Post-secondary education theoretically increases
an individual's human capital prior to entering the USNA and is hypothesized to increase
his/her likelihood of graduation. Furthermore, midshipmen in the MILPREP category are
likely to have acquired a greater degree of Navy-specific training or at least military
socialization.
The binary variable RECRUIT denotes all athletes who are actively recruited by
varsity NAAA coaches in accordance with the rules of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA). NAAA recruits highly talented student-athletes in support of the
USNA's intercollegiate athletic program. The final demographic variables identify an
individual's USNA class as binary control variables. For example, CLASS80 = 1 for the
USNA Class of 1980, CLASS8J = 1 for the Class of 1981, and so on.
Table 5.2 Demographic Variables.
Variable Description ofCode
MINI 1 = Minority, = White or Unknown
FEMALE1 1 = Female, = Male or Unknown
WAYAGE Age upon entering USNA (01 July of 4th Class Year)
40 The Naval Academy Foundation annually funds a select number of prospective
midshipmen, with demonstrated outstanding leadership potential but requiring additional academic
preparation, at civilian prep schools.
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GRADAGE Age upon graduation from USNA (30May of 1st Class Year)
MILFAM 1 = Career Military Family, = Non-Military Family or Unknown
PRIORNOM 1 = Prior Active Enlisted Navy/Marine Corps, = Other
MLPREP 1 = Military sponsored Prep School, = Other
CIVPREP 1 = Civilian Prep School, = Other
RECRUIT 1 = Student-Athlete recruited by NAAA, = Other
CLASS8X 1 = USNA Class of 198X, = Other
B. USNA ADMISSIONS VARIABLES
The USNA Database at NPRDC includes applicant data on each midshipman's prior
experience and education. The data sets included represent the scores of the Candidate
Multiple and its predictors, and personal background data submitted by USNA candidates
during the application process. The applicant variables used in this research are derived both
directly and indirectly from the USNA database documentation provided by NPRDC.
(Wahrenbrock and Neumann, 1989)
The Candidate Multiple is represented by the variable CM. This empirically derived
score, which was described in great detail in Chapter II, represents the weights assigned to
individual predictors and includes the additional factor (RAB) based on the recommendation
from the USNA Admissions Board (up to +/-9000 points). Individuals whose Candidate
Multiple scores were in the highest 10 percent are coded in this research with the binary
variable TOP10CM, and the highest 5 percent are included in the binary variable TOP5CM.
Proxies for these dummies will be used in the marginal effects analysis to exhibit quantum
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leaps from the mean Candidate Multiple. Due to the whole-person nature ofthe Candidate
Multiple, it is expected to be significantly related to both USNA and fleet performance though
research by Neumann and Abrahams (1989) found no relation between the CM and early
junior officer performance. It should be noted here that the Candidate Multiple weighting
was not identical for the Classes of 1980 through 1985. As a result of the very slight
variations, the CM variable is not consistent through this sample.
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores are represented by the variables SATMHI
(Math) and SATVHI (Verbal). These scores (on a scale of 200-800) indicate an individual's
highest Math and Verbal SAT scores, or its empirically-derived equivalent from the American
College Test (ACT). SAT scores represent the quantitative and verbal aptitude of an
individual as measured by the two college admissions testing programs. 41 Individuals who
scored in the top 20 percent of both the Math and Verbal SAT are coded with the binary
variable TOPHSAT. SAT scores are expected to be significantly positive in the
"GRADUATION" analysis, yet due to the time lapse between time of the test and the
"careerist" decision points they are expected to be insignificant in the analysis of"CAREER
POTENTIAL."
Rank in secondary school class (RC) is translated to a standardized score based on an
individual's rank and the size of his/her graduating class. RC ranges from 200 to 800.
41 Research at NPRDC indicates that for multiple test-takers, their individual average SAT
score is a more accurate predictor ofUSNA performance than their individual highest score.
(Cowen and Abrahams, 1982) Since that time, individual average scores have been utilized in the
Candidate Multiple. Unfortunately, due to inconsistencies in data recording, average SAT scores
were not available for the entire sample of midshipmen in this study.
85
Individuals scoring 800 are high school valedictorians and are coded with the binary variable
NUMBER] for use in cross-tabulation, and by proxy in the marginal effects analysis. Similar
to SAT scores, high school class rank is expected to be significant related to USNA success,
but is not expected to be related to fleet performance.
RECS is a recommendation score based on high school officials' estimates of an
applicant's potential for success as a naval officer. English and Math teachers evaluate
students on communication skills, interpersonal relations, personal conduct, and leadership
potential. An objective standardized score, on a scale of to 1000, is derived from the
evaluations. As early as 1950 in the Service Academy Board report, recommendations of
teachers, employers, and coaches have been seen as the most effective method of measuring
the moral character of candidates. "Carefully constructed rating scales filled out by
individuals who have had opportunity to see and compare the candidate with his age mates
provide more valid judgements with regard to this intangible quality."42 It is therefore
assumed that midshipmen with higher RECS scores will be more likely to succeed at the
USNA and in the fleet.
Extracurricular activities (ECA's) are evaluated on the basis of an individual's
Candidate Activities Record (CAR), which covers participation from 10th to 12th grade in
both athletic and non-athletic extracurricular activities during high school. A rationally-
derived scoring system is used to compute a candidate's composite score in this area. For
example, earning a varsity letter during one's senior year might contribute 50 points to this
42 DOD Service Academy Board, 1950, 22.
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score, while being the team captain in the same sport might earn an additional 75 points. This
score which ranges from 300 to 800 is represented by the variable COMPECA. Based on the
research by Neumann and Abrahams (1989), ECA's are expected to significantly increase
one's performance at the USNA and in the fleet.
Disenrollment interest (DIS), military career interest (CIS) and technical interest (775)
are scales consisting of items from the aforementioned Strong-Campbell Interest Inventory
(SCII), a commercially-available career guidance instrument. Items from this inventory are
keyed to differentiate between USNA graduates and non-graduates, between high- and low-
tenure naval officers, and between those with high and low interest in a technically-oriented
curriculum to create the disenrollment, career, and technical interest scales, respectively. 43
They are then transformed linearly to scores with a mean of 500. DIS and CIS are expected
to be related to USNA and fleet success, respectively, due to their inherent relationships.
Table 5.3 below presents a summary of the variables derived from the Candidate
Multiple score and its individual predictors. Continuous score variables will be utilized in the
multivariate regression analysis, while the truncated binary variables will be utilized in cross-
tabulations and the marginal effects analysis.
Table 5.3 USNA Admissions Predictors.
Variable Description
CM Candidate Multiple
TOP10CM Top 10 Percent of Candidate Multiple = 1; = Other
43 For further information see Neumann and Abrahams, 1974 and 1982.
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Variable Description
SATMHI High Math SAT (200-800)
SATVHI High Verbal SAT (200-800)
TOPHSAT Top 20 Percent ofMath and Verbal SAT = 1; = Other
RC Rank in Secondary School Class (200-800)
NUMBER1 High School Valedictorian = 1; = Other
RECS HS Teacher Recommendations (0-1000)
COMPECA Composite ECA Score (300-800)
DIS Disenrollment Interest Scale
CIS Career Interest Scale
TIS Technical Interest Scale
Several binary variables, representing outstanding pre-USNA experiences, were
derived from the CAR Such experiences may be found to be useful as predictors of military
career potential. For example, an individual who has served in a significant leadership
position prior to college may in fact be a "natural leader." Or an individual who has attained
the highest rank in scouting (Eagle Scout or Gold Award), ranks which less than 20 percent
of all scouts reach, may be more likely to be oriented towards the ideals of service, discipline,
and achievement essential to military officer careers. A sampling of these variables are
provided in the following table, though not all are used in this study. The additional variables
all offer interesting prospects for future research.
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Table 5.4 Extracurricular Activity Variables Derived from CAR
Variable Description of Variable Code
VARSITY High School (HS) Varsity letter winner = 1; Other =
TEAMV Team sport Varsity letter winner = 1 ; Other =
INDV Individual sport Varsity letter winner = 1 ; Other =
CAPTAIN HS Varsity sport Captain = 1 ; Other =
ALLSTATE All-State, District, County, or City athlete = 1; Other =
ATHLETE Significant HS athletic experience {CAPTAIN or ALLSTATE) = 1; Other =
PRES HS Student Body or Class President = 1; Other =
PRESVP President or Vice-President of Student Body or Senior Class = 1; Other =
CLUBP President ofHS club or National Honor Society, Editor ofHS publication,
Director ofHS music group, or President of Church group = 1; Other =
JROTC JROTC, Sea Cadet, or Civil Air Patrol member = 1; Other =
JROTCLDR JROTC, Sea Cadet, or Civil Air Patrol officer = 1; Other =
SCOUT Boy or Girl Scout member = 1; Other =
SCOUTLDR Boy or Girl Scout Unit Leader = 1; Other =
EAGLE Highest Boy/Girl Rank (Eagle Scout or Gold Award) = 1; Other =
LEADER Significant HS leadership experience (PRES or Boy's/Girl's State state-wide
elected official or SCOUTLDR or JROTCLDR or CLUBP or Captain ofteam
sport) = 1; Other =
The admissions database, which includes a wealth of data not mentioned here,
represents a very complete picture of midshipmen prior to entering the USNA. Additional
items in the applicant data set (such as the Admissions Board Recommendation (RAB),
separate ECA for athletics and non-athletic activities, civilian work experience, parent's
education/occupation, and Physical Aptitude Exam (PAE) scores) were not used in this study
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because complete information was not available for this sample, USNA classes of 1980
through 1985. This notwithstanding, the data include almost every possible aspect of pre-
USNA life and may help to explain the success of midshipmen at the USNA and ofUSNA
graduates in the fleet.
C. USNA PERFORMANCE VARIABLES
The creation of the USNA database revealed a plethora of measurements of
midshipman performance. While not all variables are used in this analysis, the various
measurements merit mention in this section as possible tools for further analysis. The only
USNA variable used in the "GRADUATION" models is the criterion for USNA success
defined in this study, graduation/commissioning. It is represented in the data set by the binary
variable GRAB.
The composite measure ofUSNA performance, the Aggregate Multiple (described
in detail in Chapter II), is represented by the variable AGGMULT. Midshipmen with higher
AGGMULT scores are assumed to have acquired a greater stock ofhuman capital and are
therefore hypothesized to have a higher likelihood of developing into career naval officers.
As described above, the Aggregate Multiple is used to determine the final ranking of
midshipmen, the Order of Merit, identified by the variable OM, which determines service
selection. Similar to the Candidate Multiple, the weighting procedures for the Aggregate
Multiple deviated very slightly during the years in question leading to minor inconsistencies
in this variable between classes.
A binary variable, HONORG, was created from the Aggregate Multiple and Order of
90
Merit to identify those midshipmen who graduated with distinction—the top 10% of each
class—from the USNA. HONORG will be used in this research similarly to the high school
valedictorian dummy, both in cross-tabulations and marginal effects analysis.
The various components ofthe aggregate multiple were broken down from NPRDC's
midshipman performance files and indirectly through manipulation of the USNA registrar's
database. AQPR or Academic Quality Point Rating is essentially the cumulative grade point
average on a 4.0 scale of a midshipman in all academic courses. MQPR or Military Quality
Point Rating is the cumulative grade point average in all military areas—military performance,
conduct, physical education, PCR scores, and professional development courses—and is
assumed to be the best composite measure of a midshipman's Navy-specific human capital.
The registrar's matrix database was programmed to create averages for all
midshipmen by groupings of courses. The measures listed in Table 5.5 were created for this
study, all on the same 4.0 scale, though not all were used in this analysis.
Table 5.5 Grade Averages by Academic/Performance Area.
Average Grouping of Courses
COREQPR All USNA core courses required of all midshipmen regardless of major
ACADQPR All academic courses not specific to USNA (likely to be found at most leading
four-year universities)
PRDVQPR Professional Development courses only
ENGQPR Engineering courses only
MTSCQPR Math and Science courses only
HUMSQPR Humanities and Social Science courses only
PERFQPR Military Performance grades only
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Average Grouping of Courses
CONDQPR Military Conduct grades only
PCRQPR Professional Competency Review (PCR) grades only
PEQPR Physical Education courses only
Binary variables were created to represent a midshipman's academic major by the
three USNA academic groups. The classification of these variables, GRI (engineering), GRII
(math/science), and GRIII (humanities/social sciences), differ slightly from Bowman's
classification which excluded the non-accredited General Engineering and General/Physical
Science majors from academic groups I and n, respectively. Based on the findings of
Bowman (1990), humanities and social science majors are expected to be more likely to
develop into "careerists."
One ofthe more interesting aspects ofthis thesis is the analysis of midshipman leaders
as defined by qualitative measures. Prior research has focused mainly on such quantitative
performance measures as discussed above. Midshipmen leaders were grouped into three
categories of outstanding achievers or "moral, mental, and physical leaders," using three
binary variables.
Top "moral" leaders are those midshipmen who have excelled in military performance
throughout their USNA careers, have exhibited exceptional leadership potential, and are thus
assigned to first-class midshipman leadership positions within the brigade. Those individuals
were grouped into the category ofSTRIPER, representing their leadership uniform insignia
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or "stripes," by matching historical USNA hard-copy records with the registrar's database by
name and midshipman ID. STRIPER includes only those in significant leadership (vice
administrative or staff) positions with the rank of Midshipman Lieutenant Commander (4
stripes) or above, plus those Midshipman Lieutenants (3 stripes) in the position ofCompany
Commander. Company Officers are more likely to assign their top leaders to this valuable
company position rather than lose them to "out-of-company" battalion or brigade staffs.
Additionally, the Company Commander position is assumed to be a better test of an
individual's leadership potential than a staff administrative position.44
Among the USNA's "mental" or scholarly leaders are the Trident Scholars, first -class
midshipmen who, based on their academic achievement and motivation, are selected to pursue
extensive independent research in their major field. This exclusive group of scholars are
designated by the variable TRIDENT, and were identified through a historical record of
Trident Scholars. Independent research by CAPT John Bodnar, USNR (Ret.) has revealed
that in the short history of the Trident Scholarship program (1963 and on), 6 of the first 48
Tridents later became Admirals, and over half ofthose who graduated before 1975 (and can
thus be assessed for career attainment) were "still wearing a Navy uniform twenty years later
44 The same restrictions on the STRIPER designation (4 stripes and Company
Commanders) is used at the USNA for institutional research on level of minority achievement
within the brigade. See Minority Midshipmen Study Group, Report to the Superintendent on the
Status ofMinorities in the Brigade ofMidshipmen, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Academy,
1996).
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with over half ofthose being Captain's uniforms."45 Bodnar points out that this contradicts
opponents to the Trident program who argue that the program develops academic
researchers, not naval officers.
The USNA's "physical" leaders include those midshipmen who earned the varsity "N"
letter in their first-class year and are designated by the variable NLETTER, and was
determined through an investigation ofhistoricalNAAA records. In addition to the academic
and professional development which all midshipmen receive, varsity athletes must endure the
intense stress and demands of varsity athletic preparation and intercollegiate competition.
The NLETTER designation is restricted to those who earn varsity letter in their first-class year
due to the high frequency of recruited athletes who letter in their early years and then quit
their sport in order to focus on academic or military demands. In addition to greater physical
and athletic skills which may or may not enhance an individual's career potential, varsity
athletes are assumed to have greater survival and teamwork skills which are critical to a
successful naval career. (Interview, CAPT Jeffrey K. Sapp, USN, 1997)
Additional binary classifications for top USNA performers were created through
NPRDC's midshipman performance files and the registrar's database. These will be used
along with HONORG in the initial cross-tabulation analysis, and by proxy to determine the
marginal effects of such achievements. The following categories are proxies for cumulative
performance over and above the standards set for the Superintendent's, Commandant's, and
45 Bodnar, John W. CAPT USNR (Ret.), Trident Scholars: On the Road to Admiral or to
CIVLANT?. Unpublished Draft, 1996.
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Dean's Lists, which are awarded on a semester basis:
• SUPELIST - AQPR greater than or equal to 3.40, Military Performance and
Conduct averages equal to an A (4.0), PE average greater than or equal to a B
(3.0), and no average by academic group less than a C (2.0).
• DANTLIST- AQPR greater than or equal to 2.90, Military Performance average
greater than or equal to a B (3.0), Conduct average equal to an A (4.0), and PE
average greater than or equal to a B (3.0). Excludes Superintendent's List
midshipmen.
• DEANLIST - AQPR greater than or equal to 3.40, Military Performance and
Conduct averages greater than or equal to a B (3.0), PE average greater than or
equal to a C (2.0), and no average by academic group less than a C (2.0).
Excludes Superintendent's List midshipmen.
Additional variables not mentioned here have been created in order to track
midshipman development by semester, to establish trends and changing interests. While the
midshipman performance variables created in this research may exhibit significant
multicollinearity when used together, the resulting database more than adequately captures
the human capital ofmidshipmen and is a rich and valuable resource for future researchers in
this area. The variables which were selected for use in this analysis are summarized in Table
5.6.
Table 5.6 USNA Performance Variables.
Variable Description
GRAB USNA Graduate = 1; Other =
AGGMULT Aggregate Multiple
HONORG Distinguished Graduate = 1; Other =
AQPR Academic Quality Point Rating (0-4.0)
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Variable Description
MQPR Military Quality Point Rating (0 - 4.0)
ACADQPR Non-USNA Specific Academic Average (0-4.0)
PERFQPR Military Performance Average (0-4.0)
CONDQPR Military Conduct Average (0-4.0)
PRDVQPR Professional Development Course Average (0 - 4.0)
STRIPER Brigade Leader = 1; Other =
TRIDENT Trident Research Scholar = 1 ; Other =
NLETTER Varsity Letter-Winner = 1; Other =
SUPELIST Superintendent's List (by cum avg) = 1; Other =
DEANLIST Academic Dean's List (by cum avg) = 1; Other =
DANTLIST Commandant's List (by cum avg) = 1; Other =
D. POST-COMMISSIONING VARIABLES
An officer who stays in the Navy to the 0-4 board and is promoted to LCDR within
a major URL community is assumed to be a "careerist" and designated by the binary variable
CAREER. As described above, an officer commissioned into a warfare community who stays
in the Navy but does not remain in a URL community is excluded from the "careerist" pool
in this study and are coded as non-careerists. This restriction, which affects a small number
of officers (approximately 5 percent of those selected for LCDR in this study) who laterally
transfer from their URL community, is made due to the USNA's mandate to produce




For CAREER to equal 1, the following conditions must be met:
• GRAD = 1 if the officer graduated from the USNA.
• NA VYURL= 1 ifthe officer is serving in a major URL community at the 0-3 board.
• STAYER= 1 if the officer remains in the Navy between the 0-3 and 0-4 boards.
• TRANSFER = if the officer has not transferred to a non-URL community, and
thus is still in a major URL community at the 0-4 board.
• PROMOTE = 1 ifthe officer is promoted to LCDR.
Several post-commissioning variables are included in the models to control for
institutional differences by warfare community or family demographics. These variables were
taken from the Bowman-Mehay Officer Promotion History files. An individual's warfare
community is coded by the self-explanatory variables, SWO, NSWO (Nuclear SWO), SUB,
PILOT, and NFO. These data are taken from the Officer Promotion History File at the 0-3
promotion board, the best proxy for the time of an individual's retention decision. These
controls are used to account for the aforementioned potential self-selection bias by warfare
community. Officers in more selective communities such as submarine warfare and pilot may
be more motivated and possess a greater degree ofhuman capital, and may in fact be more
likely to develop into career officers. But on the other hand, they may have better civilian
opportunities and thus less likely to become "careerists."
The marital status of an individual, derived from the Officer Promotion Ffistory file
and measured at the 0-3 Board, is coded into four binary variables:
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SNC = Single, No Children
SWC = Single with Dependent Children
MNC = Married, No Children
MWC = Married with Dependent Children
Both civilians and military personnel with dependents have consistently been shown to exhibit
more stable and productive behavior, and are thus more likely to stay in the military and to
be promoted. The marital status variable is obviously time-dependent and may change
between the two career decision points in question, at the four-year point and at the 9-10 year
point. (Mehay and Bowman, 1996) This being the case, the usefulness of these variables is
questionable due to the potential for a shift in the officer's marital status from the retention
decision to the promotion decision.
Control variables to account for the fiscal year of an individual's 0-4 promotion board
are not utilized in the selectivity and human capital models due to collinearity with USNA
graduating class. For example, almost all Class of 1980 graduates who stayed in the Navy
first appeared before the FY1989 0-4 board together. The sample includes only officers who
reached the retention decision point during the Reagan military build-up years (1981-1988)
or just after, and are likely to have exhibited consistent retention behavior. In contrast, the
sample reached the 0-4 promotion point during the period 1989-1994, a period representing
the end ofthe Reagan years and the beginning of the post-Cold War military downsizing. As
a result, little variance in career orientation is expected to be related to an officer's year
group.
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The final post-commissioning variable used in this study is USNAPER, which
represents the percentage ofUSNA graduates who served as members of an individual's 0-4
promotion board. USNAPER is an independent explanatory variable used in this study to
analyze potential institutional favoritism during the promotion process. Board membership
lists for fiscal years 1985 through 1995, obtained from the Navy's Office of the Judge
Advocate General (OJAG), were matched with the USNA alumni directory to calculate this
percentage. One would reasonably assume that there is some likelihood of institutional bias
in the Navy favoring USNA graduates if a greater differential between the USNA graduate
and the overall URL officer promotion rates was found in years when the promotion board
membership was over-represented by senior USNA graduates.
Table 5.7 Post-Commissioning Variables.
Variable Description
GJRAD USNA Graduate = 1; Other =
NAVYURL Major URL Community at 0-3 Board = 1; Other =
STAYER Remained on active-duty in Navy between 0-3 and 0-4
Boards = 1;0 = Other
TRANSFER Lateral transfer between 0-3 and 0-4 Boards to non-URL
Community = 1 ; Other =
PROMOTE Promoted to LCDR = 1; = Other
SWO Surface Warfare Officer = 1; = Other
NSWO Surface Warfare Officer (Nuclear) = 1; = Other
SUB Submarine Warfare Officer = 1; = Other
PILOT Navy Pilot = 1 ; Other =





Single-No Children (0-3 Board) = 1; Other =
swc Single with Children (0-3 Board) = 1; Other =
MNC Married-No Children (0-3 Board) = 1; Other =
MWC Married with Children (0-3 Board) = 1; Other =
Early fleet performance models, such as the REP (percentage of valid fitness reports
recommended for accelerated for promotion) developed by Neumann are available, but not
included in the analysis of the career potential. These variables are not included due to the
high likelihood that early indicators of performance will influence an individual's decision to
stay in that organization and through a "halo effect" will influence the organization to
promote those individuals who display early signs of strong performance. This study is not
interested in a path analysis, where such early performance variables have been utilized in
prior research and should prove fruitful to future research. (Mehay and Bowman, 1996)
Postgraduate education variables are also excluded from the career models. Despite
analysis by Mehay and Bowman which gives strong evidence that officers with postgraduate
education (additional accumulated human capital) are significantly more likely to be
promoted, graduate education does not appear to be useful in accounting for retention
decisions. Strong economic links between graduate education and retention in the form of
additional years of service requirement bias any potential relationship. Additionally their use
leads to potential selection bias resulting from the characteristics of officers concerned with
achievement and therefore likely to pursue graduate education, and the administrative
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selection as the Navy selects officers for graduate education on the same criteria its selects
for promotion. This study of career potential ignores post-commissioning performance and
education, and focuses almost exclusively on early predictors~pre-USNA factors in the




A. USNA GRADUATION SAMPLE AND INITIAL ANALYSIS
The sample considered to analyze the effects of selectivity on USNA graduation
includes all midshipmen from the Classes of 1980 through 1985 who took the oath of office
as midshipmen on Indoctrination Day. All such midshipmen were assigned a six-digit
midshipman ID and entered into NPRDC's midshipmen performance files. This data set
contains 7,981 observations and 879 variables. Of these 7,981 midshipmen who entered the
Academy, 6,017 (or 75.4 percent) graduated as shown below in Figure 2.
The shaded boxes in Figure 2 represent the extent of this analysis. Database
restrictions prevent the analysis of candidates who were not offered an appointment or of
appointees who chose not to enter the Academy. Furthermore, voluntary and involuntary
resignations from the USNA are indistinguishable. Therefore, the results of this "Graduation"
analysis are applicable only to actual midshipmen. Any generalization of the results to the
greater population of high school graduates, or even of those interested in and/or with the
aptitude for USNA life, are limited to the extent that this sample is representative of the
greater populations.
The sample ofUSNA midshipmen in this study, and the variables used in the cross-

















Figure 2. Flowchart of Midshipmen towards Graduation
in USNA Graduation Sample
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In the "GRADUATION" analysis, the variable GRAD serves as the dependent
variable. This variable has a value of 1 for midshipmen who graduate from the USNA,
regardless ofbranch of commissioned service, and a value of for those who do not graduate
(either voluntarily or involuntarily.) Overall, 75.4 percent of those who entered the USNA
eventually graduated.
While the data set represents a very robust set of pooled cross-sectional data on
USNA midshipmen, this type of data may present problems in the form of serial correlation
from the time-series nature of pooled data, as well as heteroskedasticity from the cross-
sectional data. The heteroskedasticity is further increased by the nature of binary dependent
variables. (Studenmund, 1992) Multicollinearity will be found among a number of the
variables, and will be accounted for in the modeling specifications. For example, individuals
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with high SAT scores are also likely to have high class rank scores.
The following graphs provide a preliminary analysis of the data in the
"GRADUATION" models. USNA graduation (GRAD) is cross-tabulated with a number of
variables. The figure below indicate the actual percentage of midshipmen in each sub-group
who graduated from the USNA. Figure 3 breaks midshipmen down by demographic
category, Figure 4 by mental aptitude/USNA potential category, Figure 5 by ECA, and Figure
6 by Candidate Multiple percentile group.
Figure 3 shows that females and minority midshipmen, as well as prior enlisted
personnel, graduated at a much lower rate than the USNA average of 75.4 percent. Based
on this finding, the null and alternative hypotheses for Pm^ and Pfemale] are specified as the
reverse of the selectivity variables' null hypotheses. We expect the coefficient signs to be
negative for the minority demographic groups. This specification is additionally supported
by a 1993 General Accounting Office report on gender and racial disparities at the USNA.
(General Accounting Office, 1993)
The military preparatory schools are charged with "building a level playing field" for
such minorities and prior-service personnel, and appear in Figure 3 to have been moderately
effective at doing so.47 As prep school midshipmen appear to graduate at a slightly higher
rate than the mean, it will be interesting to see the independent effect ofthese variables in the
47 For further discussion on the roles and performance of the service academy preparatory
schools, see General Accounting Office, POD Service Academies . (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1992); and Moskos, Charles C, and John Sibley Butler, All That We






USNA Graduation Rate by Demographic Group
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Figure 4.
USNA Graduation Rate by Aptitude
FEMALE1 I MILPAM > RECRUfT I OVPREP
USNAAvtrag* MINI PRIORNOM MILPREP
Figure 5.
USNA Graduation Rate by ECA Category
Figure 6.






Figure 4 indicates that the Candidate Multiple, SAT's, and secondary school class
rank (as represented by binary variables) all play a role in USNA success, though no
conclusions can be gained from this initial analysis. Figure 5 shows that of the superlative
ECA categories analyzed, all but JROTCLDR graduated at a higher rate than the mean.
Most outstanding is the 81 .2 percent graduation rate ofEagle/Gold Award Scouts. Figure
6 shows a near linear relationship between the Candidate Multiple, as grouped by quintile, and
USNA graduation rate. While this relationship is expected, given the validation efforts of
NPRDC analysts, multivariate regression analysis will be required in order to reject the null
hypothesis (coefficient less than or equal to 0) and to test the significance of this relationship.
B. "GRADUATION" MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
1. "GRADUATION" Model Specification
After having completed this description ofthe sample populations and the explanatory
variables, the exact specification ofthe estimating models can be described. As explained in
Chapter IV, models ofthe first naval officer development criterion~GRADUATION~can be
estimated to examine the selectivity hypothesis and to identify significant early predictors.
These models are specified below:
"GRADUATION" Selectivity Model One:
GRADUATION = a + PiMTNl + P2FEMALE1 + P3MILFAM +
P4PRIORNOM + P 5RECRUIT + P6CIVPREP + p7MILPREP + P 8CM +
P9CLASS81 + P 10CLASS82 + PnCLASS83 + P 12CLASS84 + P 13CLASS85
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"GRADUATION" Selectivity Model Two:
GRADUATION = a + p,MINl + P2FEMALE1 + P 3MTLFAM +
P4PRIORNOM + P 5RECRUIT + P6CIVPREP + P7MILPREP + p gSATMHI +
P9SATVHI + p i0RC + PURECS + p 12COMPECA + P 13DIS + p 14EAGLE +
p 15LEADER + p i6ATHLETE + P 17CLASS81 + p igCLASS82 + P 19CLASS83 +
P20CLASS84 + P21CLASS85
Model One analyzes the impact of demographics and the composite Candidate Multiple on
the probability of USNA graduation. 48 While the CM is the USNA's primary selection
measurement tool, the reader is reminded of the heavy weight assigned to cognitive skill
measures such as SAT's and class rank, which may bias the measure. Essentially, this
"Whole-Person" value measure is better classified a "Cognitive + other" multiple. Therefore,
it is necessary to evaluate the individual admissions predictors as well.
Model Two builds on the first graduation model by breaking out the weighted
Candidate Multiple into its individual components, and by including the USNA disenrollment
interest scale and selected binary dummy variables representing outstanding pre-USNA
experiences. In this second model, SAT and class rank are grouped into the category of
cognitive skills, while recommendations, the disenrollment interest scale, and ECA's are
assumed to be affective skills in that they increase the ease of assimilation into the USNA's
military environment. The two models thus estimate the effects of overall selectivity and
specific selection criteria, respectively, on the probability ofUSNA graduation.
48 The variable IDAYAGE is not included in these model specifications due to an
extremely high number of missing observations (1,761), which would greatly reduce the
"Graduation" sample size in the regression analysis.
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2. Results of "GRADUATION" Models
Table 6.1 below shows the results of estimated "GRADUATION" LOGIT models.
Due to the presence of random missing data in the Candidate Multiple and other predictor
data fields, the regression models captured only 7,849 and 7,841, respectively, of the
observations in the sample. This accounts for a respective loss of 1.65 percent and 1.75
percent of the sample, and is not considered to be significant.
The -2 LOG L criterion, from the logistic model, is applied to assess model fit. The
X
2
values range from 256 with 13 degrees of freedom (Model 1) to 306 with 23 degrees of
freedom (Model 2). Both models had p-values of 0.0001 . Therefore, the null hypotheses of
zero explanatory power are rejected, and it is concluded that the models do have some
explanatory power. The concordance ratios are 0.623 for the more simple Candidate Multiple
model and 0.633 for Model two. The concordance ratio is used as a measure of the
predictive accuracy of the model by pairs of responses, and essentially indicates that these
models are able to correctly "predict" a GRAD response of or 1 for a minimum of 62.3
percent of the observations. (SAS Institute, 1985)
Examination of the linear probability model (results not shown here) provided
assurance ofthe coefficient's level of significance, and provided tests to disprove the presence
oftroublesome multicollinearity, serial correlation, and heteroskedasticity. Slight, though not
troublesome, multicollinearity is found due to the positive correlation between MILPREP and
PRIORNOM (r = 0.32), ATHLETE and RECRUIT (r = 0.37), SATMHI and SATVHI (r =
03S),SAJMHI and RC (t = 0.31), ATHLETE and COMPECA (r = 0.41), and LEADER and
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COMPECA (r = 0.37); and negative correlation between CM and RECRUIT (r = -0.3 1), and
CM and MILPREP (r = -0.36). High x2 values ranging from 412 to 761 in the linear
probability model reveal the inherent heteroskedasticity found in cross-sectional data.
Heteroskedasticity is the result ofthe error term variance ofthe model not being constant, and
may lead to an overestimation of the significance of the P coefficients. (Studenmund, 1992)
Table 6. 1 shows the P parameter estimates from the two maximum likelihood logistic
models ofUSNA graduation. Significance has been determined by a "one-tailed" analysis of
the binary logistic models, utilizing the Prob > x
2
test statistic. We are able to reject the null
hypotheses for all of the selectivity variables in the models with the exception ofLEADER,
ATHLETE, and CIVPREP. The logistic models show that the following explanatory variables
are significant at the 1 percent level: FEMALE1 (-), MLFAM (+), PRIORNOM (+)
MILPREP (+), SATMHI (+), RECS (+), COMPECA (+), DIS (+), and EAGLE (+). The
variablesMINI (-), RECRUIT (+), and SATVHI (+) are significant at the 5 percent level. The
reader is reminded that the logistic model does not offer easy interpretation of the P
coefficients. They represent the one-unit change in an independent variable, holding all else
constant, on the log of the odds of graduation, not on the actual probability itself. More
accurate estimates ofthe marginal effects of changes in these variables are calculated below.
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Table 6.2 LOGIT Parameter Estimates for USNA GRADUATION Models.
























Concordance Ratio 0.623 0.632
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Model One Model Two
-2LOGL 256.415 299.408
Sample Size 7849 7841
Note: *** Significant at the .01 Level (one-tailed test)
** Significant at the .05 Level (one-tailed test)
* Significant at the . 10 Level (one-tailed test)
The results indicate that there are many important factors that are associated with the
probability of a midshipman graduating from the USNA. The demographic variables show
that females, minorities, and prior-enlisted midshipmen are less likely to complete the four-
year USNA program, holding all else constant.
As expected, the military prep schools, including NAPS, the Naval Academy
Foundation scholarship program, and BOOST, appear to significantly improve a
midshipman's probability of graduation. This finding provides support for the efficacy of
these programs which, as explained earlier, help to build a level playing field for incoming
midshipmen. It appears that what these programs offer in addition to an extra year of
academic preparation—additional military development and military socialization prior to the
USNA plebe year-explains the differential between the MILPREP and CIVPREP P
coefficients. MILPREP is significantly and positively associated with the probability of
graduation, while CIVPREP is insignificant and has a negative coefficient.
The selection criteria employed by the USNA Office of Admissions all, to varying
degrees, appear to improve a midshipman's probability of graduation. This finding is
expected, given the extensive Candidate Multiple validation efforts by NPRDC utilizing
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graduation as one of its criteria.
The coefficients from the LOGIT models are used to calculate the marginal effects of
the demographic and selection variables on the probability ofUSNA graduation. First, the
baseline probability of graduation is calculated for the reference (or notional) midshipman.
The reference midshipman in both Models One and Two is a Class of 1980 white male who
attended neither a military nor civilian prep school, was neither an athletic recruit nor a prior-
enlisted servicemember, and was not from a military family. The reference midshipman in
Model One had the mean Candidate Multiple score of63,157, while the reference midshipman
in Model Two had the mean score for each individual predictor and was neither a high school
athlete nor a leader. The probability ofgraduation for this "base case" individual was 0.7464
and 0.7474, respectively. The marginal effect is the difference in this probability due to
changing the value ofthe binary dummy variables from to 1 and changes equal to one-tenth
of the mean for the continuous variables, while holding all other variables constant.
Additionally, marginal effects are calculated for the dummy variables derived from the
Candidate Multiple, SAT's, and class rank, by substituting these changes to the base case
scores. For example, the marginal effect of NUMBER! represents the increase in the
probability of graduation for a high school valedictorian with the maximum RC, over an
individual with the mean RC score. Table 6.3 below provides the marginal effects.
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Table 6.3 Marginal Effects of Changes in the
Explanatory Variables on the Probability ofUSNA Graduation.
Model One Model Two
Reference Probability 74.64 % 74.74 %
MINI -3.47% -3.57%
FEMALE1 -15.78% -16.95 %
MILFAM +4.24 % +4.45 %
PRIORNOM -10.23 % -8.26 %
RECRUIT +2.35 % +2.20 %
CTVPREP NS NS
MILPREP +7.00 % +7.33 %
CM +9.11% --
SATMHI ~ +2.57%
SATVHI -- +0.81 %







NUMBER1 * ~ +8.59 %
TOPHSAT * ~ +4.90 %
TOP10CM * +9.59 % —
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Model One Model Two
TOP5CM * + 10.86% —
Notes: (1) Marginal effects calculated for reference midshipman. (See text.)
(2) * indicates effects of changes in related variables from the mean to achieve a
proxy for these variables, (e.g. For NUMBER], RC = 800)
(3) All marginal effects are significant at . 10 level (one-tailed test) or greater.
(4) NS = Not significant.
Table 6.3 shows, for example, that a ten percent deviation from the mean Math SAT
score of 666 to 733 (holding other variables constant) is associated with a positive 2.57
percentage point difference in a midshipman's probability of graduation. This amounts to a
3.4 (.0257 -=- .7474) percent increase in the probability of graduation.
Of special note are the high negative marginal effects attributed to minority group
members (-3.47 and -3.57 percentage points), gender (-15.78 and -16.95 percentage points),
and prior military service (-10.23 and -8.26 percentage points), as well as the positive
marginal effects of a military family background (+4.24 and +4.45 percentage points), the
military prep school experience (+7.00 and +7.33 percentage points), Eagle Scout/Gold
Award attainment (+4.12 percentage points), and athletic recruitment (+2.35 and +2.20
percentage points). The top scorers on the Candidate Multiple (TOP5CM) and high school
class valedictorians, both notable accomplishments, are associated with a positive 10.86 and
8.59 percentage point difference, respectively, indicating 14.6 and 11.5 percent increases in
the probability of graduation over the base case midshipman.
Perhaps all of these are expected, with the exception ofRECRUIT. Conventional
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wisdom says that collegiate athletic coaches will take a chance on less gifted student-athletes
in order to improve their athletic programs. The data here (significantly positive for
RECRUIT and not significant for the ATHLETE variable) suggest that NAAA coaches are
concerned with recruiting student-athletes who not only have the athletic talents to improve
their sports programs, but also who are more likely to complete the rigorous four-year USNA
program and be commissioned as officers in the Navy and Marine Corps.
Analysis of the individual admissions predictors in Column 2 of Table 6.3 shows that
increases in the six primary components of the Candidate Multiple all significantly increase
the probability ofUSNA graduation. 49 As stated above, this finding is expected, as are the
greater positive effects ofthe cognitive/scholastic measure, secondary school class rank, and
the cognitive/quantitative aptitude measure, Math SAT. These predictors appear best suited
to the technically-oriented USNA academic program. It is clear, however, that both the
cognitive and affective measures of selectivity are important factors in completing the
four-year USNA program.
Given the weighting ofthe Candidate Multiple, this analysis effectively validates the
selectivity hypothesis of this study, as well as the efforts and stated goals of the USNA
admissions office. But, as explained above, this study seeks a longer term approach to
personnel selection. USNA graduation and commissioning as Ensign in the U.S. Navy is just
one step in the development of career naval officers. Given the current near-term approach
49 TIS and CIS are not relevant to likelihood of graduation, and thus not included in these
models.
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ofUSNA admissions and the time lag between plebe year and promotion to LCDR, findings
as significant as this model may not be duplicated in the following models of the effects of
selectivity on post-commissioning career potential.
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Vn. CAREER POTENTIAL ANALYSIS
A. CAREER POTENTIAL SAMPLE AND INITIAL ANALYSIS
The sample used to analyze career potential includes all individuals who graduated
from the USNA (GRAD = 1), entered a Navy URL officer community upon commissioning
(NAVYURL = 1), and remained on active duty through the 0-3 promotion board
(approximately four years.) This restricted data set for the USNA classes of 1980 through
1985 excludes both Marine Corps officers and restricted line/staff corps officers. Of the
6,017 USNA graduates in the Chapter VI analysis, only 5,051 were commissioned as Navy
Ensigns. Almost 1,000 of these officers either entered staff, restricted line, General
Unrestricted Line (GURL), or other communities, or were separated from the Navy prior to
being screened for Lieutenant. 50 Figure 7 below demonstrates this flow. The restrictions
resulted in a final sample size of 4,095 for analysis. This sub-set will be used to create the
selectivity, and human capital models of"CAREER POTENTIAL."
The shaded boxes in Figure 7 represent the "yield" of career-oriented URL
officers from the total supply ofURL Lieutenants from the USNA Classes of 1980 through
1985. The results of this analysis, therefore, are applicable only to the USNA graduates in
the major URL communities at the 0-3 board. No attempt is made to control for the self-
selection of officers into the major URL communities. The results of this analysis can
50 Data on service selection choices and community designation as Ensigns, as well as data























Figure 7. Flowchart of USNA Graduates into
Navy URL Sample towards "Careerist" Attainment.
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therefore be generalized to other USNA graduates only to the extent that the sub-set ofURL
officers is representative of Marine officers, and non-URL, Special Warfare, and Special
Operations Navy officers. To this end, the characteristics of the following groups ofUSNA
graduates are presented in Appendix B:
• All USNA graduates (GRAD = 1);
• Navy graduates in the major URL communities at 0-3 (NAVYURL =1);
• Navy graduates not in the major URL communities at 0-3 (Staff, Restricted Line,
Special Operations, Special Warfare, and officers separated prior to 0-3);
• USMC graduates;
• Other graduates (Army, Air Force, or no commission).
Analysis of Appendix B shows that the pre-USNA and USNA characteristics of officers in
the major URL communities are noticeably greater than other graduates, indicating a higher
level of selectivity and accumulated human capital in this URL sub-set which represents the
focus ofthe USNA's mission.
An additional restriction of this database is shown in Figure 7 by the flow ofURL
officers who reached the rank of Lieutenant. The study does not attempt to control for the
decisions ofofficers who elect to leave the major URL communities (e.g. transfer from SWO
to Engineering Duty Officer (EDO)), who leave the Navy entirely, or who are passed over
for promotion to LCDR. The flow out ofthe Navy accounts for the greatest loss of potential
"careerists," 2,042 officers. Only 164 (or 4 percent of the major URL sub-set) laterally
transfer, while 423 (or 22.4 percent of those URL officers who stayed to the 0-4 board) are
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not selected for LCDR. The characteristics of these groups of officers (major URL,
"careerists," "leavers," lateral transfers, and non-promotees) are presented in Appendix C.
Most noteworthy from Appendix C is that while the pre-USNA selection characteristics of
the "careerist" group is below the sample mean, their USNA performance characteristics are
superior to all other groups. This suggests perhaps that "careerists" are a cut above other
junior URL officers in terms of motivation, and that the Navy is retaining and promoting the
top USNA graduates. These decisions in Figure 7, however, are indistinguishable in the joint
retention/promotion analysis of the progression from Lieutenant to career officers.
Finally, Figure 7 shows that the "yield" of "careerists" from the original 4,095 Navy
URL Lieutenants from the Classes of 1980 through 1985 is 1,466 officers, or 35.80 percent
of the USNA graduates in this sub-set. Table 7. 1 below presents the means and standard
deviations of all variables which are used for analysis of the URL sample.
As stated above, CAREER is the dependent variable in the analysis of career potential
and has a value of 1 for the nearly 50 percent ofURL Lieutenants who remain in the Navy
between the 0-3 and 0-4 boards (STAYER) and the nearly 80 percent whom are promoted
to LCDR (PROMOTE) in a major URL community. Of the 164 officers excluded from the
category of "careerists" laterally transferring from the URL, 135 officers (or 82.3 percent of
the lateral transfers) were promoted to 0-4. Overall, this accounts for a loss ofjust over 8
percent ofthe officers promoted to LCDR.
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Like the "Graduation" data set in Chapter VI, this sample represents a very robust set
of pooled cross-sectional data. And like the previous data set this data may introduce
problems of serial correlation from the time-series nature of pooled data, and
heteroskedasticity from the cross-sectional data. (Studenmund, 1992) Correlation is even
greater among a number of these variables given the focus of the USNA on academics,
increasing the potential for multicollinearity. For example, midshipmen with higher academic
grades are obviously likely to have higher averages by subject area, and stripers are selected
primarily on the basis of their military performance grades, and at least in part on academic
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performance.
1. Initial Selectivity and Human Capital Analysis
An initial analysis ofthe "CAREER POTENTIAL" data samples is presented below.
Cross-tabulations of"careerist" and selected variables indicate the percentage ofNavy URL
Lieutenants who developed into career naval officers for various sub-groups. Essentially, the
following bar graphs represent the "careerist yield rate" within a given category of URL
officers. Figure 8 breaks the sample down by demographics, Figure 9 by selection criteria,
Figure 10 by USNA performance, and Figures 11 and 12 by Candidate Multiple and
Aggregate Multiple percentile groups.
Figure 8 shows that career development varies greatly by demographic group.
Females and minorities appear to lag behind their peers in terms of career development,
leading again to the expectation of negative signs for their coefficients in the multivariate
analysis. In contrast, officers from military families and prior-enlisted personnel develop into
"careerists" at a higher rate than the USNA average of 35.8 percent. This is perhaps due to
their early orientation to military life. Officers from prep schools also appear to be more
career-oriented. This again begs the question ofwhy minority officers, who are more likely
to attend military prep schools, do not develop into career officers at a comparable rate. 51
As expected, officers with the superlative measures of the USNA selection criteria in
Figure 9, with the notable exception of TOPHSAT, all appear to increase the "careerist" rate
51 For a more detailed analysis of the development of minority naval officers, see Bowman,
William R. and Stephen L. Mehay, Career Advancement of Minority Officers in the U.S. Navy .
(Paper presented at the 1996 Western Economic Association Annual Conference, 1996).
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Figure 8.
"Careerist" Yield Rate by Demographic Group
Figure 9.
"Careerist" Yield Rate by Selection Criteria
50
FEMALE1 I MILFAM I RECRUIT I CIVPREP
USNAAverag* MINI PRIORNOM MILPREP
TOP10CM I NUMBER1 I ATHLETE
USNA Average TOPHSAT LEADER EAGLE
Figure 10.
'Careerist" Yield Rate by Performance Criteria
60
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Figure 11.
'Careerist" Yield Rate by Candidate Multiple
Figure 12.
'Careerist" Yield Rate by Aggregate Multiple
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ofUSNA graduates to some degree. In addition to the below-average category of high SAT
scorers, it is worth noting the extraordinarily above-average "careerist" yield rate for
Eagle/Gold Award Scouts, 44.5 percent.
The top measures ofUSNA performance in Figure 10 also appear to benefit the career
development of its graduates, again as expected. Most outstanding is the 55 percent
"careerist" yield rate of Trident Scholars, who, though they represent an extremely small
sample size (n = 20), appear to be very successful in the fleet. Some minor variation in career
development is seen by academic major, though its significance is unclear.
The grouping ofUSNA graduates by Candidate Multiple quintile in Figure 1 1 does
not reveal any trends. In fact, the highest careerist rate is seen by the lowest 20th percentile
of USNA candidates~37.3 percent. Aggregate Multiple as well does not offer any clear
trends, except at the extremes. The highest quintile of midshipmen become "careerists" at a
rate well above the USNA average, while the lowest quintile develop at a rate well below the
average. Between the two extremes, no obvious trends are revealed.
At this point it is worth noting an interesting phenomenon in the analysis of career
potential. As explained above, the "careerists" in this study must display both retention and
promotability behaviors. A quick glance below at Table 7.2 applied to two distinct groups—
prior-enlisted personnel and USNA varsity letter-winners—shows that these two behaviors
are very different.
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Table 7.2 Analysis of Retention vs Promotability Behavior.
PRIORNOM NLETTER TOTAL
SAMPLE
RETENTION RATE (STAY) 57.69% 48.73% 50.13%
PROMOTION RATE (PROMOTE) 72.22% 82.84% 77.98%
"CAREERIST" RATE (CAREER) 38.46% 36.36% 35.80%
While prior-service personnel stay to the LCDR board at a rate of almost 60 percent, their
overall careerist rate is only marginally higher than USNA letter-winners. In contrast, while
letter-winners stay at a below-average rate, varsity athletes who do stay are promoted at
much higher rate than the USNA graduate average. While this may be perceived as a
limitation in this analysis, the Navy is concerned with more than the rate at which officers
choose to make the Navy a career. It is also concerned with choosing (and promoting) the
very best people for its career officer force. The ability ofthe "careerist" measure to capture
this joint retention/promotion phenomena enhances the value of this research to the Navy.
2. Initial Institutional Favoritism Analysis
This study seeks to investigate the possible presence of institutional favoritism or bias
at the 0-4 promotion board. Members of statutory promotion boards are selected to serve
on boards on the basis oftheir career performance and experiences, and are selected in order
to represent a diverse and heterogeneous officer corps. The guiding precepts of the
promotion boards for the period in question were examined for possible bias. No evidence
of preferential treatment for any individual group of officers was found, with the exception
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ofa statutory requirement that officers with Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) or
experiences be promoted at a rate not less than the overall URL promotion rate. (Department
of the Navy, 1986-1995)
The members of the board, listed on the precepts, were then examined for their
commissioning sources to determine whether an over- or under-representation ofUSNA
graduates biased the promotion process in any way. For the period in question, USNA
representation on the URL LCDR boards ranged from a low of a 28.57 percent in FY1991
to a high of 42.86 percent in FY1990 and FY1993. Such USNA representation by senior
officers (0-6 and above) appeared neither extraordinarily high or low when compared to
historical representation ofUSNA graduates in the Navy URL communities at the grades of
0-6 and above. 52
The next step was to look at the LCDR promotion rates for these years for USNA
graduates and all URL officers to determine if any relationship existed. Officer promotion is
driven by Navy requirements at the higher level and by vacancies at that higher grade.
Promotion opportunities thus vary slightly from year to year. As a result of this dynamic,
promotion opportunity for individual groups can only be analyzed relative to other groups or
to the overall rate for that given year. Table 7.3 below presents the promotion rates for
USNA graduates and the overall promotion rates for the primary years of this study in order
to explore possible bias.
52 As ofDecember 1996, USNA graduates made up 25.0 percent ofURL LCDR's, 31.5
percent ofURL CDR's, 37.3 percent ofURL CAPT's, and 48.8 percent ofURL Flag officers.
Statistics obtained from USNA Office Of Institutional Research.
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Table 7.3 U.S. Navy Active URL LCDR Promotion Boards (FY1990-FY1995).
FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95
B&ard Members (USNA%) 419% mm* SS.7% 42,9% 35J% 29.4%
USNA Promotion Rate 0.790 0.834 0.818 0.845 0.709 0.730
Total URL Promotion Rate 0.764 0.754 0.781 0.775 0.707 0.703
Bilferentiai Promotion
Rate {USNA - Total URL)
0.026 0.M0 am? 0.070 0M02 0.027
Analysis of this table shows no readily apparent trends, though we are limited to only
six year's of data. A statistical t-test for correlation between the USNA Board representation
and the differential promotion rates revealed no signs of a significant relationship. In fact, the
greatest differential between USNA promotion rate and the rate for all URL officers is seen
in FY 1991, when the percentage ofUSNA graduates on the board is the smallest of the six
years in question. If anything, this one year indicates the possible inverse ofthe institutional
favoritism theory which predicts that USNA graduates are promoted at a higher rate than
their peers on the basis of the over-representation of senior USNA "ring-knockers" on the
board. Further analysis will be required before any significant conclusions can be reached
regarding the presence in the Navy of a bias favoring USNA junior officers.
B. "CAREER POTENTIAL" MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
1. Selectivity Model Specification
The selectivity models of "Career Potential" are now able to be better specified after
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having completed a full data description of the Navy URL Lieutenant sub-set of USNA
graduates and an initial cross-tabulation analysis of the USNA selection criteria.
Selectivity Model One:
Career Potential = a + p xMINl + p2FEMALEl + P3MILFAM +
P4PRIORNOM + P 5RECRU1T + P6CIVPREP + P7MELPREP + p gCM +
P9CLASS81 + P 10CLASS82 + PnCLASS83 + P 12CLASS84 + P 13CLASS85 +
P 14GRADAGE + p i5NSWO + P I6SUB + p 17PILOT + P 18NFO + P 19SWC +
P20MNC + p21MWC
Selectivity Model Two:
Career Potential = a + PiMINl + p2FEMALEl + P3MILFAM +
P4PRIORNOM + P 5RECRUIT + P6CIVPREP + P7MILPREP + P 8SATMHI +
P9SATVHI + p 10RC + PURECS + P 12COMPECA + P 13CIS + P 14EAGLE +
P 15LEADER + P 16ATHLETE + P 17CLASS81 + P lgCLASS82 + P 19CLASS83 +
p20CLASS84 + P21CLASS85 + P22GRADAGE + P^NSWO + P24SUB +
p25PILOT + P26NFO + P27SWC + P28MNC + P29MWC
Selectivity Models One and Two estimate the effects of selectivity on the probability of an
officer in the USNA graduate sample developing into a "careerist." The models are similar
to the graduation models, and similarly account for the skewed nature of the Candidate
Multiple. First selectivity is measured as a weighted composite factor, and in Model Two
selectivity is modeled by a number individual predictors. Post-commissioning controls are
added to the models, and the USNA Disenrollment Interest Scale is replaced by the more
relevant Career Interest Scale in Model Two. The definition ofthe base case is expanded here
to include the average graduation age of 22.44, the Surface Warfare community and Single
No Children (SNC) marital status, both measured at the 0-3 board.
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2. Results of Selectivity Models
Table 7.4 below shows the results of the estimated selectivity LOGIT models of
"Career Potential" for Navy URL officers. The presence of missing data fields in the sample
restricted the observations in the models to 4,030 and 3,955 officers, respectively. The
-2 LOG L criterion, from the logistic model, are applied to assess model fit. The x2 values
ranged from 1 19 with 21 degrees offreedom to 153 with 29 degrees of freedom, both with
p-values equal to 0.0001 . Therefore, the null hypotheses of zero explanatory power for the
models are rejected. The predictive accuracies ofthe models are estimated using concordance
ratios, 0.600 for the more simple composite multiple model and 0.614 for the individual
predictor model.
The linear probability models are again analyzed (results not presented here) to test
for significant specification errors in the form of multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, or serial
correlation, and to ensure that the coefficients have signs and levels of significance consistent
with the LOGIT models for one-tailed tests. Some multicollinearity is found in these models
due to similar correlation between the variables as was seen in Chapter VI'
s
"GRADUATION" models. Again, this slight multicollinearity, indicated by Variance Inflation
Factors (VDF's) < 2 and relatively low simple correlation coefficients (no r's greater than
0.42), is assumed not to bias the models in any way. As with the "Graduation" models,
however, the high x
2
values ranging from 336 to 651 and Prob>x2=0.00001 reveal inherent
heteroskedasticity common to cross-sectional data, leading to a possible overestimation of
the coefficients in the linear probability models. (Studenmund, 1992)
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The selectivity models show that the following variables are significant at the 1
percent level: MILFAM (+), COMPECA (+), EAGLE (+), PILOT (+), NFO (+), and SUB
(+). At the 5 percent level MINI (-), GRADAGE (+), SATMHI (-), and CIS (+) are
significant. SATVHI(+) is significant at the 10 percent level. Table 7.4 shows the parameter
estimates and level of significance across the two selectivity models. Additionally, model
results by warfare community are presented in Appendices D-G.
The results in Table 7.4 indicate that a number of the selectivity factors are
significantly related to the probability ofan officer developing into a "careerist." First looking
at demographics, minority status is negatively associated with becoming a "careerist" whereas
military family status is positively associated with the "careerist" measure. A possible
explanation for this is an extraordinarily high taste for military life among individuals raised
in a military environment, and a below average taste for military life among minority
households. As expected, the age at graduation of an individual is significant and positive.
Labor economics statistics consistently show that older individuals are more stable and career-
oriented in their decision-making. Marital status of officers does not appear to be significant,
though the reader is reminded that marital status is observed at the 4 year point of an officer's
career and is likely to change between the timing of the retention and promotion decisions.
This time lag makes the validity of the marital status dummy variables questionable.
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Table 7.4 LOGIT Parameter Estimates for Selectivity Models of Career Potential.


































Concordance Ratio 0.600 0.614
-2LOGL 118.709 152.763
Sample Size 4030 3955
Note: *** Significant at the .01 Level (one-tailed test)
** Significant at the .05 Level (one-tailed test)
* Significant at the . 10 Level (one-tailed test)
The Candidate Multiple has no significant effect on career potential, while a number
of the individual predictors have significant effects. Despite the level of significance of
SAJMHI, its negative coefficient does not agree with the selectivity hypothesis, and we
therefore cannot reject the individual null hypothesis for this selection criterion. Indeed, the
two most essential cognitive criteria from the "Graduation" analysis, Math SAT and Class
Rank, appear to be associated with a decrease in an individual's probability of developing into
a career naval officer. This finding is quite unexpected, especially when one considers the
high weight given to these criteria by the USNA Admissions Office. If the USNA is actively
seeking applicants with strong cognitive abilities, especially quantitative ability, to meet the
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needs of a technologically-advanced Navy, we would expect these skills to increase fleet
performance. The significantly opposite signs of the Math and Verbal SAT also bring into
question the needs of a naval officer, in that math aptitude is more commonly associated with
technical abilities and verbal aptitude is more easily associated with managerial abilities.
Two possible explanations can be applied to the significant and positive coefficient
ofthe Eagle Scout/Gold Award Scout. One is that this significant early predictor of career
potential is the result of the quasi-military nature of the Boy/Girl Scouts of America, which
imbue young men and women with such qualities as service, discipline, loyalty, and
citizenship. But this finding more likely indicates that individuals with a drive for high
achievement and lofty goals early in life are most likely to display the same character traits in
their military careers as well. 53
Significantly positive results are found for the Verbal SAT and composite ECA score,
though their positive marginal effects (seen below in Table 7.5) are not great. ECA scores
and verbal aptitude are assumed to be affective measures of an individual's ability to inter-
relate, communicate, and cooperate with others in a military team environment. Despite the
technical orientation of today's Navy, it does appear from this analysis that
management and "people" skills are essential to a successful military career.
The "Career Potential" models attempt to control for self-selection among warfare
communities by including community control dummies. As explained in Chapter II, USNA
According to the Boy Scouts of America, less than twenty percent of scouts who
ever join a Boy Scout troop will eventually earn the Eagle Scout award.
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graduates select among warfare communities in their first-class year on the basis of their
individual choice and relative class standing. Therefore, individuals in the highly selective
aviation and nuclear communities are likely to exhibit both higher observed (e.g. SAT scores,
class rank) and non-observed factors (e.g. motivation, perseverance, desire to succeed)
associated with success as a military officer. Thus, it is not surprising to see the positive and
significant coefficients for the more selective warfare community dummies. A positive
selection bias may also be evident in the models by warfare community as the result of strictly
economic factors. Officers in the aviation communities incur a greater minimum service
requirement and are given monthly career incentive pay to offset their marketability in the
civilian labor market. Nuclear-trained officers (both submarine and surface) are also offered
substantial nuclear bonuses at several career points in order to encourage retention. As a
result of such incentives, the highly significant and highly positive impact ofbeing in the NFO,
pilot, and submarine communities is expected. It is somewhat unexpected not to see such
effects among the nuclear SWO's, whose officers are similarly more selective and receive the
same bonuses as their peers in the submarine community. The lack of significance forNSWO
may indicate an overall poorer quality of life and more arduous work conditions and
deployments, for all Surface Warfare Officers, both nuclear and conventional.
The results of the selectivity models for the segregated warfare community sub-
samples (see Tables D.2 - G.2 in the appendices) are relatively consistent with the aggregate
URL models in terms of expected coefficient signs, though less significance among the
coefficients is found due to smaller sample sizes. In fact, the only predictor which remains
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significantly positive throughout the sub-samples is military family background. Noteworthy
deviations from the aggregate model include the significant positive coefficient ofLEADER
and insignificance ofEAGLE in the SWO models; and the insignificance ofMath or Verbal
SAT in both the SUB and PILOT models.
The results from the LOGIT models were next used to calculate the marginal effects
ofthe demographic and selectivity variables on probability ofbecoming a "careerist" as seen
in Table 7.5 below. First, the reference probability of graduation is calculated for the
reference (or notional) USNA graduate in this sub-set ofURL officers. The reference officer
in both models one and two is a Class of 1980 single (no children) white male SWO who
attended neither a military nor civilian prep school, was neither an athletic recruit nor a prior-
enlisted servicemember, and was not from a military family. The reference USNA graduate
in model one had the mean Candidate Multiple score of 63,663, while in model two he had
the mean score for each individual predictor and was neither a high school athlete nor a
leader. Marginal effects were then calculated from these reference probabilities (.2634 and
.2700, respectively), given one-unit changes in the binary dummy variables and changes equal
to one-tenth ofthe mean for the continuous variables. Additionally, proxies for the marginal
effects of achieving TOP10CM, TOPHSAT, or NUMBER1 status are calculated for the
reference officer by substituting the appropriate changes to the mean Candidate Multiple,
SAT, and class rank. The results of the marginal effects analysis are shown in Table 7.5.
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Table 7.5 Marginal Effects of Changes in the Explanatory
Selectivity Variables on the Probability of Development into a "Careerist."
Model One Model Two
Reference Probability 26.342 % 27.002 %
MINI -4.65 % -4.14%
FEMALE1 NS NS





GRADAGE +0.63 % +0.59 %
CM NS —
SATMHI ~ -1.51 %




CIS — +0.71 %




NUMBER1* — -1.93 %
TOPHSAT* — -0.33 %
SWC NS NS
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PILOT +11.11% +10.35 %
NFO +15.84% +14.68 %
Notes: (1) Marginal effects calculated for reference USNA URL graduate (see text).
(2) * indicates effects of changes in related variables from the mean to
achieve a proxy for this category.
(3) All marginal effects are significant at the .10 level or greater.
(4) NS = Not Significant.
The model predicts that a ten-percent deviation from the mean Math SAT score (an
increase from 672 to 739 while holding all else constant) is associated with a negative 1.51
percentage point difference in a USNA graduate's probability ofbecoming a "careerist." This
amounts to a 5.6 (-.0151 + .27002) percent decrease in the probability of career success. In
contrast, having achieved the rank of Eagle Scout increases the probability of an officer
developing into a "careerist" by 24.6 percent (+.0664 + .27002) when all other variables in
the model remain unchanged.
Ofnote are the large negative marginal effects attributed to minority ethnic groups (-
4.65 and -4. 14 percentage points), and the high positive marginal effects of a military family
background (+7.75 percent and +7.97 percent) and the Eagle Scout/Gold Award. Also, ten-
percent increases in Verbal SAT and ECA composite are associated with increases (+0.95
and +2. 17 percentage points, respectively) in the "careerist" probability.
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The scouting achievement is especially exceptional when one considers the time lag
between the age of Boy/Girl Scouts (11-17) and the LCDR promotion board (3 1-36). The
data thus suggest that this achievement, relative to similar exceptional achievements such as
earning all-state awards in a varsity sport or being elected class president, is an outstanding
predictor of career potential. Explanation for the phenomenon may be drawn from the time
required to achieve Eagle Scout rank. In contrast to virtual "snapshots" of youth
potential/achievement such as the SAT, or even election to the position of class president, this
achievement goes far towards describing the character and perseverance of an individual.
The reader is however cautioned not to conclude that the Math SAT, or
quantitative/technical skills in general, predicts poor fleet performance or retention. The
sample considered is a highly select group ofUSNA graduates in the Navy's unrestricted line.
The mean SAT score for this sample ofUSNA graduates, 672, indicates that the reference
USNA graduate ranked near the highest percentile nationally among incoming college
freshmen. Similarly, he/she ranked just outside the top quarter of his/her high school class.
Thus, the average USNA graduate is a very talented individual, and possesses above average
quantitative skills and technical aptitude. The analysis merely suggests that additional signs
of quantitative aptitude, over and above this already high mean, decreases an individual's
career potential. One cannot apply opposite logic and assume that an officer with a 400 Math
SAT score is likely to become an Admiral. He/she is unlikely to be eligible to earn a
commission via the USNA or any other commissioning source. Simply stated, the null
hypothesis for this selection criterion cannot be rejected. As a result, the theory which stated
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that the Math SAT will have a positive impact on fleet performance is not valid.
The extremely high marginal effects ofthe warfare community variables are attributed
to both the self-selection of highly talented and motivated USNA graduates into the more
selective communities, and to the economic incentives (offered in all communities except
SWO) to stay in the Navy and become "careerists." The economic incentives appear to be
especially effective at increasing one's career-orientation in the NFO community (over 50
percent increase in "careerist" probability) where there may be fewer job opportunities in the
civilian job market.
The selectivity models show us that the USNA's overall measure of selectivity, the
Candidate Multiple, has no impact on fleet performance as measured in terms of career
development. This notwithstanding, three of the so-called affective individual predictors, the
composite ECA score, Verbal SAT, and the Career Interest Scale, significantly increase the
probability of an officer developing into a "careerist." In contrast stand the apparently
negative effects of cognitive abilities such as Math SAT and high school class rank. Analysis
of these disparate effects of cognitive and affective selectivity measures leads the author to
the conclusion, that, for USNA graduates in the major URL communities, an individual's
cognitive abilities as a whole do not increase his/her career potential, yet
communication skills and affective skills developed through non-scholastic activities do
significantly increase his/her military career potential.
The USNA's selectivity overall does appear to play a role in officer career
development. However, that role appears limited to those criteria which increase the abilities
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of an individual to more readily adapt into the Navy team. Additionally, the models validate
the positive impact oftwo early predictors—military family background and Eagle Scout/Gold
Award—on long-term career potential, thereby destroying a commonly-held myth that pre-
commissioning achievements are unrelated to fleet performance.
3. Human Capital Model Specification
The human capital models of "Career Potential" are fully specified below, given the
initial data analysis ofUSNA performance criteria for the same Navy URL Lieutenant sub-set
ofUSNA graduates.
Human Capital Model One:
Career Potential = a + pjMINl + P2FEMALE 1 + p3MILFAM +
P4PRIORNOM + P 5RECRUIT + P6CIVPREP + p7MTLPREP + pgAGGMULT +
P9CLASS81 + p 10CLASS82 + pnCLASS83 + P 12CLASS84 + P 13CLASS85 +
P 14GRADAGE + P 15NSWO + P 16SUB + p 17PILOT + P 18NFO + P 19SWC +
p20MNC + P21MWC
Human Capital Model Two:
Career Potential = a + p!MTNl + P2FEMALE1 + P3MILFAM +
P4PRIORNOM + p 5RECRUIT + p6CIVPREP + P7MILPREP + P8AQPR +
PgMQPR + P10STRIPER + pnTRIDENT + P 12NLETTER + P 13GRI + P 14GRDI +
P 15CLASS81 + P 16CLASS82 + P 17CLASS83 + P 18CLASS84 + P 19CLASS85 +
P20GRADAGE + P21NSWO + P22SUB + P^PILOT + p24NFO + P25SWC +
P26MNC + P27MWC
Human Capital Model Three:
Career Potential = a + ^MINl + P2FEMALE 1 + p3MILFAM +
P4PRIORNOM + P 5RECRUIT + P6CIVPREP + P7MILPREP + P8PERFQPR +
P9CONDQPR + P 10PRDVQPR + PnACADQPR + P 12STRIPER +
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P 13TRIDENT + P 14NLETTER + P 15GRI +P 16GRm + P 17CLASS81 +
P 18CLASS82 + p 19CLASS83 + P20CLASS84 + P 21CLASS85 + P^GRADAGE +
P^NSWO + P24SUB + P25PILOT + P26NFO + P27SWC + P28MNC + P.9MWC
As discussed in Chapter IV, accumulated human capital is traditionally measured in terms of
quantity and quality. Model One captures the composite quantity ofhuman capital with the
USNA Aggregate Multiple measure. As explained in Chapter n, the Aggregate Multiple, just
like the Candidate Multiple, is heavily weighted to reflect the Academy's emphasis on
academics. Therefore it is necessary to break down this measure into its relevant individual
components.
Model Two partitions USNA performance, and accumulated human capital, into its
two primary components, the Military and Academic Quality Point Ratings. IfAQPR and
MQPR are assumed to measure the quality ofhuman capital, academic major is then assumed
to represent the quantity ofhuman capital acquired by midshipmen. Group II (Math/Science)
is assumed to be the academic major group for the reference midshipman. This approach
follows the theory used by Bowman in his test of the Rickover hypothesis. (Bowman, 1990)
Additionally, this model incorporates the qualitative performance measures described in
Chapter V as dummy variables. Dummies such as STRIPER and NLETTER are also assumed
to the be a measure ofan individual's quantity ofhuman capital. While the model does better
identify an individual's strengths and weaknesses, the reader is reminded that the MQPR is
itself a composite weighted measure of military performance, conduct, physical education, and
academic performance in professional development courses. The professional development
courses are additionally included in the AQPR calculation, suggesting the need for the further
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partitioned model specifications in Model Three.
An alternative approach to measuring accumulated human capital, introduced by Wise
and adopted by Mehay and Bowman in their 1996 graduate education study, is followed in
Model Three. Wise's model differentiates two different types of human capital—cognitive
skills and affective skills—which help determine relative performance of professional workers.
(Mehay and Bowman, 1996) In Model Three above, cognitive abilities are specified by an
individual's grade point average in non-USNA specific courses (ACADQPR) and academic
major. PRDVQPR serves as a measure ofNavy-specific cognitive skills. Affective skills are
described by Mehay and Bowman as "work-related attitudes and attributes such as
perseverance, self-discipline, leadership, initiative and the ability to cooperate effectively,
especially in the military's team production environment." 54 Military performance, conduct,
and the additional qualitative measures, such as NLETTER, are assumed in this study to
differentiate an individual's affective skills. It is assumed that an individual with higher
military performance grades and/or a varsity letter has greater affective skills, and thus would
more readily adapt to the military team environment and be more likely to develop into a
"careerist."
4. Results ofHuman Capital Models
The -2 LOG L criterion, from the binary logistic model, was again applied to assess
model fit. The x
2
values ranged from 152 with 21 degrees offreedom to 232 with 30 degrees
54 Mehay, Stephen L. and Bowman, William R., Human Capital and Job Performance in a
Hierarchical Organization: Evidence from Military Personnel . (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval
Academy, 1996), 10.
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of freedom, both with p-values equal to 0.0001. The null hypotheses of zero explanatory
power for all the human capital models are thus rejected. The coefficients of concordance
were 0.61 1 for the more simple Aggregate Multiple model, and 0.63 1 and 0.638 for the more
complex Models Two and Three, respectively, indicating relatively strong predictive
accuracy.
Models Two and Three introduce a moderate degree of multicollinearity by
partitioning the Aggregate Multiple into its components due to the presence of highly
correlated performance criteria. Simple correlation as high as r = 0.75 forMQPR and AQPR
in Model Two, and r = 0.77 between ACADQPR and PRDVQPR. Such high simple
correlation coefficients as these and others between SUB and several USNA criteria, as well
as between STRIPER and military performance and MQPR, are an inherent limitation of this
sample. Despite the correlation, only moderate multicollinearity is assessed by analysis ofthe
Variance Inflation Factors in the linear probability model. As no variables exceed the
generally accepted VIF>5 threshold, the models are accepted as sound due to the inherent
nature ofthe correlations. (Studenmund, 1992)
The multicollinearity can be explained first by the aforementioned inclusion of
professional development (PRODEV) courses into both the AQPR and MQPR, but also by
a general USNA trend. Top USNA performers tend to excel in all areas of academic
performance. This is exemplified by the excessively high and unexpected correlation between
grade point averages in the three academic groups—engineering, math/science, and
humanities/social sciences—and between averages in the USNA core curriculum and the
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AQPR and MQPR measures. For example, the correlation coefficient between the unrelated
HUMSQPR and ENGQPR is 0.5 19. While correlation such as this potentially increases the
standard errors of the individual coefficients and therefore may decrease their level of
significance, such multicollinearity does not reduce the explanatory power of the models.
(Studenmund, 1992)
Secondly, some simultaneity may be present between explanatory variables, as
exemplified by SUB and STRIPER. The high correlations between submariners and academic
performance, and between brigade leaders and military performance, are expected, at least
in part due to the fact that these performance averages are utilized to a degree as selection
criteria for inclusion in these same groups. The presence of such simultaneity on the right side
ofthe regression equation may bias the individual coefficients but also does not reduce the
explanatory power ofthe overall models. (Studenmund, 1992)
The human capital LOGIT models in Table 7.6 show that the following variables are
significant at the 1 percent level: MILFAM (+), AGGMULT (+), AQPR (-), MQPR (+),
PERFQPR (+), PILOT (+), and NFO (+). At the 5 percent level GRADAGE (+),
ACADQPR (-), andPRDVQPR (+) are significant. RECRUIT{+), TRIDENT'(+), and MWC
(+) vary in their significance at the 10 percent level across the three models. Table 7.6 shows
the parameter estimates and level of significance, as determined through one-tailed tests,
across the three human capital models for the entire sample ofUSNA graduates. Appendices
D through G present the results for the human capital models by warfare community.
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Table 7.6 LOGIT Parameter Estimates
for Human Capital Models of Career Potential.
Model One Model Two Model Three
INTERCEPT -3.2981*** -4.2600*** -3.8150***
MINI -0.1224 -0.1126 -0.1151
FEMALE1 -0.1809 -0.2767 -0.3235
MILFAM 0.3853*** 0.3784*** 0.3845***
PRIORNOM 0.0750 0.0155 0.00420
RECRUIT 0.1288* 0.1146* 0.1300*
CIVPREP -0.00428 -0.0191 -0.0226
MILPREP 0.1131 0.1061 0.1010
GRADAGE 0.0334** 0.0331** 0.0336**
AGGMULT 0.00155**,* ~ ~
AQPR -- -0.3264*** —
MQPR ~ 1.1434*** ~
ACABQPR ~ ~ -0.2859**
PRDVQPR ~ ~ 0.3230**
PERFQPR ~ — 0.6163***
CONDQPR ~ ~ -0.0105
GRI ~ 0.0289 0.0518
GRDI ~ 0.0556 0.0311
STRIPER ~ 0.1358 0.0762
TRIDENT ~ 0.6194* 0.6289*
NLETTER ~ -0.0326 -0.00500
CLASS81 0.1231 0.1058 0.1176
CLASS82 0.1163 0.0809 0.1384
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Model One Model Two Model Three
CLASS83 0.0139 -0.0367 0.0459
CLASS84 -0.3186*** -0.4025*** -0.3492***
CLASS85 -0.0912 -0.1875* -0.1079
NSWO -0.1828 -0.2016 -0.2023
SUB -0.00448 -0.00324 -0.00550
PILOT 0.4408*** 0.4157*** 0.4151***
NFO 0.6216*** 0.6010*** 0.6013***
SWC 0.0588 0.0219 0.0133
MNC 0.0669 0.0591 0.0440
MWC 0.1549* 0.1365 0.1228
Concordance Ratio 0.611 0.628 0.635
-2L0GL 151.560 205.625 223.458
Sample Size 4033 4035 4035
Note: ***Significant at the .01 Level (one-tailed test)
** Significant at the .05 Level (one-tailed test)
* Significant at the . 1 Level (one-tailed test)
Analysis ofthese models reveals that a number offactors, including both cognitive and
affective USNA performance measures, are significantly related to the probability of a URL
officer developing into a "careerist." Demographics clearly plays a lesser role in these models
than in the selectivity models, with neither minorities nor females developing into "careerists"
at a significantly higher or lower rate than the base case. This indicates perhaps that the
USNA does effectively act as a leveling ground for racial and gender minorities in terms of
developing career-oriented officers. It is apparent that the gender or color of a USNA
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graduate's skin is insignificant compared to his/her performance at the USNA. This appears
to be a very positive sign for the USNA and the Navy, and warrants further analysis.
Despite the insignificance of race and gender, the impact of being from a military
family appears to be even greater in the three human capital models. While sociologists have
for years discussed the influence of military taste and military socialization in their studies of
development of an American military elite, such significant differences are still surprising. 55
Additionally, in all ofthe models, recruited athletes are associated with a significantly greater
likelihood of becoming "careerists." This finding is again unexpected considering the
conventional wisdom among academia and intellectual elites that the recruitment of student-
athletes brings down the level of education in America's colleges and universities, and that
the value of so-called "blue-chippers" to society is limited beyond the athletic arena. The age
at graduation ofan individual is again significant and positive, as one would expect due to the
more stable decision-making processes associated with age. In Model One, the individuals
married with children, relative to single officers, are associated with a significantly higher
probability of making the Navy a career. This finding appears to be consistent with labor
economic theory as to the role of marital status in an individual's retention behavior. Officers
with dependents are more likely to appreciate the security of a military career and its benefits
and are thus less likely to try to "go it alone" in the civilian labor market. The reader is
reminded however, ofthe limitation of the marital status demographic variables in this study,
55 See for example Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. 1960; or Little, Roger W.,
Handbook of Military Institutions . (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1971).
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inasmuch as marital status is observed at the 0-3 board and is likely to change prior to the
0-4 board.
We see in Model One that, unlike the USNA's composite selection criterion
(Candidate Multiple), the composite performance criterion (Aggregate Multiple) is
significantly and positively associated with career potential. We thus reject the individual null
hypothesis for AGGMULT. Yet, before any conclusions about the impact of USNA
performance on URL fleet performance can be reached, we must decompose this overall
performance score into its components. Model Two is also inconclusive. Quality measures
of human capital, AQPR and MQPR, have opposite effects while quantity measures
(academic major, leadership, athletic, and academic achievements) are all insignificant with
the exception of TRIDENT.
As discussed in the model specifications, the Aggregate Multiple is assumed to be the
overall measure of accumulated human capital in a midshipman. It includes measures of
human capital associated with both cognitive skills (AQPR, academic major, and independent
scholastic research) and affective skills (military performance, conduct, leadership, and
athletic achievement.)
USNA measures of general cognitive skills appear to be consistent with the null
hypothesis ofzero or negative impact. An increase in the USNA overall Grade Point Average
(GPA), AQPR, is actually associated with a significant decrease in the probability of
development into a "careerist." A similar result is found in Model Three for the strictly
academic, ACADQPR. These findings are not only unexpected, but unreasonable when one
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considers the amount of emphasis USNA places on academics. We are therefore not able to
reject the null hypotheses for these cognitive measures of human capital. One possible
explanation for this phenomenon is that officers with stronger academic records may, on the
margin, possess greater and more marketable human capital skills in the civilian labor market
and thus be more likely to voluntarily leave the Navy. Another possible explanation is that
officers on the margin with a higher degree of cognitive skills, may in fact have a lower
amount of the so-called affective skills necessary for a manager in today's military.
Obviously, further research is necessary to test these explanations.
Academic major, relative to the base case of a Math/Science major, is insignificant in
terms ofdeveloping career officers. This finding appears to validate the research ofBowman
in disproving Rickover's hypothesis—that engineering majors are better-suited to the
technologically-advanced Navy of the late twentieth century. If technical proficiency is
needed among the Navy's URL officer corps, it appears that either the USNA's technical core
or post-commissioning training is adequately meeting those needs. However, academic major
does appear to be significant in the SWO and SUB sub-samples (see Table D.3 and E.3), as
humanities/social science majors in the SWO community and engineering majors in the
submarine community are associated with a greater probability ofcareer development relative
to math and science majors
The high level of career attainment seen among Trident Scholars in the cross-
tabulation analysis is found to be statistically significant in all three multivariate models
despite their limited numbers (n = 20). There exists such a small frequency of Trident
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Scholars, approximately six per USNA class, that no statistical significance was expected.
The Trident Scholar, as indicated by its highly positive P coefficient, appears to be an
excellent early predictor ofURL officer career success, due either to the cognitive aptitude
necessary to tackle an independent research project but more likely due to the obvious
initiative and strong work ethic involved (affective skills) with such a project.
In contrast to the purely academic variety of cognitive skills, gains in human capital
through Navy-specific cognitive skills, as measured by academic performance in the USNA's
professional development courses, significantly increase an officer's potential for career
success. The PRODEV courses which focus on both the short-term (e.g. navigation and
naval engineering) and the long-haul (e.g. leadership) appear to prepare officers for both their
junior officer responsibilities as manifest in promotion to 0-4 and a career-orientation as
manifest in retention to the ten year point. A notable aspect ofPRDVQPR is its insignificance
among the SWO sub-sample and its significantly positive coefficient in the NFO sub-sample
(see Tables D.3 and G.3). A reasonable assumption would be to predict a more positive and
significant coefficient in the SWO community, given the greater relevance of course material
such as navigation and naval science to surface warfare officers. Apparently, more than it is
a sign of professional competence, outstanding PRODEV performance may indicate the
priority which a midshipman placed in his/her professional development relative to other
academic areas.
The primary USNA measure of affective skills, military performance, is shown by the
LOGIT analyses to be very significantly and positively associated with career success. These
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results are expected, given the military environment and rating structure used to assign
semester-by-semester performance grades. Military performance embodies a number of
factors—leadership potential, military bearing, teamwork, discipline, dedication, initiative,
professional knowledge, and training of subordinates—all of which are readily adaptable to
the fleet environment, regardless of warfare community. And similar to performance in
professional development courses, military performance average may be indicative of a
midshipman's relative prioritization of the USNA's two worlds, military and academic. A
midshipman who dedicates himsehTherself to being a top performer in his/her company may
be more likely career-oriented at an early age and is thus more likely to develop into a career
officer.
The insignificance of qualitative affective measures such as STRIPER and NLETTER
in the aggregate URL model may be somewhat misleading. Brigade leaders are selected
based on a variety of measures, not the least of which is military performance. This
simultaneity, given the relatively high simple correlation between PERFQPR and STRIPER
(r = 0.40), may bias the significance of the brigade leadership coefficient. In any case, the
positive P coefficient indicates that it may still be an excellent predictor of career success.
Additionally, STRIPER is positive and significant at the 5 percent level in the PILOT sub-
sample. (See Table F.3) As for varsity letter-winners, the reader is reminded that all
midshipmen are required participate in athletics on the varsity, club, or intramural level. Thus,
all midshipmen theoretically do accumulate some level of affective skills associated with
athletic competition such as teamwork, dedication, competitiveness, and fair play. In theory,
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athletes competing on the varsity level accumulate a greater stock ofhuman capital through
these skills. Yet, in reality, the NLETTER status captures athletes in such individual and non-
traditional collegiate sports as pistol, rifle, golf, and off-shore sailing. Such sports may in fact
rank below club sports such as rugby, boxing, field hockey, and ice hockey (and perhaps even
below some intramural sports) in terms of their associated level of competitive drive and
teamwork. Further research is recommended to segregate varsity athletes by team and
individual sports, or by contact and non-contact sports. Such an analysis may show that the
level ofcooperation necessary in team sports, and the survival instincts gained from "getting
your face kicked in" in contact sports may yield more career-oriented officers.
As in the selectivity models, the human capital models account for warfare community
self-selection through dummy variables. Similar results to the selectivity models are seen in
the aviation communities where a longer minimum service requirement and incentive pay bias
retention behavior relative to SWO's. Yet, no significance is found for either the submarine
or nuclear surface community dummies, despite the presence ofeconomic incentives. As with
the STRIPER variable, the lack of significance in the submarine warfare coefficient may be
in part due to a simultaneity bias between SUB and USNA performance.
A linear transformation technique was applied to the LOGIT models in order to
calculate the marginal effects of the demographic and human capital variables on the
probability ofbecoming a "careerist." The marginal effects analysis are displayed in Table
7.7. The reference officer in both models one and two is a Class of 1980 single (no children)
white male SWO, 22.44 years old at graduation, who attended neither a military nor civilian
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prep school, was neither an athletic recruit nor a prior-enlisted servicemember, and was not
from a military family. He majored in a group II area subject (Math/Sciences). In Model
One, he had the mean Aggregate Multiple score of 1,039, while in Models Two and Three,
he had the mean grade averages for each individual area and was neither a brigade leader,
letter-winner, nor Trident Scholar. Marginal effects are then individually calculated from the
reference probabilities, given the following changes:
• changes in the dummy variables from to 1;
• one year increase in graduation age;
• one-tenth ofthe mean increase for Aggregate Multiple;
• 0.25 point increases in grade averages;
• increases in the associated performance areas (e.g. AGGMULT, MQPR,
ACADQPR) necessary for the reference officer to achieve a proxy for HONORG,
SUPELIST, DEANUST, or DANTUST.
As expected, the Military Quality Point Rating, which incorporates Navy-specific
cognitive skills and affective skills, appears to achieve the highest marginal gain in probability
of career development among all the grade averages in Table 7.7. An 1/4 point increase from
the mean MQPR of 3.09 to 3.34, holding all other else constant, is associated with a positive
6.20 percentage point difference a USNA graduate's probability of becoming a "careerist."
The probability for the reference officer is thus increased by 22 percent (.0620 * .28822).
Significant and substantial marginal gains in the "careerist" probability are also seen
for the officers from military families (+8.40, +8.33, and +8.31 percentage points), and for
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Table 7.7 Marginal Effects of Changes in the Explanatory







Reference Probability 28.152% 28.822 % 27.701 %
MINI NS NS NS
FEMALE1 NS NS NS
MILFAM +8.40 % +8.33 % +8.31 %
PRIORNOM NS NS NS
RECRUIT +2.68 % +2.41 % +2.68 %
CIVPREP NS NS NS
MILPREP NS NS NS
GRADAGE +0.68 % +0.68 % +0.68 %
AGGMULT +3.37% ~ —
AQPR -- -1.64% ~
MQPR ~ +6.20 % ~
ACADQPR — — -1.41%
PRDVQPR — ~ +1.65 %
PERFQPR — — +3.19%
CONDQPR ~ ~ NS
GRI ~ NS NS
GRin — NS NS
HONORG * +9.03 % ~ ~
SVPEL1ST* — +11.26% +10.57%
DEANUST * — +6.24 % +6.12 %
DANTLIST * — + 7.89% +6.37%






TRIDENT ~ +14.11% +14.11%
NLETTER — NS NS
SWC NS NS NS
MNC NS NS NS
MWC +3.24% NS NS
NSWO NS NS NS
SUB NS NS NS
PILOT +9.69 % +9.21 % +9.02 %
NFO +14.03 % +13.66% +13.44%
Notes:
(1) Marginal effects calculated for reference USNA URL graduate. (See text.)
(2) * indicates effects of changes in related variables to achieve this category.
(3) All marginal effects are significant at .10 level or greater (one-tailed tests.)
(4) NS = Not Significant
increases in graduation age (+0.68 percentage points across all models), military performance
(+3.19 percentage points) and professional development averages (+1.65 percentage points),
as well as the Aggregate Multiple (+3.37 percentage points). Significant negative effects are
the result of increases in the two primary measures ofgeneral cognitive skills, AQPR and non-
USNA specific academic averages (-1.64 and -1.41 percentage points, respectively).
Most outstanding in the marginal effects of human capital analysis is a positive
difference of9.03 percentage points, or an increase of 32 percent, in the probability of career
development attributed to an increase in Aggregate Multiple which moves the reference
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individual into the HONORG category. Graduating at the top of one's USNA class is truly
a significant accomplishment which, in the highly competitive Academy environment, requires
dedication to both academic and military development over the course of four years, in
addition to obvious skills and talents. Such a sustained dedication to excellence, more than
any measure ofan individual's cognitive or affective human capital, is clearly an indicator of
military career potential. Additionally, this finding appears to disprove any doubts as to
whether or not the Navy is retaining the top USNA graduates.
Similar increases are found by increasing the averages ofthe "base case" to the level
ofthe Superintendent's List (+1 1.26 and +10.57 percentage points), the Dean's List (+6.24
and +6.12 percentage points), and the Commandant's List (+7.89 and +6.37 percentage
points). While positive effects are expected, given the significant and positive effects of gains
in the Aggregate Multiple itself, all four achievements require excellence in academic and
military areas. As has been shown by this analysis, only the Navy-specific cognitive and
general affective skills appear to improve one's chances for career success holding all else
constant. Together these gains in academic and military areas account for significant
increases in the probability of career development for a URL officer. It is interesting, though,
to note the greater positive effects associated with the Commandant's List relative to the
Dean's List. Overall, the Dean's List requirements appear to be more stringent, but the
higher military performance average required for the Commandant's List appears to be
dominant in the marginal effects analysis.
In summary, the human capital models indicate that accumulated human capital gained
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by an officer during his matriculation at the USNA plays a significant role in his/her career
development. Specifically, the affective skills and Navy-specific cognitive skills gained
by a midshipman over four years increase the probability of USNA graduates in the
major URL communities developing into "careerists." Generic, or academic, cognitive
skills, in contrast, significantly decrease this probability, indicating a possible dichotomy
between the worlds of academia and the operational Navy. Finally, top overall USNA
performance is shown to be an outstanding predictor of fleet success. These findings validate
this study's human capital hypothesis, that the USNA's four-years of academic and military
preparation increase an officer's potential for fleet success. Additionally, they lend support
to the USNA as an institution. While officers from other leading universities commissioned
through ROTC or OCS may compare to USNA graduates in terms ofacademic background,
they theoretically pale in comparison with the stock ofNavy-specific cognitive and affective
skills that have been shown to improve fleet performance over the long-haul.
5. Combined Selectivity and Human Capital Model
Given the relative strengths of the individual selectivity and human capital models in
their ability to predict the career success ofUSNA graduates, the next logical analytical step
is to test these effects in the same model. Such a model would ideally determine the dominant
explanation for the high level of fleet performance by USNA graduates. In order to reduce
the correlation between variables, the two composite multiples are utilized in the model. The
Candidate Multiple captures the overall selectivity of an individual, and the Aggregate
Multiple incorporates an individual's accumulated cognitive and affective human capital.
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Combined Selectivity & Human Capital Model One:
Career Potential = a + P,MIN1 + p2FEMALE 1 + p3MILFAM +
P4PRIORNOM + P 5RECRUIT + P6CIVPREP + P7MILPREP + p 8CM +
P^GGMULT + p i0CLASS81 + pnCLASS82 + P 12CLASS83 + p 13CLASS84 +
P 14CLASS85 + P 15GRADAGE + P 16NSWO + P 17SUB + p 18PILOT + p 19NFO +
P20SWC + P21MNC + P22MWC
Missing data reduced the sample size ofNavy URL Lieutenants from 4,095 to 4,028, a loss
of 1 .6 percent of the URL sample. The model's -2 LOG L criterion x2 value of 159, with
22 degrees of freedom and p-value equal to 0.0001 allows us to reject the model's null
hypothesis of zero explanatory power. The concordance ratio is 0.614, indicating a degree
ofpredictive accuracy similar to the previous models. A slight degree of multicollinearity is
still found due to the high simple correlation (r = 0.5072) between the Candidate and
Aggregate Multiples.
Table 7.8 below shows the results of this combined LOGIT model. Similar to the
earlier career potential models, MLFAM (+), MINI (-), GRADAGE (+), PILOT (+), and
NFO (+) are found to be significant with one-tailed tests. Unlike the earlier selectivity model,
however, the Candidate Multiple, holding all else constant, is shown to be significantly (.01
level) and negatively associated with an officer's probability ofbecoming a "careerist." Such
a finding is very unexpected when one considers the value the USNA places on the Candidate
Multiple as a selection tool, but becomes more easy to understand when one recalls the
individual negative parameter estimates for two of its primary predictors, Math SAT and
secondary school class rank. The Aggregate Multiple is again significantly and positively
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Table 7.8 LOGIT Parameter Estimates for the Career Potential






























Note: *** Significant at the .01 Level (one-sided test)
** Significant at the .05 Level (one-sided test)
* Significant at the . 10 Level (one-sided test)
related to fleet success, as expected.
The reference officer in the marginal effects analysis is a Class of 1980 single (no
children) white male SWO, 22.44 years old at graduation, attended neither a military nor
civilian prep school, was neither an athletic recruit nor a prior-enlisted servicemember, and
was not from a military family. Both his Candidate Multiple of 63,663 and his Aggregate
Multiple of 1,039 were the means among all USNA graduates in this sample ofNavy URL
officers. Marginal effects were calculated from the reference "careerist" probability of .2729
first by substituting the mean Candidate Multiple score for each CMquintile ofthe sample,
holding Aggregate Multiple constant, and then by substituting the mean Aggregate Multiple
score within each AGGMULT quintile while holding the Candidate Multiple constant. The
resultant probabilities thereby reflect the marginal effects ofCM and AGGMULT variance by
percentile, and are presented in Figures 13 and 14 below.
Figure 13 shows the effects of varying the Candidate Multiple while holding USNA
performance constant. Essentially, if a midshipman's selectivity is an adequate measure of
his/her potential, then this analysis shows the impact of overall potential, given average
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Figure 13.
'Career Development" by Candidate Multiple
2nd Quintil* I 4th Quintil*
Top Quintil* 3rd Quintil* Low Qulndl*
Figure 14.
'Career Development" by Aggregate Multiple
0.4
0.375
2nd Quintil* I 4th Quintil*
Top Quintil* 3rd Quintil* Low Quintil*
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USNA performance, on the probability of career success in the fleet. On the left, we see a
graduate with exceptionally high potential who obviously did not meet his/her expectations
at the USNA as a result of lack ofmotivation or distaste for military life and thus is less likely
to meet his/her full expectations as a Navy officer. This observation represents the classic
underachiever or "slacker." On the right side of Figure 13, we see a graduate with below-
average potential, who through diligence and motivation became an average USNA performer
and is likely to carry that motivation and work ethic with him/her into the fleet. His/her
"careerist" probability is thus highest (Pt(CAREER) = 0.30469) among the "average USNA
performers" in Figure 13.
Figure 14 presents a similar analysis with opposite logic. We see the effects of
variance in a midshipman's Aggregate Multiple while holding his/her potential (as measured
by Candidate Multiple) constant. A USNA graduate who entered USNA with only average
potential but finished in the top 20 percent of his/her class is seen on the left, and theoretically
represents the classic overachiever. It is expected that an overachiever at the USNA will
bring a similar motivation, desire for success, and taste for the military into his/her naval
career. The likelihood of him/her developing into a "careerist" is over 9 percentage points
higher than the "base case." The converse case is shown on the right. This midshipman with
average potential finished at the bottom of his/her USNA class, and again represents the
"slacker." He/she is likely to exhibit similar performance characteristics in the fleet and thus
has only a .218 probability of career success.
In summary, this model adds very little to the "Career Potential" analysis of selectivity
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and human capital. Rather, the model shows us a great deal about the interaction of potential
and performance. The potential-performance interaction measures an individual's
motivation and work ethic and has proven to play a very significant role in the
development of career naval officers. Neither high potential alone nor above-average
performance alone, are predictors of top fleet officer performance. Yet, a great deal can be
told about a URL officer and his/her probability for success in the Navy through analysis of
this potential-performance motivation dynamic.
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VHI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study examined the effects of pre-commissioning characteristics on the
development of career naval officers. Specifically, it focused on the development of
unrestricted line (URL) officers from the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA). It assessed three
hypotheses for explaining the performance ofUSNA graduates—selectivity, human capital
investment, and institutional favoritism. Additionally, various early predictors were examined
for their importance in predicting the long-term career success ofUSNA graduates.
As its mission statement directs the USNA towards the development of career naval
officers, a most applicable measure of its institutional effectiveness is its ability to produce
such "careerists." In the opening chapter, a conceptual model of career naval officer
development was presented (see Figure 1). The first essential step in this process is
graduation from the USNA and commissioning as an Ensign in the U.S. Navy. It is
hypothesized that the USNA's selectivity plays an integral role in achieving this first step, as
evidenced by extensive research and personnel selection validation efforts. The next step
towards a career-orientation is modeled in this study as the result of decisions by both the
individual and the Navy of retention to the ten-year career point and promotion ofthe officer
to the grade of LCDR. It is hypothesized that the USNA's selectivity, along with the
extensive human capital investment associated with a midshipman's academic and professional
development, and a possible institutional bias favoring USNA graduates, all play a significant
role in this developmental process. Statistical modeling is employed to test the strengths of
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these hypotheses. This chapter will summarize the findings, offer policy recommendations,
and make recommendations for further research.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. USNA Graduation
Graduation from the USNA is only accomplished through four years of hard work,
discipline, and dedication. Beyond these ingredients, the selectivity of an individual plays an
important role in his/her probability of graduation, as seen in the statistical analysis of the
USNA's selection standards. Specifically, the Candidate Multiple, developed as the USNA's
primary "whole-person" selection yardstick, significantly affects the likelihood of graduation
in a positive manner. The primary individual predictors of the composite Candidate Multiple,
associated with both cognitive and affective skills, also play a positive and significant role.
Of these, the measures of cognitive skills, secondary school class rank and the Math SAT,
have the greatest impacts on a midshipman's probability of graduation and taking that first
step towards a naval career. While significant, these findings regarding selectivity are
expected and validate the research efforts of the USNA's Office of Admissions. This study
broadens this scope and looks at graduation as just one component of the potential long-term
return on the Navy's investment.
2. Career Potential
a. Selectivity
The USNA's selectivity, or the relative quality of the USNA's inputs, plays
a part in the development of career potential in its graduates. While the overall composite
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measure appears to be insignificant, several of its individual predictors play significant roles
in this process.
The selection criteria based on an individual's cognitive skills, class rank and
quantitative aptitude have a negative impact on the development of career officers. This
unexpected finding calls into question the validity ofthe USNA's emphasis on these measures.
Ifheavy weight is given to these skills in the admissions process, this should be based on the
reasonable expectation that they would increase, if anything, the probability of career success
in today's technologically-advanced Navy.
In contrast, the selection criteria which represent an individual's affective and
communication skills, extra-curricular activities and the Verbal SAT, significantly increase the
likelihood of development into a "careerist." It is thus concluded that such skills, which
theoretically increase one's ease of assimilation into the military team environment as
well as one's managerial abilities are what the Navy really needs in its URL officer
corps. While this study looked only at those who completed the technically-oriented USNA
curriculum and thus have more than adequate technical aptitude, the question remains as to
whether or not the USNA is selecting the truly "best." Is the Navy missing the boat on
potentially gifted leaders with 550 Math SAT's, and instead selectingfuture engineers with
780 SAT's and minimal inter-personal skills?
b. Human Capital
The effect of accumulated human capital, or the relative quality ofthe USNA's
outputs, is looked at in three different models. The first shows us that overall accumulated
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human capital, as measured by the USNA's aggregate multiple, plays a significant role in an
officer's career development. 56 The second and third models suggest a disparity between the
effects of human capital as measured in terms of cognitive skills and affective skills.
Cognitive skills are measured by academic performance in a variety of areas. Averages in
strictly academic courses are negatively associated with the career potential of the USNA's
graduates in the URL communities. Among all academic areas, only grades in
professional development courses, a measure of a midshipman's N av\ -specific cognitive
skills, improve career performance. This finding too seems unreasonable, but nonetheless
calls into question the USNA's increased emphasis on academics over the last thirty years.
Further, it suggests that there is a conflict of priorities between the world of academia and the
operational military.
An individual's affective skills are measured in terms of military performance
grades and significant leadership or athletic experiences. Gains in military performance
significantly improve an officer's potential for career success. This area more than any
other is where differences are likely to be found in the accumulated human capital, and thus
the likelihood of career success, between USNA graduates and their peers. A midshipman's
four years at Annapolis are effectively a four-year apprenticeship in the Navy, which cannot
be rivaled by even the most competitive ROTC or OCS program. And the empirical results
56 Though not a primary focus of this study, it is interesting to note the statistical
insignificance of demographics, specifically minority status, in the human capital models which
specify the USNA professional development process, in contrast to the significantly negative
impact of minority status in the selectivity models.
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of this study indicate that it is these affective skills that are most significant and essential in
the development of career officers.
c Institutional Favoritism
This study attempts to isolate a potential bias favoring USNA graduates for
promotion at the 0-4 board. The relationship between the USNA graduate representation
of the promotion board and actual board results are explored to see whether or not USNA
"ring-knockers" are promoting their own. Using simple statistical correlation methodology,
no relationship was found between the level of representation by senior USNA graduates on
a promotion board and the relative performance ofjunior URL officers from the USNA.
Though no apparent trends were found, this thesis only explored the most obvious potential
area of bias and the mystery or question of a potential bias still clouds the model of career
officer development.
d. Early Predictors ofCareer Potential
In the process of analyzing the "Career Potential" models, a number of
significant early predictors of fleet success stand out. First and most noteworthy, a military
family background plays an obvious and significant role in molding an individual's taste, as
well as his suitability, for a military career. One additional pre-USNA characteristics similarly
earmarks an individual for career potential, namely the attainment ofthe Eagle Scout/Gold
Award rank in scouting. In contrast to the virtual snapshots of ability or aptitude, measured
by SAT's or high school class presidency, this accomplishment requires a sustained
commitment and a desire for excellence. Beyond any measurement of aptitude, these traits
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are critical to military careers and are thus expected to serve these individuals well beyond
adolescence.
Similarly, USNA graduates at the top of their class have displayed a balanced
and sustained commitment to excellence at the USNA. And regardless of the impact of
individual areas of performance, the USNA's distinguished graduates have established the
personal commitment to achievement and drive for success which therefore makes them
significantly more likely to develop into career officers. The impact of the three superior
performance lists are significant predictors of career development as well. Similar to
distinguished graduates, Superintendent's List midshipmen have displayed outstanding
performance in all areas at USNA, and are thus most likely to succeed in the fleet. While
Dean's List midshipmen also are more likely to achieve career success, it is interesting to note
the greater marginal effect attributed to the Commandant's List for which superior military
performance and only marginally greater academic performance are required. An additional
USNA achievement, independent research through the Trident Scholarship program,
significantly increases an officer's career potential and perhaps indicates superior initiative in
addition to analytical skills. Another USNA achievement, selection for brigade leadership
rank presents similar promise as an indicator of strong fleet potential, though its statistical
significance is weak. The impact of the USNA's varsity athletic program is unclear, as
recruited athletes are associated with a significant increase in the "careerist" probability, yet
the varsity letter-winners do not appear to be significantly related to this probability.
Finally, motivation, as determined by an analysis of the inter-relationship
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between USNA potential and performance, has been proven to be an excellent predictor of
career potential. Just as "over-achievers" apparently have high levels of motivation which
help them to overcome limited potential and achieve an exceptionally high likelihood of career
success, the opposite is true for "slackers" who despite apparently unlimited potential perform
only marginally as midshipmen. The motivation which carried them to USNA success or
failure can be equally expected to increase or decrease their career potential.
3. Summary
The empirical results of the "GRADUATION" and "CAREER POTENTIAL"
analyses are summarized below. Table 8.1 below represents a synopsis ofthe relative impact
(positive, negative, or insignificant) of the most noteworthy measures ofUSNA selection
criteria on the likelihood of graduation from the USNA.
Table 8.1 Statistical Impact of Various Criteria on Probability of USNA Graduation.
Significant & Positive Insignificant Significant & Negative
Military Family Civilian Prep
School/College (-)
Female
Athletic Recruit High School Leadership (-) Minority









Significant & Positive Insignificant Significant & Negative
Disenrollment Interest
Notes: (1) All findings are significant the .10 level or greater (one-sided test).
(2) Coefficient signs are listed in parentheses for insignificant findings.
Similarly, Table 8.2 presents a synopsis of the effects of the selection and performance
criteria on the likelihood of development into "careerists" for officers in the Navy's URL
communities.
Table 8.2 Statistical Impact of Various Criteria on "Careerist" Probability.
Significant & Positive Insignificant Significant & Negative
Military Family Minority* (-) Math SAT
Verbal SAT Female (-) AQPR
Composite ECA 's Candidate Multiple (-) Academic QPR
Eagle Scout High School Class Rank (-)
Graduation Age Athletic Recruit** (+/-)
Career Interest HS Leadership (+)
Aggregate Multiple HS Athletics (+)
MQPR Military Prep School (+)
Military Performance Civilian Prep School/College(-)
PRODEVQPR Prior-Enlisted (+)
Trident Scholar USNA Varsity Athlete (-)
USNA Brigade Leader (+)
Notes: (1) All findings are significant the .10 level or greater (one-tailed tests).
(2) Coefficient signs are listed in parentheses for insignificant findings.
(3) * MINI is significant and negative in Selectivity models.
(4) ** RECRUIT is significant and positive in Human Capital models.
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Based on the empirical results, a final conceptual model (refining the original model
in Figure 1) of the naval officer career development for USNA graduates in the URL
communities is presented in Figure 15. The first step, graduation from the USNA, is
impacted to a great extent by the overall selectivity—both cognitive and affective—which an
individual midshipman brings with him from his adolescent years. The Whole-Person
(affective and cognitive) criteria utilized in the USNA admissions process clearly meet this
first step of career officer development by selecting candidates who are more likely to finish
the four year USNA program and earn a commission. However, the existing selection
paradigm appears to be limited in its ability to identify those candidates most likely to make
the Navy a career. While an individual's cognitive skills do indirectly influence "career
potential" by making him/her more likely graduate, they do not increase the probability of
career success. In contrast, a midshipman's affective background skills directly and
significantly impact his/her career development. Affective skills such as cooperation,
teamwork, and communication, gained through an adolescent's extra-curricular
group/team experiences make the assimilation into the operational military team
environment smoother and more effective.
With regard to USNA matriculation, an individual's professional development appears
critical in developing a career-minded officer. Professional development, both in Bancroft
Hall and in the classroom, increase a midshipman's accumulated human capital in the areas
of overall affective skills and Navy-specific cognitive skills. The Navy's human capital
investment at the USNA does not in general appear to positively impact the career
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development of its graduates, but these affective skills and Navy-specific cognitive skills
do play a direct and significantly positive role in the process of creating "careerists."
The presence of and/or influence of a bias favoring USNA graduates in the Navy's
promotion processes was not demonstrated through any significant statistical relationship.
However, the research was able to neither prove nor disprove its existence. The result is that
the question of such a bias will continue to cloud or shadow the top fleet achievement of the
USNA's graduates until it is sufficiently addressed statistically.
In summary, Figure 15 indicates that selectivity and human capital investment
hypotheses ofUSNA graduate fleet excellence are both supported to a degree, whereas no
























The results of this thesis lead the author to recommend minor modifications of the
current processes, and a shift from the current short-term paradigm for selecting and training
the Navy's future corps of career officers. These recommendations will first be directed to
the U.S. Naval Academy itself, and then to the entire Navy organization.
1. Institutional View
From an institutional standpoint, the USNA's Admissions Office and Candidate
Guidance Office stands as one of the two integral keys to the fleet success of the USNA's
graduates. Though not without its faults, the admissions office does attempt to select the best
and brightest "whole-person" candidates available. To better meet that objective,
consideration should be given towards increasing the weights assigned to non-scholastic
predictors in the Candidate Multiple. By placing almost 1/2 of the weight ofthe Candidate
Multiple on two areas (Math SAT and secondary school class rank)~which this research
shows to be associated with a decrease in the probability of career development for URL
officers—the Navy may be selecting-out some potentially valuable career performers.
Validation of the Candidate Multiple must begin to incorporate the "long-haul" career
performance ofUSNA graduates. The role of the USNA's preparatory programs should
additionally be broadened, building a level playing field for candidates who may have
demonstrated promise for long-term careers in the Navy, but who have marginal academic
backgrounds. In short, the USNA must take its "selection for a profession, not just an
education" motto to heart.
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Meanwhile, the Candidate Guidance Office appears to be adequately fulfilling its
mission of attracting the best and brightest, as seen in the USNA's consistent rating by the
Barron's Guide as one of the "Most Competitive" undergraduate institutions in the United
States. Its ability to annually attract an incoming class with over 10 percent Eagle/Gold
Award scouts, over 80 percent varsity letter-winners, and a combined mean SAT in the 1200
range stand as testimony to their success. Armed with the knowledge of the effects of the
early predictors (both positive and negative) used in this study, the Candidate Guidance Office
can and should better focus its recruiting efforts on those with the potential not only to
graduate, but also to make a valuable impact on the Navy.
This research confirms that the second integral key to the USNA graduate
performance is the coordinated effort ofthe Office ofthe Commandant and the Division of
Professional Development. The impact ofthe new Character Development Division, which
has filled a valuable void in the brigade's moral development, promises to be equally vital in
this aspect of midshipmen development. By overseeing the brigade's professional
development both in and out ofthe classroom, these offices impart the greatest Navy-specific
human capital value to midshipmen. Even in an era of declining budgets, their roles and
related resources should remain a priority.
Additionally, the findings regarding the apparently non-value added area of
academics suggest that the USNA evaluate the relative emphasis it has placed on this area of
midshipman development over the last thirty years. Clearly, the data presented herein
notwithstanding, an undergraduate education (B.S. equivalent) is essential to the development
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of an analytically-sound officer corps. What this thesis recommends is a decrease in the
emphasis placed upon the strictly academic portion of the USNA core curriculum. This
would involve reduced semester hours, less stringent core technical courses, less concern with
the ratio oftechnical/non-technical majors, and a greater leniency by the Academic Board in
evaluating academically-deficient midshipmen. As seen in Chapter II, small steps are being
made in this area currently by the USNA leadership. Such reforms are applauded, though
more can be done.
The average midshipman's priority will always be academics as long as he knows that
it is his/her AQPR which, more than anything else, controls not only graduation but also
service selection. Let the role of midshipman performance be heightened through the
establishment and empowerment of an equally powerful Military Performance Board to
evaluate the fate of professionally-deficient midshipmen, and thus increase its importance in
the eyes of midshipmen. Such small steps are necessary to ensure that the USNA 's whole-
person development is sufficiently broad to prepare midshipmenfor the moral, mental, and
physical challenges they willface during their naval careers.
2. Organizational View
This research has a great deal ofvalue to the United States Navy, and perhaps to its
sister services as well, as it strives to develop smarter practices in the recruitment, selection,
training, development, and retention of our career officer corps. While the empirical results
in this study cannot be generalized beyond the sub-set of officers in the Navy's major URL
communities from the USNA, obvious trends may be applicable. Improved practices are
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especially vital today in an era of increasing operational requirements and ever-decreasing
budgets.
Ideally, stressing the whole-person philosophy across all commissioning sources will
help the Navy pick its future leaders. The Navy can not afford to pass up less-technically
inclined or less-scholastically gifted high school students who possess the very
attributes of leadership, initiative, cooperation, motivation, and perseverance which
increase their likelihood of developing into successful career officers.
In order to execute the "Whole-Person" philosophy effectively, the other
commissioning sources and services should follow the USNA's lead in the creation of a
"Whole-Person multiple." But as seen in this thesis, in order to achieve a worthwhile return
on the Navy's extensive training and educational investments, such a multiple should be
weighted towards those areas which increase an individual's long-term officer potential.
These selection tools must be validated not only with pre-commissioning data such as
graduation, but also with actual post-commissioning data such as retention and promotion.
A longer-term approach to officer selection and development is clearly needed. The
Navy may not earn an adequate return on its $200,000 USNA investment or $100,000
NROTC scholarship by selecting and graduating students who will serve the Navy for their
minimum service requirement and then separate. As life-cycle management is emphasized
in defense weapon system acquisition management, so should management for the long-
haul be the aim of the Navy and its sister services in the selection and training of the
professional officer corps.
185
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
By limiting this study to USNA graduates in the URL, less than one third of the
Navy's 1980 to 1985 URL officer cohort was examined. Attempts should be made to obtain
comparable selection and college background data from the Navy's ROTC programs to
further the officer career development research effort.
Despite the wealth of data available in the new USNA database constructed for this
study, inherent data restrictions ought to be explored and potentially included in the database.
First, in the analysis ofUSNA graduation, distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary
resignations from the USNA was not possible with this cohort, and may provide further
insight into theUSNA matriculation process. Second, post-commissioning data was limited
to USNA graduates in the major URL communities—only 2/3 ofthe total graduates from the
USNA Classes of 1980 through 1985 and just over 4/5 of the graduates commissioned as
Ensigns in the U.S. Navy. While URL officers remain the focus of the USNA's output, a
total of956 Navy officers are lost between graduation due to their selection into the non-URL
communities or leaving the Navy in the first four years of commissioned service. Accounting
for these officers and including them in the database may increase this study's applicability to
all USNA graduates.
A potential limitation ofthis study is its assumption that officers who stay to the ten-
year point and are selected for promotion to LCDR are in fact "careerists." The potential
certainly exists for both voluntary and involuntary separation from the officer corps between
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the ten-year and twenty-year points. Additionally, an individual's propensity to stay is
probably not necessarily influenced by the same factors that influence his promotability.
Therefore, additional research with this data set is recommended to further study the
retention and promotion decisions.
Continued research with this data set may also present the USNA and the Navy with
more concrete policy recommendations. For example, the use of optimization software to
develop a linear programming model of retention by years of service from the individual
admissions predictors may yield a more valuable long-term Candidate Multiple, and may help
the Navy to optimize its training investments.
Finally, this data set presents several other research opportunities for labor economics
or sociology researchers wishing to study military officers. Future studies might concentrate
solely on demographics, solely on selectivity, or solely on athletics, as more recent cohorts
of USNA graduates may present alternative explanatory data such as socioeconomic
background and physical aptitude. Alternative officer performance metrics could be utilized.
In addition, the data could be used to analyze later points in an officer's career. This study
has shown us what factors are significant at the ten-year point of an officer's career, but
perhaps an estimation of similar models may present dramatically different findings at the
Commander, Captain, and Flag level. For example, varsity letter-winners or brigade leaders,
statistically insignificant in this study, may not stand out significantly from their peers until the
0-6 career stage. Conversely perhaps significant factors in this study such as USNA military
performance may be of little value in the selection ofFlag officers. This study only begins to
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realize the value of the USNA database and the potential of such long-term career analyses
to positively influence the shape of the Navy's professional officer corps.
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APPENDIX A. USNA PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The following is a description of the year-by-year breakdown of the USNA's
professional development program, designed to develop midshipmen "morally, mentally, and
physically for careers in the Naval Service." Sources for this summary include USNA
Catalogs (1980, 1996), Reef Points (1987), the USNA and Majors Program (1980-1985)
matrix, and curriculum information obtained via the Internet at the USNA Homepage.
A. FOURTH CLASS (OR PLEBE) YEAR
The Fourth Class year is divided into Plebe Summer and an equally demanding
academic year. The intense seven-week plebe summer, with its frantic, exhaustive pace, is
designed to quickly bridge the gap between civilian life (or previous military service) and life
as a midshipman. The plebe indoctrination program, lead by firstTclass midshipmen and
brigade officers, has a three-fold process: to instill discipline, to develop leadership qualities,
and to introduce plebes to the nautical and military aspects of a career in the Naval service.
Plebes begin each day before dawn and end their days long after sunset with no free
time in between—thereby learning self-discipline, time and personal management, physical
conditioning, and the ability to think clearly under stress. During this summer, plebes are
trained in infantry drill, sailing, small arms marksmanship, signaling, basic seamanship,
integrity and the Honor Concept, rote memorization ofnaval traditions and rates, and physical
conditioning.
The plebe academic year includes further military training by upperclass midshipmen
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with an emphasis on rote memorization ofNavy ships and aircraft, allied capabilities, and joint
missions, in addition to a demanding academic workload which includes the following
professional courses and training:
• Three professional classes: Naval science (including at-sea labs on Yard Patrol
craft and Combat Information Center (CIC) and Bridge simulators), fundamentals
of leadership, and naval history;
• 3 weekly hours of infantry drill, including Brigade ofMidshipmen dress parades;
• Physical Education - 4 graded semester (non-credit) hours of swimming, weight
training, and lifetime fitness, in addition to mandatory varsity or intramural
athletics and semi-annual fitness tests (1.5-mile run, obstacle course, and applied
strength tests).
B. THIRD-CLASS (OR YOUNGSTER) YEAR
Following the rigors of plebe year, newly "striped" third-class midshipmen will
conduct Atlantic training patrols in Yard Patrol craft or sail up and down the eastern seaboard
on training sloops. These "Youngster Cruises" are conducted with classmates under the
supervision of officers from the Division of Professional Development, and are designed to
give midshipmen hands-on ship handling and practical leadership experience. Additionally,
youngsters spend three weeks ofNaval Tactical Training, which includes indoctrination with
the Marine Corps in Quantico, VA, land navigation, and SEAL training, as well as orientation
training in the joint arena ofthe Pentagon, Army, and Air Force, and Coast Guard.
Third-class academic year includes the following professional courses and training:
• Three required classes, including navigation and piloting, naval engineering, and
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ethics and moral reasoning. This final class includes formal ethics and theory
lecture by philosophers, small group discussion facilitated by senior officers, and
weekly case analyses involving real military scenarios;
• 3 weekly hours of infantry drill, including Brigade ofMidshipmen dress parades;
• Physical Education - 4 graded semester (non-credit) hours of swimming and
lifesaving, boxing, and wrestling, in addition to mandatory varsity or intramural
athletics and semi- annual fitness tests (1.5-mile run, obstacle course, and applied
strength tests).
C. SECOND-CLASS YEAR
Midshipmen spend the summer before second-class year experiencing every major
branch ofthe Navy. This includes aviation and flight training at Pensacola, nuclear-powered
submarine training offthe coast ofFlorida, and additional Marine Corps training in Quantico.
Additionally, midshipmen report for four weeks of duty onboard Navy ships or submarines -
their first fleet experience. Midshipmen take part in exercises, stand watches, and receive
indoctrination in the actual shipboard life of the Operations, Engineering, and Weapons
departments, working with a senior enlisted (E-6 to E-8) running mate. The experience is
designed to give midshipmen first-hand knowledge ofthe Navy at-sea and an appreciation for
the talents, responsibilities, and perspectives of the enlisted men and women whom they will
lead in the future.
The second class academic year is generally acknowledged as the most demanding
year, in terms of academics, individual training of fourth-class midshipmen, and their own
professional training. The year includes the following professional training:
• Five required classes: naval strategy and tactics, an advanced naval engineering
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course, naval electricity and electronics, naval weapons systems, and a leadership
course emphasizing management techniques, problem-solving, decision making,
and subordinate development. This is accomplished with both theory and practice,
often involving midshipmen and company NCO's in role-playing exercises in an
effort to prepare them for situations they might face as junior officers;
3 weekly hours of infantry drill, including Brigade ofMidshipmen dress parades;
Physical Education - 4 graded semester (non-credit) hours of swimming and
lifesaving, and judo, in addition to mandatory varsity or intramural athletics and
semi-annual fitness tests (1.5-mile run, obstacle course, and applied strength tests).
D. FIRST-CLASS YEAR
First-class summer offers midshipmen the opportunity to put leadership skills to the
test, both in the fleet and at the Academy with the new Plebes. Midshipmen spend up to eight
weeks with an operational Navy or Marine Corps unit, and assume the duties of a junior
officer. Depending upon their career interests, they select from surface warships, submarine,
aircraft carriers or squadrons, or an intense "Bulldog" officer candidate course and follow-on
tour attached to a Marine Corps unit. Additional opportunities include various internships
and plebe indoctrination.
After assuming leadership for the brigade, the first-class midshipmen are faced with
more responsibilities, as well as privileges, as they prepare for their roles as junior officers in
the Navy or Marine Corps. Additional first-class military training includes the following:
• Three required classes, including a advanced weapons course exploring warfare
systems design, a law course covering military justice and the law of war, and a
junior officer practicum designed and tailored to serve as a capstone course for the
warfare specialty selected;
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• 3 weekly hours of infantry drill, including Brigade ofMidshipmen dress parades;
• Physical Education - 4 graded semester (non-credit) hours of swimming and
lifesaving, hand-to-hand combat and an elective recreational sport, in addition to
mandatory varsity or intramural athletics and semi-annual fitness tests (1.5-mile
run, obstacle course, and applied strength tests).
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APPENDIX B. CHARACTERISTICS OF USNA GRADUATES












GRAD (n) 6017 4095 956 918 48
MINI .115 .107 .061 .147 .208
FEMALE1 .061 .017 .268 .041 .021
GRADAGE 22.48 22.44 22.58 22.59 22.25
MILFAM .196 .205 .177 .168 .417
RECRUIT .250 .238 .274 .285 .125
PRIORNOM .046 .136 .042 .088
CIVPREP .203 .207 .195 .191 .250
MILPREP .201 .183 .211 .271 .208
CM 63439.5 63663.2 63518.9 62373.9 63057.5
SATMHI 666.2 672.0 659.1 648.1 664.4
SATVHI 577.0 579.3 577.3 566.4 577.0
RC 585.7 589.3 597.5 558.8 558.9
RECS 864.1 860.6 872.5 871.3 855.1
COMPECA 527.7 526.1 531.1 531.0 540.1
CIS 523.4 526.4 517.6 517.0 500.9
NUMBER1 .046 .047 .056 .029 .021
TOPHSAT .083 .090 .075 .062 .062
ATHLETE .391 .377 .400 .440 .396
EAGLE .117 .126 .086 .110 .167
LEADER .555 .540 .586 .588 .562













AQPR 2.784 2.823 2.775 2.626 2.626
MQPR 3.064 3.087 3.025 3.004 2.946
ACADQPR 2.741 2.777 2.741 2.582 2.585
PRDVQPR 2.994 3.040 2.953 2.836 2.831
PERFQPR 3.160 3.173 3.126 3.147 3.003
CONDQPR 3.758 3.761 3.757 3.750 3.718
GRI .376 .429 .277 .250 .187
GRn .434 .406 .475 .501 .646
GRm .190 .164 .245 .250 .167
STRIPER .106 .108 .086 .119 .062
TRIDENT .005 .005 .006 .003
NLETTER .142 .134 .183 .140 .062
HONORG .101 .113 .092 .062 .042
CLASS80 .155 .155 .142 .170 .155
CLASS81 .160 .174 .140 .125 .160
CLASS82 .174 .179 .166 .145 .396
CLASS83 .177 .171 .190 .193 .125
CLASS84 .164 .156 .179 .180 .229
CLASS85 .171 .165 .182 .187 .167
Notes: (1) Please refer to Figure 2 in the text for a full explanation ofthe categories.
(2) "Other Navy Grads" includes both non-URL officers and URL officers separated
from the Navy in the first 4 years of service.
(3) "Other Grads" includes graduates commissioned in the USAF or USA, and any
graduates not commissioned for medical or other reasons.
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APPENDIX C. CHARACTERISTICS OF URL OFFICERS









GRAD (n) 4095 1466 2042 164 423
MINI .107 .086 .106 .128 .116
FEMALE1 .017 .016 .268 .067 .021
GRADAGE 22.44 22.54 22.58 22.40 22.25
MELFAM .205 .245 .177 .262 .417
RECRUIT .238 .243 .274 .177 .125
PRIORNOM .038 .041 .032 .037 .057
CIVPREP .207 .220 .199 .232 .187
MILPREP .183 .191 .170 .201 .215
CM 63663.2 63596.5 63696.7 64169.8 63537.8
SATMHI 672.0 669.1 673.0 675.9 675.2
SATVHI 579.3 579.2 579.3 580.8 578.9
RC 589.3 584.5 592.2 607.4 584.6
RECS 860.6 861.8 860.5 864.7 855.5
COMPECA 526.1 532.8 523.6 517.8 517.6
CIS 526.4 529.1 522.3 535.6 533.8
NUMBER1 .047 .051 .048 .055 .031
TOPHSAT .090 .083 .094 .110 .088
ATHLETE .377 .394 .375 .396 .326
EAGLE .126 .156 .107 .098 .121
LEADER .540 .553 .533 .549 .520










AQPR 2.823 2.859 2.824 2.847 2.681
MQPR 3.087 3.149 3.074 3.088 2.936
ACADQPR 2.777 2.811 2.782 2.808 2.628
PRDVQPR 3.040 3.085 3.030 3.035 2.938
PERFQPR 3.173 3.284 3.146 3.182 2.910
CONDQPR 3.761 3.786 3.749 3.798 3.720
GRI .429 .444 .418 .421 .435
GRH .406 .394 .411 .451 .409
GRm .164 .162 .170 .128 .156
STRIPER .108 .138 .102 .116 .031
TRIDENT .005 .130 .003 .012
NLETTER .134 .136 .138 .146 .104
HONORG .113 .144 .103 .110 .052
CLASS80 .155 .156 .149 .226 .154
CLASS81 .174 .191 .170 .177 .130
CLASS82 .179 .195 .171 .177 .161
CLASS83 .171 .175 .164 .165 .192
CLASS84 .156 .128 .173 .122 .189
CLASS85 .165 .156 .172 .134 .175
SWO .301 .239 .324 .683 .262
NSWO .042 .036 .054 .012 .021
SUB .250 .239 .292 .104 .144
PILOT .244 .282 .214 .085 .322










SNC .542 .522 .549 .530 .579
SWC .004 .003 .005
MNC .365 .376 .364 .390 .324
MWC .090 .099 .082 .079 .097
Notes: (1) Please refer to Figure 7 in the text for a full explanation ofthe categories.
(2) "Leavers" includes all URL officers who left active duty between the 0-3
and 0-4 promotion boards.
(3) "Lateral Transfer" includes all URL officers who transferred into a non-URL
community between the 0-3 and 0-4 promotion boards.




APPENDIX D. CAREER POTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF "SWO" SUB-SAMPLE
Table D. 1 Means/Proportions for the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) Sub-Sample
Variables (n = 1408)
Variable Means Variable Means
GRAD 1.00 LEADER .537
NAVYURL 1.00 AGGMULT 984.6
MINI .157 AQPR 2.657
FEMALE1 .020 MQPR 2.956
GRADAGE 22.50 ACADQPR 2.608
MILFAM .203 PRDVQPR 2.889
RECRUIT .255 PERFQPR 3.003
PRIORNOM .045 CONDQPR 3.710
CIVPREP .197 GRI .332
MILPREP .214 GRH .447
CM 62,985.9 GRHI .205
SATMHI 661.5 STRIPER .081
SATVHI 575.7 TRIDENT .002
RC 576.7 NLETTER .122
RECS 861.3 HONORG .062
COMPECA 524.0 CLASS80 .132
CIS 523.6 CLASS81 .165
NUMBER1 .038 CLASS82 .180
TOPHSAT .075 CLASS83 .144
ATHLETE .373 CLASS84 .173
EAGLE .122 CLASS85 .206
201
Variable Means Variable Means
SWO 1.00 MNC .330
NSWO .122 MWC .071
SNC .594 STAYER .448
SWC .006 CAREER .283
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Table D.2 Estimated LOGIT P Parameter Coefficients ofExplanatory
Variables in Selectivity Models of Career Potential for SWO Sub-Sample
(Dependent Variable = CAREER)






























Concordance Ratio 0.576 0.617
-2 LOG L 20.570 44.950
Sample Size 1396 1363
Notes:
(1) SWC deleted from model due to low frequency and resulting model spec errors.
(2) *** Significant at the .01 Level (one-tailed tests)
** Significant at the .05 Level (one-tailed tests)
* Significant at the . 10 Level (one-tailed tests)
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Table D.3 Estimated LOGIT P Parameter Coefficients ofExplanatory Variables in
Human Capital Models of Career Potential for SWO Sub-Sample
(Dependent Variable = CAREER)
Model One Model Two Model Three
INTERCEPT -2.3195*** -3.2227*** -2.5818***
MINI -0.0579 -0.0648 -0.0672
FEMALE1 -0.3809 -0.4661 -0.5382
MILFAM 0.2710** 0.3181** 0.3171**
PRIORNOM -0.0986 -0.1534 -0.1511
RECRUIT 0.2154* 0.1675 0.1618
CIVPREP -0.00969 -0.0391 -0.0319
MILPREP 0.2879** 0.2304* 0.2127*
GRADAGE 0.0120 0.0145 0.0154
AGGMULT 0.000939** ~ —
AQPR ~ -0.5887*** —
MQPR ~ 1.1345*** ~
ACADQPR ~ — -0.3687*
PRDVQPR — -- 0.0194
PERFQPR ~ ~ 0.6518***
CONDQPR ~ ~ 0.0114
GRI ~ -0.0258 0.0293
GRffl ~ 0.2565* 0.2279*
STRIPER -- 0.1831 0.0912
NLETTER -- 0.0826 0.1387
CLASS81 0.2502 0.1923 0.2065
CLASS82 0.2780* 0.2142 0.2309
205
Model One Model Two Model Three
CLASS83 -0.0131 -0.1115 -0.0744
CLASS84 -0.2041 -0.3287* -0.2864
CLASS85 -0.1066 -0.2280 -0.1615
NSWO -0.0381 0.00896 0.0167
MNC 0.0320 0.0153 -0.0134
MWC 0.2127 0.1252 0.1251
Concordance Ratio 0.585 0.610 0.615
-2 LOG L 23.121 45.352 52.976
Sample Size 1383 1396 1396
Notes:
(1) SWC and TRIDENT deleted from models due to low frequencies and resulting spec
errors.
(2) *** Significant at the .01 Level (one-tailed tests)
** Significant at the .05 Level (one-tailed tests)
* Significant at the . 10 Level (one-tailed tests)
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APPENDIX E. CAREER POTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF "SUB" SUB-SAMPLE
Table E. 1 Means and Proportions for the Submarine Officer (SUB) Sub-Sample
Variables (n= 1025)
Variable Means Variable Means
GRAD 1.00 AGGMULT 1140.3
NAVYURL 1.00 AQPR 3.135
MINI .057 MQPR 3.281
GRADAGE 22.30 ACADQPR 3.102
MTLFAM .184 PRDVQPR 3.301
RECRUIT .172 PERFQPR 3.389
PRIORNOM .036 CONDQPR 3.826
CrVPREP .214 GRI .604
MILPREP .098 GRH .294
CM 65,542.7 GRHI .098
SATMHI 702.4 STRIPER .164
SATVHI 596.8 TRIDENT .015
RC 632.7 NLETTER .099
RECS 853.4 HONORG .246
COMPECA 518.8 CLASS80 .173
CIS 541.4 CLASS81 .196
NUMBER1 .086 CLASS82 .177
TOPHSAT .158 CLASS83 .204
ATHLETE .321 CLASS84 .138
EAGLE .134 CLASS85 .112
SUB 1.00 SNC .512
207
Variable Means Variable Means
LEADER .553 SWC .002
MNC .379 STAYER .419
MWC .107 CAREER .342
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Table E.2 Estimated LOGIT p Parameter Coefficients ofExplanatory
Variables in Selectivity Models of Career Potential for SUB Sub-Sample
(Dependent Variable = CAREER)




























Concordance Ratio 0.593 0.613
-2L0GL 23.071 34.502
Sample Size 1015 995
Notes:
(1) SWC deleted from models due to low frequency and resulting spec errors.
(2) *** Significant at the .01 Level (one-tailed tests)
** Significant at the .05 Level (one-tailed tests)
* Significant at the . 10 Level (one-tailed tests)
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Table E.3 Estimated LOGIT P Parameter Coefficients of Explanatory Variables in Human
Capital Models of Career Potential for SUB Sub-Sample
(Dependent Variable = CAREER)
Model One Model Two Model Three
INTERCEPT -5.2209*** -6.2078*** -6.6057***
MINI -0.3820 -0.3652 -0.3684
MILFAM 0.4942*** 0.5165*** 0.5264***
PRIORNOM 0.00572 -0.0126 0.0251
RECRUIT 0.2973** 0.3059* 0.3300**
CIVPREP -0.0135 -0.0279 -0.0334
MILPREP 0.2178 0.2275 0.2087
GRADAGE 0.0468 0.0395 0.0409
AGGMULT 0.00291*** ~ ~
AQPR — 0.2907 ~
MQPR ~ 1.0560*** ~
ACADQPR ~ — 0.2600
PRDVQPR — ~ 0.3703
PERFQPR — ~ 0.5051***
CONDQPR ~ ~ 0.2522
GRI ~ 0.1934 0.2152*
GRHI ~ -0.1058 -0.1371
STRIPER ~ -0.0690 -0.1028
NLETTER ~ -0.0304 -0.00120
CLASS81 0.1314 0.1534 0.1644
CLASS82 0.0413 0.0232 0.0506
CLASS83 0.3824** 0.3583* 0.3964**
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Model One Model Two Model Three
CLASS84 -0.2190 -0.2467 0.2258
CLASS85 -0.2193 -0.2824 -0.2373
MNC 0.0165 0.00643 0.00206
MWC -0.1076 -0.1323 -0.1351
Concordance Ratio 0.629 0.641 0.645
-2L0GL 47.130 56.059 59.405
Sample Size 1016 1017 1017
Notes:
(1) SWC and TRIDENT deleted from models due to low frequencies and resulting spec
errors.
(2) *** Significant at the .01 Level (one-tailed tests)
** Significant at the .05 Level (one-tailed tests)
* Significant at the .10 Level (one-tailed tests)
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APPENDIX F. CAREER POTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF "PILOT" SUB-SAMPLE
Table F. 1 Means and Proportions for the Pilot (PILOT) Sub-Sample
Variables (n = 1001)
Variable Means Variable Means
GRAD 1.00 LEADER .542
NAVYURL 1.00 AGGMULT 1016.7
MINI .066 AQPR 2.737
FEMALE1 .021 MQPR 3.056
GRADAGE 22.52 ACADQPR 2.685
MTLFAM .224 PRDVQPR 2.972
RECRUIT .288 PERFQPR 3.146
PRIORNOM .029 CONDQPR 3.719
CTVPREP .214 GRI .403
MILPREP .221 GRH .432
CM 62,834.9 GRHI .157
SATMHI 659.7 STRIPER .094
SATVHI 566.4 TRIDENT .002
RC 565.1 NLETTER .183
RECS 868.2 HONORG .070
COMPECA 533.9 CLASS80 .155
CIS 516.7 CLASS81 .174
NUMBER1 .029 CLASS82 .184
TOPHSAT .005 CLASS83 .161
ATHLETE .419 CLASS84 .157
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Variable Means Variable Means
EAGLE .107 CLASS85 .168
PILOT 1.00 MWC .113
SNC .497 STAYER .562
SWC .002 CAREER .415
MNC .395
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Table F.2 Estimated LOGIT p Parameter Coefficients ofExplanatory
Variables in Selectivity Models of Career Potential for PILOT Sub-Sample
(Dependent Variable = CAREER)































Concordance Ratio 0.584 0.594
-2L0GL 24.152 34.197
Sample Size 991 980
Notes:
(1) SWC deleted from model due to low frequency and resulting model spec errors.
(2) *** Significant at the .01 Level (one-tailed tests)
** Significant at the .05 Level (one-tailed tests)
* Significant at the . 10 Level (one-tailed tests)
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Table F.3 Estimated LOGIT P Parameter Coefficients of Explanatory Variables in Human
Capital Models of Career Potential for PILOT Sub-Sample
(Dependent Variable = CAREER)
Model One Model Two Model Three
INTERCEPT -3.6116** -4.0282** -3.3668**
MINI -0.2355 -0.1801 -0.2077
FEMALE1 0.1870 0.1512 0.1318
MELFAM 0.3680** 0.3664** 0.3854***
PRIORNOM -0.1059 -0.1881 -0.1679
RECRUIT -0.1797 -0.1201 -0.1159
CIVPREP 0.0703 0.0167 0.00514
MILPREP -0.1308 -0.0912 -0.0806
GRADAGE 0.0868 0.0793 0.0749
AGGMULT 0.00140*** — ~
AQPR ~ -0.1638 —
MQPR ~ 0.7761*** —
ACADQPR ~ ~ -0.2398
PRDVQPR ~ -- 0.3229
PERFQPR ~ ~ 0.5129***
CONDQPR ~ ~ -0.1730
GRI ~ 0.1525 0.1480
GRHI — 0.0841 0.0175
STRIPER ~ 0.5063** 0.4316**
NLETTER ~ -0.0970 -0.0827
CLASS81 -0.2390 -0.2494 -0.2069
CLASS82 -0.0647 -0.0934 -0.00986
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Model One Model Two Model Three
CLASS83 -0.4164** -0.4664** -0.3507*
CLASS84 -0.4707** -0.5368** -0.4376**
CLASS85 0.00956 -0.0646 0.0353
MNC 0.1229 0.1247 0.1221
MWC 0.2329 0.2406 0.2438
Concordance Ratio 0.600 0.618 0.624
-2 LOG L 30.888 47.647 52.840
Sample Size 987 991 991
Notes:
(1) SWC and TRIDENT deleted from models due to low frequencies and resulting spec
errors.
(2) *** Significant at the .01 Level (one-tailed tests)
** Significant at the .05 Level (one-tailed tests)
* Significant at the . 10 Level (one-tailed tests)
218
APPENDIX G. CAREER POTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF "NFO" SUB-SAMPLE
Table G. 1 Means and Proportions for the Naval Flight Officer (NFO)
Sub-Sample Variables (n = 661)
Variable Means Variable Means
GRAD 1.00 LEADER .518
NAVYURL 1.00 AGGMULT 1031.3
MINI .106 AQPR 2.778
FEMALE1 .030 MQPR 3.077
GRADAGE 22.40 ACADQPR 2.730
MILFAM .216 PRDVQPR 3.005
RECRUIT .217 PERFQPR 3.174
PRIORNOM .042 CONDQPR 3.760
CTVPREP .210 GRI .385
MBLPREP .193 GRH .427
CM 63,370.3 GRm .180
SATMHI 667.3 STRIPER .094
SATVHI 578.4 TRDDENT
RC 582.2 NLETTER .135
RECS 860.5 HONORG .073
COMPECA 530.2 CLASS80 .168
CIS 525.2 CLASS81 .159
NUMBER1 .036 CLASS82 .172
TOPHSAT .072 CLASS83 .190
ATHLETE .401 CLASS84 .168
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Variable Means Variable Means
EAGLE .148 CLASS85 .144
PILOT 1.00 MWC .079
SNC .540 STAYER .639
SWC .004 CAREER .448
MNC .376
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Table G.2 Estimated LOGIT P Parameter Coefficients ofExplanatory
Variables in Selectivity Models of Career Potential for NFO Sub-Sample
(Dependent Variable = CAREER)






















CLASS83 0.1864 -0 00378
221





Concordance Ratio 0.607 0.634
-2L0GL 25.780 37.889
Sample Size 655 642
Notes:
(1) SWC deleted from model due to low frequency and resulting model spec errors.
(2) *** Significant at the .01 Level (one-tailed tests)
** Significant at the .05 Level (one-tailed tests)
* Significant at the . 10 Level (one-tailed tests)
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Estimated LOGIT P Parameter Coefficients of Explanatory Variables in Human Capital
Models of Career Potential forNFO Sub-Sample
(Dependent Variable = CAREER)
Model One Model Two Model Three
INTERCEPT -10.1825*** -13.1245*** -12.7481***
MINI -0.00914 -0.00215 0.0186
FEMALE1 -0.2079 -0.5596 -0.6385
MILFAM 0.5507*** 0.4733** 0.4660**
PRIORNOM 0.0356 0.00151 -0.0754
RECRUIT 0.2011 0.1224 0.1926
CTVPREP -0.1052 -0.1014 -0.1301
MILPREP -0.2780 -0.3498* -0.3403
GRADAGE 0.3651** 0.3860** 0.3905**
AGGMULT 0.00156*** ~ ~
AQPR ~ -0.8046*** --
MQPR — 2.1627*** ~
ACADQPR ~ « -0.8988***
PRDVQPR ~ ~ 1.0056***
PERFQPR ~ ~ 0.8562***
CONDQPR ~ ~ 0.1538
GRI — -0.3241** -0.3517**
GRHI — -0.1906 -0.2536
STRIPER — -0.2309 -0.2107
NLETTER — 0.0529 0.0399
CLASS81 0.4787** 0.4013* 0.3801*
CLASS82 0.0648 -0.1156 0.0153
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Model One Model Two Model Three
CLASS83 0.1007 -0.0334 0.1686
CLASS84 -0.2718 -0.5045** -0.3933
CLASS85 -0.1104 -0.3309 -0.1696
MNC 0.1240 0.1498 0.1307
MWC 0.2835 0.2910 0.2482
Concordance Ratio 0.613 0.658 0.669
-2 LOG L 29.749 59.934 66.398
Sample Size 651 655 655
Notes:
(1) SWC and TRIDENT deleted from models due to low frequencies and resulting spec
errors.
(2) *** Significant at the .01 Level (one-tailed tests)
** Significant at the .05 Level (one-tailed tests)
* Significant at the . 10 Level (one-tailed tests)
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